RE: BHA: RE: Radical Philosophy Conference

["howard Engelskirchen" <lhengels@xxxxxxx>]

Marshall and Ruth,

I'll join and should be able to attend.  We should make sure to have a
regular presence in the future.

Howard


> [Original Message]
> From: Marshall Feldman <marsh@xxxxxxx>
> To: <bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
 > Date: 5/15/2002 10:29:13 AM
> Subject: BHA: RE: Radical Philosophy Conference
>
> Ruth,
>
> Obviously, the RPA does not deem participation a marketable commodity. So
> paying organizational dues don't count. :^)
>
> Here's the link to the conference announcement:
>
> 	http://www.uvm.edu/~radphil/rpa2002call.htm
>
> Let me know how things work out. It would be nice to have some BHA listers
> to hang with.
>
> 		Best,
>
> 		Marsh
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: owner-bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > [mailto:owner-bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]On Behalf Of Ruth Groff
> > Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2002 7:36 AM
> > To: bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Subject: BHA: Radical Philosophy Conference
> >
> >
> > Marsh,
> >
> > I am a *member* of the Radical Philosophy Association, and I
> > haven't heard a thing from them about this!  When is the
> > conference?  Can I come present too?  What are my dues going to,
> > g*dda&@#!it?
> >
> > r.
> >
> >
> > At 07:50 AM 15/05/2002 -0400, you wrote:
> > >Hi Mervyn,
> > >
> > >Thanks for the advice. Actually it's the radical philosphers'
> > conference and
> > >it's nearby at Brown. So, I just want to see how the other half lives.
> > >
> > >         Cheers,
> > >         Marsh
> > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: owner-bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > > [mailto:owner-bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]On Behalf Of Mervyn
> > > > Hartwig
> > > > Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2002 5:59 PM
> > > > To: bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > > Subject: Re: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Hi Marsh, Ruth,
> > > >
> > > > I think the crucial thing is that Papineau comes out of the
positivist
> > > > tradition (which as you know Bhaskar submits to withering
> > critique), and
> > > > is still fundamentally operating within it in many respects,
> > as are many
> > > > who call themselves 'realists' of one kind or another. Even
> > Ellis, e.g.,
> > > > in his reductionism is still operating within it.
> > Politically, too, this
> > > > kind of approach is supportive of the status quo, and the
> > 'critical' in
> > > > critical realism is just too radical for them. The whole tradition
> > > > accepts Hume on facts and values.
> > > >
> > > > >Bohr's interpretation of quantum
> > > > >mechanics and science would seem to have implications sharply at
> > > > odds with
> > > > >the answer CR offers to the question,
> > > >
> > > > [snip]
> > > >
> > > > >But why then are so many
> > > > >other issues that seem central for mainstream philosophy of
> > > > science, such as
> > > > >the problems posed by quantum theory, seemingly absent from CR?
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Chris Norris has a whole book on the quantum dispute from a CR
> > > > perspective, reviewed by Doug Porpora in JCR. Bhaskar in DPF and
> > > > elsewhere deploys a concept of 'quantised' causality, and his view
of
> > > > the radical relationality or connectivity of the world is almost
> > > > certainly strongly influenced by quantum theory.
> > > >
> > > > >I am unaware of anywhere that CR addresses the other forms
> > of explanation
> > > > >and their role in science. If Ellis is correct, then CR is at
> > > > best a partial
> > > > >account of science.
> > > >
> > > > I've cited Bhaskar's defense of functionalist explanation a number
of
> > > > times on this list, and John Mingers recently posted a bibliography
of
> > > > his CR writings on systems theory.
> > > >
> > > > As for giving a talk on CR to a conference of mainstream
philosophers,
> > > > my advice is, if you're not a professional philosopher (and I
believe
> > > > you're not), don't do it! What would be the point? Give a talk on a
CR
> > > > approach to whatever you're into (community planning, isn't it?) to
an
> > > > audience that's interested in that subject.
> > > >
> > > > Ruth writes:
> > > >
> > > > >So I think that mainstream philosophers don't know about Bhaskar
> > > > because he
> > > > >hasn't undertaken to force himself upon the discipline.
> > > >
> > > > The other side of this coin, of course, is that their minds are so
> > > > imprisoned within mainstream dogmas that 'force' is necessary.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Mervyn
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Marsh Feldman <MarshFeldman@xxxxxxx> writes
> > > > >Hi friends,
> > > > >
> > > > >I'm reading sections of _The Philosophy of Science_, ed.
> > David Papineau.
> > > > >(Oxford 1996). The back cover describes the book thus:
> > > > >
> > > > >       "This volume contains the most important contributions to
> > > > the recent
> > > > >debate
> > > > >on the philosophy of science. The
> > > > >       contributors crystallize the oft heated arguments of
> > the last two
> > > > >decades,
> > > > >assessing the skeptical attitudes within
> > > > >       philosophy of science and the counter-challenges of
> > the scientific
> > > > >realists."
> > > > >
> > > > >The cover goes on to list Papineau's credentials, among which it
> > > > lists these
> > > > >books: _For Science in the Social Sciences_ (1978), _Reality and
> > > > >Representation_ (1987), and _Philosophical Naturalism_ (1983).
> > > > >
> > > > >I am troubled by this book. Despite its topic and the
> > obvious relation
> > > > >between it and CR, it doesn't mention CR. The index has no
> > references to
> > > > >Bhaskar, and thus far I've found only one reference to
> > anything typically
> > > > >considered part of CR. (A passing reference to Harre and Madden
> > > > on p. 170,
> > > > >which the author uses as an example of one of two realist
> > approaches to
> > > > >causality. Harre and Madden represent the natural necessity
> > > > approach, while
> > > > >the other approach is Humean.) Similarly, a quick glance at key
> > > > works in CR
> > > > >(RTS, PON, Essential Readings) shows almost no overlap with the
> > > > authors in
> > > > >this anthology (one reference to Nancy Cartwright is all I found).
> > > > >
> > > > >Yet many of the issues in this book are relevant for CR.
> > Here are a few:
> > > > >
> > > > >       1. The Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics, in
> > > > particular Bohr's
> > > > >anti-realist position. Bohr's argument would seem to imply that
> > > > what happens
> > > > >and exists in closed systems is entirely of a different kind
> > that what
> > > > >happens and exists outside the lab. Bohr's interpretation of
quantum
> > > > >mechanics and science would seem to have implications sharply at
> > > > odds with
> > > > >the answer CR offers to the question, "What must the world
> > be like for
> > > > >science to be possible?" (see the essays by Fine and Musgrave).
> > > > >
> > > > >       2. Brian Ellis' distinction between causal, functional,
> > > > model-theoretic,
> > > > >and systemic explanations. CR typically focuses on causal
> > > > explanations, and
> > > > >I am unaware of anywhere that CR addresses the other forms
> > of explanation
> > > > >and their role in science. If Ellis is correct, then CR is at
> > > > best a partial
> > > > >account of science.
> > > > >
> > > > >       3. John Worrall's account of structural realism. This
> > > > seems akin to CR
> > > > >accounts, except "structure" for Worrall has to do with
> > formal properties
> > > > >(e.g., Maxwell's equations) rather than the nature (structure)
> > > > of the thing
> > > > >possessing these properties. Might it not be possible to extend
> > > > this formal
> > > > >account to what critical realists mean when they speak of
> > structure (i.e.
> > > > >necessary internal relations) without requiring an ontological
> > > > commitment to
> > > > >the stuff making up such relations?
> > > > >
> > > > >       4. The Maxwell-Bridgman criterion for physical reality,
> > > > namely that "an
> > > > >entity is physically real if it manifests itself in more than
> > > > one way." This
> > > > >resembles the CR emphasis on independent corroboration (cf.
> > RTS ch. 3).
> > > > >
> > > > >       5. Papineau's presentation of realism boiling down to two
> > > > propositions:
> > > > >the
> > > > >independence of the world (i.e. the existence of an intransitive
> > > > dimension)
> > > > >and the possibility of knowledge of the world (i.e., that
> > the transitive
> > > > >dimension is more than a social ritual). The latter seems to
> > suggest a
> > > > >question, "What must the world be like for scientific knowledge to
be
> > > > >possible?" that one would expect CR to ask.
> > > > >
> > > > >Although these issues are interesting, what concerns me is
> > the seeming
> > > > >disconnect between CR and mainstream philosophy of science. Does
> > > > anyone have
> > > > >insight into this disconnect? Why do mainstream philosophers
> > seemingly
> > > > >ignore CR? Why does CR seemingly avoid questions that seem central
to
> > > > >mainstream philosophy? (I realize CR wants to make a Copernican
> > > > revolution,
> > > > >but a major part of the agenda is resolving issues that mainstream
> > > > >philosophy cannot resolve. Surely this is true with, for
> > > > instance, Bhaskar's
> > > > >claim that CR resolves the problem of induction. But why
> > then are so many
> > > > >other issues that seem central for mainstream philosophy of
> > > > science, such as
> > > > >the problems posed by quantum theory, seemingly absent from CR?)
> > > > >
> > > > >This question is motivated by a fear of mine. About a year
> > from now I'm
> > > > >scheduled to give a talk on CR at a conference of philosophers.
> > > > I have this
> > > > >terrible fear that, after they stop their hysterical
> > laughter, they will
> > > > >tell me that most of the solutions that CR purports to give were
> > > > discussed
> > > > >long ago and discredited by mainstream philosophers. When I was
> > > > finishing my
> > > > >doctorate, I was on the job market and gave a talk at Penn,
> > > > where something
> > > > >very much akin to this scenario happened. Today, I do think
> > the people at
> > > > >Penn were wrong, but at the time I was unprepared for their
> > > > reaction to my
> > > > >talk and did not have an appropriate response. Once in a
> > > > lifetime is enough
> > > > >to go through an experience like this. Can anyone help me assuage
my
> > > > >anxiety?
> > > > >
> > > > >       Best,
> > > > >
> > > > >       Marsh Feldman
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >     --- from list bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > Mervyn Hartwig
> > > > Editor, Journal of Critical Realism (incorporating 'Alethia')
> > > > 13 Spenser Road
> > > > Herne Hill
> > > > London SE24 ONS
> > > > United Kingdom
> > > > Tel: 020 7 737 2892
> > > > Email: <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > >
> > > > Subscription forms:
> > > > http://www.criticalrealism.de




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