Re: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science

[rsmyhre@xxxxxxxxxx]

Hi,

Mainstream Philosophy of Science. Is there such an animal?

I think this thread is highly interesting and as a wannabe philosopher of
science I feel I have to respond.

I dispute that there are any mainstream philosophy of science today. I also
disagree with the claim that most philosophers of science is positivists. In
the 1950s and the 1960s maybe there was such a beast as 'mainstream philosophy
of science' but certainly not today. On the contrary, contemporary philosophy
of science (now I am talking about specialists in philosophy of science not
other academics) is a highly disputed terrain. I can't think of any central
interesting topic that most philosophers of science agree on.

Another question is why Bhaskar is almost unknown among professional
philosophers. I think some have made to much about this. For two reasons.
Firstly, RTS is certainly a original book but it is nothing of the watershed
in philosophy of science as some on this list has made it into. An underground
tradition of aristotelians have defended causal realism all the time, also
during the heyday of positivism. Several philosophers, contemporary with the
RTS, developed a realist theory of causal powers - Milton Fisk's 'Nature and
Necessity' (1973), Sydney Shoemaker's 'Causality and Properties' (article)
(1980), Michael Ayers' 'The Refutation of Determinism' (1968) etc. Several
others on this list have mentioned Rom Harre & Edward Madden's 'Causal Powers'
(1975), a work, to my mind, more impressive in some ways than RTS. Secondly,
there have been some critical engagement with RTS among philosophers of
science. Take Alan Chalmers book 'What is this thing Called Science?' a widely
used introduction to philosophy of science, for instance, Chalmers discusses
Bhaskar and defend him against the alternative realist account developed by
Nancy Cartwright. I discovered Bhaskar through Marxism but one of my friends
started reading Bhaskar through Chalmers.

In any case we have to reflect on any other reasons why Bhaskar is not more
widely discussed among philosophers of science. I can think of some reasons.

1) As Ruth notes, to establish oneself as an important philosopher of science
takes hard work. You will have to attend to conferences and participate in
discussions in journals (especially such as Philosophy of Science, British
Journal for Philosophy of Science and Synthese). It seems that Bhaskar has not
done any original work in metaphysics and philosophy of (natural) science
since RTS. It seems that DPF is more influenced by his reading of Derrida,
Hegel, Heidegger and other 'continental philosophers than analytic
philosophers. What he writes about philosophy of science in Plato Etc is
simply a restatement of what he said in RTS and the artcles published in the
1970s.

2) Bhaskar's style. Bhaskar's books (even RTS but to a lesser degree) is noted
by the absence (sic) of critical engagement with other philosophers, both
living and non-living. Bhaskar can refute a whole position in one paragraph.
This is alien to analytic philosophy, if not 'continental' philosophy. Most
philosophers like books where they can learn something through particular
arguments. With Bhaskar it is in some way opposite, you will have to accept
the whole packet before the particular arguments make sense.

3) Several philosophers have developed positions than transgresses Bhaskar.
Bhaskar was undoubtably one of the first to develop a realist account of
causal powers and something like realism about possibilities. Today several
other positions compete, Cartwright, Salmon, Ellis, Tooley defends causal
power realism if not full blown modal realism. I think that Bhaskars account
in some ways are superior to those mentioned above, but Bhaskars position need
to be enriched and developed by a critical engagement with contemporary
metaphysics and philosophy of science. This is a condition of necessity for
its survival as a tenable position today in contemporary philosophy of science.

4) This topic has been widely discussed earlier but I have to mention it
again. Most analytic philosophers are either reductive or non-reductive
(emergent) physicalists. FEW and the books to be published this summer seem to
be spiritualist or something like spititualism. Not suprisingly, most
philosophers would be put off by this turn. In any case it seems that the
project launched in RTS (a philosophy FOR science) looks to have exploded in
favour of a philosophy of wisdom, more in commom with Krishnamurti
and 'eastern wisdom' than topics discussed by philosophers of science.

Maybe I have formulated myself to harsh regarding Bhaskar. But that will be a
misunderstanding of my position. RTS, PON is to my mind great works that would
enrich contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of science if it became more
widely known. But that means that CR need to renew itself by engaging in
contemporary philosophy of science.

Mervyn:

> I think the crucial thing is that Papineau comes out of the positivist
> tradition (which as you know Bhaskar submits to withering critique), and
> is still fundamentally operating within it in many respects, as are many
> who call themselves 'realists' of one kind or another. Even Ellis, e.g.,
> in his reductionism is still operating within it. Politically, too, this
> kind of approach is supportive of the status quo, and the 'critical' in
> critical realism is just too radical for them. The whole tradition
> accepts Hume on facts and values.

I think this is unfair. Ellis seems to be something like a social democrat, or
at least a critic of neo-classical economics. Maybe he would be interested in
Lawson's book? Bhaskar's 'withering critique of positivism' would in no way
hurt Papineau's position. (Interestingly Papineau supervised Psillos
dissertation at the LSE, and Psillos as Howard has mentioned is in some ways a
critical realist). It is correct that Papineau is a naturalist and a
reductionist but not a positivist. He defends theoretical entities. Some
philosophers of this 'tradition' is also committed  to moral realism (Richard
Boyd, Mario Bunge) but theirs have been a minority position. Most philosophers
of science, I believe, don't have neither time nor strenght to develop
systematically their views on ethics. Bhaskar's 'synoptic vision' is in such a
perspective highly admirable.

Best Regards,

Ronny S. Myhre



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