RE: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science

[Richard Moodey <moodey001@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Marsh,

You have hit upon one of my main problems with CR ala Bhaskar.

> 2. Issues in the mainstream seem critical for CR. Take for example "truth
> realism." Papineau nicely describes realism as being based on two
> propositions: 1) The world exists independent of our knowledge, and 2) It's
> possible to have knowledge the world. "Truth realism," as I understand it,
> focuses on the second proposition and claims that most scientific knowledge
> is true in that it approximates a correct picture of the world. CR, on the
> other hand, seems to side-step the issue by using the epistemic fallacy to
> deflect much discussion about how true scientific theories are. As we all
> know, "knowledge" in the transient dimension is fallible. This claim, which
> I accept, often seems to license avoiding serious discussion of truth and
> knowledge. Yet how can CR claim to be emancipatory if we have no strong
> concept of truth (alethic truth aside, which as I understand it is truth in
> terms of the world rather than in terms of human knowledge)? On what grounds
> would we, for instance, justify any difficult political action by light of
> scientific research when CR provides no substantial grounds for believing
> what that research says to be true?

Much of the philosophical reflection I have done on social science has to
do with how we can make reasonable judgments about the truth or falsity of
assertions about social reality.  This is very much at the heart of the
work of Michael Polanyi and Bernard Lonergan, both of whom I regard as
non-Bhaskarian critical realists.  Yet they, and I, seem to have spent much
of our time and effort wallowing in the clutches of the epistemic fallacy.

Regards,

Dick





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