BHA: RE: Radical Philosophy Conference

["Marshall Feldman" <marsh@xxxxxxx>]

Ruth,

Obviously, the RPA does not deem participation a marketable commodity. So
paying organizational dues don't count. :^)

Here's the link to the conference announcement:

	http://www.uvm.edu/~radphil/rpa2002call.htm

Let me know how things work out. It would be nice to have some BHA listers
to hang with.

		Best,

		Marsh

> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:owner-bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]On Behalf Of Ruth Groff
> Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2002 7:36 AM
> To: bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: BHA: Radical Philosophy Conference
>
>
> Marsh,
>
> I am a *member* of the Radical Philosophy Association, and I
> haven't heard a thing from them about this!  When is the
> conference?  Can I come present too?  What are my dues going to,
> g*dda&@#!it?
>
> r.
>
>
> At 07:50 AM 15/05/2002 -0400, you wrote:
> >Hi Mervyn,
> >
> >Thanks for the advice. Actually it's the radical philosphers'
> conference and
> >it's nearby at Brown. So, I just want to see how the other half lives.
> >
> >         Cheers,
> >         Marsh
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: owner-bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > [mailto:owner-bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]On Behalf Of Mervyn
> > > Hartwig
> > > Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2002 5:59 PM
> > > To: bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > Subject: Re: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science
> > >
> > >
> > > Hi Marsh, Ruth,
> > >
> > > I think the crucial thing is that Papineau comes out of the positivist
> > > tradition (which as you know Bhaskar submits to withering
> critique), and
> > > is still fundamentally operating within it in many respects,
> as are many
> > > who call themselves 'realists' of one kind or another. Even
> Ellis, e.g.,
> > > in his reductionism is still operating within it.
> Politically, too, this
> > > kind of approach is supportive of the status quo, and the
> 'critical' in
> > > critical realism is just too radical for them. The whole tradition
> > > accepts Hume on facts and values.
> > >
> > > >Bohr's interpretation of quantum
> > > >mechanics and science would seem to have implications sharply at
> > > odds with
> > > >the answer CR offers to the question,
> > >
> > > [snip]
> > >
> > > >But why then are so many
> > > >other issues that seem central for mainstream philosophy of
> > > science, such as
> > > >the problems posed by quantum theory, seemingly absent from CR?
> > >
> > >
> > > Chris Norris has a whole book on the quantum dispute from a CR
> > > perspective, reviewed by Doug Porpora in JCR. Bhaskar in DPF and
> > > elsewhere deploys a concept of 'quantised' causality, and his view of
> > > the radical relationality or connectivity of the world is almost
> > > certainly strongly influenced by quantum theory.
> > >
> > > >I am unaware of anywhere that CR addresses the other forms
> of explanation
> > > >and their role in science. If Ellis is correct, then CR is at
> > > best a partial
> > > >account of science.
> > >
> > > I've cited Bhaskar's defense of functionalist explanation a number of
> > > times on this list, and John Mingers recently posted a bibliography of
> > > his CR writings on systems theory.
> > >
> > > As for giving a talk on CR to a conference of mainstream philosophers,
> > > my advice is, if you're not a professional philosopher (and I believe
> > > you're not), don't do it! What would be the point? Give a talk on a CR
> > > approach to whatever you're into (community planning, isn't it?) to an
> > > audience that's interested in that subject.
> > >
> > > Ruth writes:
> > >
> > > >So I think that mainstream philosophers don't know about Bhaskar
> > > because he
> > > >hasn't undertaken to force himself upon the discipline.
> > >
> > > The other side of this coin, of course, is that their minds are so
> > > imprisoned within mainstream dogmas that 'force' is necessary.
> > >
> > >
> > > Mervyn
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Marsh Feldman <MarshFeldman@xxxxxxx> writes
> > > >Hi friends,
> > > >
> > > >I'm reading sections of _The Philosophy of Science_, ed.
> David Papineau.
> > > >(Oxford 1996). The back cover describes the book thus:
> > > >
> > > >       "This volume contains the most important contributions to
> > > the recent
> > > >debate
> > > >on the philosophy of science. The
> > > >       contributors crystallize the oft heated arguments of
> the last two
> > > >decades,
> > > >assessing the skeptical attitudes within
> > > >       philosophy of science and the counter-challenges of
> the scientific
> > > >realists."
> > > >
> > > >The cover goes on to list Papineau's credentials, among which it
> > > lists these
> > > >books: _For Science in the Social Sciences_ (1978), _Reality and
> > > >Representation_ (1987), and _Philosophical Naturalism_ (1983).
> > > >
> > > >I am troubled by this book. Despite its topic and the
> obvious relation
> > > >between it and CR, it doesn't mention CR. The index has no
> references to
> > > >Bhaskar, and thus far I've found only one reference to
> anything typically
> > > >considered part of CR. (A passing reference to Harre and Madden
> > > on p. 170,
> > > >which the author uses as an example of one of two realist
> approaches to
> > > >causality. Harre and Madden represent the natural necessity
> > > approach, while
> > > >the other approach is Humean.) Similarly, a quick glance at key
> > > works in CR
> > > >(RTS, PON, Essential Readings) shows almost no overlap with the
> > > authors in
> > > >this anthology (one reference to Nancy Cartwright is all I found).
> > > >
> > > >Yet many of the issues in this book are relevant for CR.
> Here are a few:
> > > >
> > > >       1. The Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics, in
> > > particular Bohr's
> > > >anti-realist position. Bohr's argument would seem to imply that
> > > what happens
> > > >and exists in closed systems is entirely of a different kind
> that what
> > > >happens and exists outside the lab. Bohr's interpretation of quantum
> > > >mechanics and science would seem to have implications sharply at
> > > odds with
> > > >the answer CR offers to the question, "What must the world
> be like for
> > > >science to be possible?" (see the essays by Fine and Musgrave).
> > > >
> > > >       2. Brian Ellis' distinction between causal, functional,
> > > model-theoretic,
> > > >and systemic explanations. CR typically focuses on causal
> > > explanations, and
> > > >I am unaware of anywhere that CR addresses the other forms
> of explanation
> > > >and their role in science. If Ellis is correct, then CR is at
> > > best a partial
> > > >account of science.
> > > >
> > > >       3. John Worrall's account of structural realism. This
> > > seems akin to CR
> > > >accounts, except "structure" for Worrall has to do with
> formal properties
> > > >(e.g., Maxwell's equations) rather than the nature (structure)
> > > of the thing
> > > >possessing these properties. Might it not be possible to extend
> > > this formal
> > > >account to what critical realists mean when they speak of
> structure (i.e.
> > > >necessary internal relations) without requiring an ontological
> > > commitment to
> > > >the stuff making up such relations?
> > > >
> > > >       4. The Maxwell-Bridgman criterion for physical reality,
> > > namely that "an
> > > >entity is physically real if it manifests itself in more than
> > > one way." This
> > > >resembles the CR emphasis on independent corroboration (cf.
> RTS ch. 3).
> > > >
> > > >       5. Papineau's presentation of realism boiling down to two
> > > propositions:
> > > >the
> > > >independence of the world (i.e. the existence of an intransitive
> > > dimension)
> > > >and the possibility of knowledge of the world (i.e., that
> the transitive
> > > >dimension is more than a social ritual). The latter seems to
> suggest a
> > > >question, "What must the world be like for scientific knowledge to be
> > > >possible?" that one would expect CR to ask.
> > > >
> > > >Although these issues are interesting, what concerns me is
> the seeming
> > > >disconnect between CR and mainstream philosophy of science. Does
> > > anyone have
> > > >insight into this disconnect? Why do mainstream philosophers
> seemingly
> > > >ignore CR? Why does CR seemingly avoid questions that seem central to
> > > >mainstream philosophy? (I realize CR wants to make a Copernican
> > > revolution,
> > > >but a major part of the agenda is resolving issues that mainstream
> > > >philosophy cannot resolve. Surely this is true with, for
> > > instance, Bhaskar's
> > > >claim that CR resolves the problem of induction. But why
> then are so many
> > > >other issues that seem central for mainstream philosophy of
> > > science, such as
> > > >the problems posed by quantum theory, seemingly absent from CR?)
> > > >
> > > >This question is motivated by a fear of mine. About a year
> from now I'm
> > > >scheduled to give a talk on CR at a conference of philosophers.
> > > I have this
> > > >terrible fear that, after they stop their hysterical
> laughter, they will
> > > >tell me that most of the solutions that CR purports to give were
> > > discussed
> > > >long ago and discredited by mainstream philosophers. When I was
> > > finishing my
> > > >doctorate, I was on the job market and gave a talk at Penn,
> > > where something
> > > >very much akin to this scenario happened. Today, I do think
> the people at
> > > >Penn were wrong, but at the time I was unprepared for their
> > > reaction to my
> > > >talk and did not have an appropriate response. Once in a
> > > lifetime is enough
> > > >to go through an experience like this. Can anyone help me assuage my
> > > >anxiety?
> > > >
> > > >       Best,
> > > >
> > > >       Marsh Feldman
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >     --- from list bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
> > >
> > > --
> > > Mervyn Hartwig
> > > Editor, Journal of Critical Realism (incorporating 'Alethia')
> > > 13 Spenser Road
> > > Herne Hill
> > > London SE24 ONS
> > > United Kingdom
> > > Tel: 020 7 737 2892
> > > Email: <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > >
> > > Subscription forms:
> > > http://www.criticalrealism.demon.co.uk/iacr/membership.html
> > >
> > > There is another world, but it is in this one.
> > > Paul Eluard
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >      --- from list bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >      --- from list bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
>
>
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