Re: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science

[Mervyn Hartwig <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Ronny,

I found your comments very interesting and informative.

Notwithstanding necessary qualifications, many of which you supply, it
still seems to a relative outsider (me) that philosophy of science
hasn't broken decisively with the mechanistic and physicalist
problematic of the bourgeois Enlightenment, such that a pall of
scientism and positivism (construed very broadly, e.g. as by Kolakowski)
still hangs over it.

Of course, I hope you're right. I wouldn't dispute that there's high
disputation, but I'm sceptical that there's been a fundamental shift of
outlook at the meta level. Perhaps the (Kuhnian) Copernican revolution
is under way (the owl of Minerva late as ever)?

>It seems that Bhaskar has not
>done any original work in metaphysics and philosophy of (natural) science
>since RTS. It seems that DPF is more influenced by his reading of Derrida,
>Hegel, Heidegger and other 'continental philosophers than analytic
>philosophers.

But there you go. You seem to be assuming that the analytic problematic
is the only appropriate one for the the philosophy of natural science -
and of course if this is so the dialecticisation of CR can be of no
interest for that discipline. But Bhaskar certainly intends DCR to be
applicable to the natural world (of which we are an emergent part!) and
this work (like his later stuff on the synthesis of science and
religion) imo only appears unoriginal if you are wearing analytic
blinkers. But of course for philosophers of science to get into the
later Bhaskar they would really have to take a (dialectical) non-
positivist naturalism and multidisciplinarity seriously; instead they
tend to reify the boundaries of their subject. They 'lack the time and
strength'? Let them find it, instead of just 'playing up and playing the
game' and promoting their careers...

>Bhaskar's books (even RTS but to a lesser degree) is noted
>by the absence (sic) of critical engagement with other philosophers, both
>living and non-living. Bhaskar can refute a whole position in one paragraph.
[snip]
>Most
>philosophers like books where they can learn something through particular
>arguments. With Bhaskar it is in some way opposite, you will have to accept
>the whole packet before the particular arguments make sense.

I agree about the 'whole packet'. But surely it should be 'absence of
*detailed* critical engagement'? (This would still be too strong though,
because of the book on Rorty.) At the meta level, the whole system has
developed, as *Reflections on Meta-Reality* makes clear, by immanent
critique (sic) of the various moments of the philosophical discourse
(sic) of modernity, starting with the critique of positivism and more
specifically abstract universalism in the early books.

>In any case it seems that the
>project launched in RTS (a philosophy FOR science) looks to have exploded in
>favour of a philosophy of wisdom, more in commom with Krishnamurti
>and 'eastern wisdom' than topics discussed by philosophers of science.

Aren't you reifying those boundaries and parameters again
(science/wisdom, West/East)? Bhaskar claims that the spiritual turn
precisely does *not* explode the earlier philosophy, which is
incorporated within it. I think his claim should be examined seriously
rather than dismissed in a knee-jerk way. He is imo attempting no less
and no more than the forging, at the level of philosophy, of a whole new
world view appropriate for a eudaimonian post-capitalist order. The
general conceptual schema it elaborates is still FOR science (as well as
other human ways of knowing which he has always acknowledged).

>Bhaskars position need
>to be enriched and developed by a critical engagement with contemporary
>metaphysics and philosophy of science. This is a condition of necessity for
>its survival as a tenable position today in contemporary philosophy of science.

I very much agree that this is one of the conditions. Bhaskar himself of
course is unlikely to engage at that level again, so it's over to the
next generation, to wit, yourself in particular! (Especially since you
admire his 'synoptic vision'.)

Mervyn







rsmyhre@xxxxxxxxxx writes
>Hi,
>
>Mainstream Philosophy of Science. Is there such an animal?
>
>I think this thread is highly interesting and as a wannabe philosopher of
>science I feel I have to respond.
>
>I dispute that there are any mainstream philosophy of science today. I also
>disagree with the claim that most philosophers of science is positivists. In
>the 1950s and the 1960s maybe there was such a beast as 'mainstream philosophy
>of science' but certainly not today. On the contrary, contemporary philosophy
>of science (now I am talking about specialists in philosophy of science not
>other academics) is a highly disputed terrain. I can't think of any central
>interesting topic that most philosophers of science agree on.
>
>Another question is why Bhaskar is almost unknown among professional
>philosophers. I think some have made to much about this. For two reasons.
>Firstly, RTS is certainly a original book but it is nothing of the watershed
>in philosophy of science as some on this list has made it into. An underground
>tradition of aristotelians have defended causal realism all the time, also
>during the heyday of positivism. Several philosophers, contemporary with the
>RTS, developed a realist theory of causal powers - Milton Fisk's 'Nature and
>Necessity' (1973), Sydney Shoemaker's 'Causality and Properties' (article)
>(1980), Michael Ayers' 'The Refutation of Determinism' (1968) etc. Several
>others on this list have mentioned Rom Harre & Edward Madden's 'Causal Powers'
>(1975), a work, to my mind, more impressive in some ways than RTS. Secondly,
>there have been some critical engagement with RTS among philosophers of
>science. Take Alan Chalmers book 'What is this thing Called Science?' a widely
>used introduction to philosophy of science, for instance, Chalmers discusses
>Bhaskar and defend him against the alternative realist account developed by
>Nancy Cartwright. I discovered Bhaskar through Marxism but one of my friends
>started reading Bhaskar through Chalmers.
>
>In any case we have to reflect on any other reasons why Bhaskar is not more
>widely discussed among philosophers of science. I can think of some reasons.
>
>1) As Ruth notes, to establish oneself as an important philosopher of science
>takes hard work. You will have to attend to conferences and participate in
>discussions in journals (especially such as Philosophy of Science, British
>Journal for Philosophy of Science and Synthese). It seems that Bhaskar has not
>done any original work in metaphysics and philosophy of (natural) science
>since RTS. It seems that DPF is more influenced by his reading of Derrida,
>Hegel, Heidegger and other 'continental philosophers than analytic
>philosophers. What he writes about philosophy of science in Plato Etc is
>simply a restatement of what he said in RTS and the artcles published in the
>1970s.
>
>2) Bhaskar's style. Bhaskar's books (even RTS but to a lesser degree) is noted
>by the absence (sic) of critical engagement with other philosophers, both
>living and non-living. Bhaskar can refute a whole position in one paragraph.
>This is alien to analytic philosophy, if not 'continental' philosophy. Most
>philosophers like books where they can learn something through particular
>arguments. With Bhaskar it is in some way opposite, you will have to accept
>the whole packet before the particular arguments make sense.
>
>3) Several philosophers have developed positions than transgresses Bhaskar.
>Bhaskar was undoubtably one of the first to develop a realist account of
>causal powers and something like realism about possibilities. Today several
>other positions compete, Cartwright, Salmon, Ellis, Tooley defends causal
>power realism if not full blown modal realism. I think that Bhaskars account
>in some ways are superior to those mentioned above, but Bhaskars position need
>to be enriched and developed by a critical engagement with contemporary
>metaphysics and philosophy of science. This is a condition of necessity for
>its survival as a tenable position today in contemporary philosophy of science.
>
>4) This topic has been widely discussed earlier but I have to mention it
>again. Most analytic philosophers are either reductive or non-reductive
>(emergent) physicalists. FEW and the books to be published this summer seem to
>be spiritualist or something like spititualism. Not suprisingly, most
>philosophers would be put off by this turn. In any case it seems that the
>project launched in RTS (a philosophy FOR science) looks to have exploded in
>favour of a philosophy of wisdom, more in commom with Krishnamurti
>and 'eastern wisdom' than topics discussed by philosophers of science.
>
>Maybe I have formulated myself to harsh regarding Bhaskar. But that will be a
>misunderstanding of my position. RTS, PON is to my mind great works that would
>enrich contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of science if it became more
>widely known. But that means that CR need to renew itself by engaging in
>contemporary philosophy of science.
>
>Mervyn:
>
>> I think the crucial thing is that Papineau comes out of the positivist
>> tradition (which as you know Bhaskar submits to withering critique), and
>> is still fundamentally operating within it in many respects, as are many
>> who call themselves 'realists' of one kind or another. Even Ellis, e.g.,
>> in his reductionism is still operating within it. Politically, too, this
>> kind of approach is supportive of the status quo, and the 'critical' in
>> critical realism is just too radical for them. The whole tradition
>> accepts Hume on facts and values.
>
>I think this is unfair. Ellis seems to be something like a social democrat, or
>at least a critic of neo-classical economics. Maybe he would be interested in
>Lawson's book? Bhaskar's 'withering critique of positivism' would in no way
>hurt Papineau's position. (Interestingly Papineau supervised Psillos
>dissertation at the LSE, and Psillos as Howard has mentioned is in some ways a
>critical realist). It is correct that Papineau is a naturalist and a
>reductionist but not a positivist. He defends theoretical entities. Some
>philosophers of this 'tradition' is also committed  to moral realism (Richard
>Boyd, Mario Bunge) but theirs have been a minority position. Most philosophers
>of science, I believe, don't have neither time nor strenght to develop
>systematically their views on ethics. Bhaskar's 'synoptic vision' is in such a
>perspective highly admirable.
>
>Best Regards,
>
>Ronny S. Myhre
>
>
>
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Mervyn Hartwig
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