BHA: Radical Philosophy Conference

[Ruth Groff <rgroff@xxxxxxxx>]

Marsh,

I am a *member* of the Radical Philosophy Association, and I haven't heard a thing from them about this!  When is the conference?  Can I come present too?  What are my dues going to, g*dda&@#!it?

r.


At 07:50 AM 15/05/2002 -0400, you wrote:
>Hi Mervyn,
>
>Thanks for the advice. Actually it's the radical philosphers' conference and
>it's nearby at Brown. So, I just want to see how the other half lives.
>
>         Cheers,
>         Marsh
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: owner-bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > [mailto:owner-bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]On Behalf Of Mervyn
> > Hartwig
> > Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2002 5:59 PM
> > To: bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Subject: Re: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science
> >
> >
> > Hi Marsh, Ruth,
> >
> > I think the crucial thing is that Papineau comes out of the positivist
> > tradition (which as you know Bhaskar submits to withering critique), and
> > is still fundamentally operating within it in many respects, as are many
> > who call themselves 'realists' of one kind or another. Even Ellis, e.g.,
> > in his reductionism is still operating within it. Politically, too, this
> > kind of approach is supportive of the status quo, and the 'critical' in
> > critical realism is just too radical for them. The whole tradition
> > accepts Hume on facts and values.
> >
> > >Bohr's interpretation of quantum
> > >mechanics and science would seem to have implications sharply at
> > odds with
> > >the answer CR offers to the question,
> >
> > [snip]
> >
> > >But why then are so many
> > >other issues that seem central for mainstream philosophy of
> > science, such as
> > >the problems posed by quantum theory, seemingly absent from CR?
> >
> >
> > Chris Norris has a whole book on the quantum dispute from a CR
> > perspective, reviewed by Doug Porpora in JCR. Bhaskar in DPF and
> > elsewhere deploys a concept of 'quantised' causality, and his view of
> > the radical relationality or connectivity of the world is almost
> > certainly strongly influenced by quantum theory.
> >
> > >I am unaware of anywhere that CR addresses the other forms of explanation
> > >and their role in science. If Ellis is correct, then CR is at
> > best a partial
> > >account of science.
> >
> > I've cited Bhaskar's defense of functionalist explanation a number of
> > times on this list, and John Mingers recently posted a bibliography of
> > his CR writings on systems theory.
> >
> > As for giving a talk on CR to a conference of mainstream philosophers,
> > my advice is, if you're not a professional philosopher (and I believe
> > you're not), don't do it! What would be the point? Give a talk on a CR
> > approach to whatever you're into (community planning, isn't it?) to an
> > audience that's interested in that subject.
> >
> > Ruth writes:
> >
> > >So I think that mainstream philosophers don't know about Bhaskar
> > because he
> > >hasn't undertaken to force himself upon the discipline.
> >
> > The other side of this coin, of course, is that their minds are so
> > imprisoned within mainstream dogmas that 'force' is necessary.
> >
> >
> > Mervyn
> >
> >
> >
> > Marsh Feldman <MarshFeldman@xxxxxxx> writes
> > >Hi friends,
> > >
> > >I'm reading sections of _The Philosophy of Science_, ed. David Papineau.
> > >(Oxford 1996). The back cover describes the book thus:
> > >
> > >       "This volume contains the most important contributions to
> > the recent
> > >debate
> > >on the philosophy of science. The
> > >       contributors crystallize the oft heated arguments of the last two
> > >decades,
> > >assessing the skeptical attitudes within
> > >       philosophy of science and the counter-challenges of the scientific
> > >realists."
> > >
> > >The cover goes on to list Papineau's credentials, among which it
> > lists these
> > >books: _For Science in the Social Sciences_ (1978), _Reality and
> > >Representation_ (1987), and _Philosophical Naturalism_ (1983).
> > >
> > >I am troubled by this book. Despite its topic and the obvious relation
> > >between it and CR, it doesn't mention CR. The index has no references to
> > >Bhaskar, and thus far I've found only one reference to anything typically
> > >considered part of CR. (A passing reference to Harre and Madden
> > on p. 170,
> > >which the author uses as an example of one of two realist approaches to
> > >causality. Harre and Madden represent the natural necessity
> > approach, while
> > >the other approach is Humean.) Similarly, a quick glance at key
> > works in CR
> > >(RTS, PON, Essential Readings) shows almost no overlap with the
> > authors in
> > >this anthology (one reference to Nancy Cartwright is all I found).
> > >
> > >Yet many of the issues in this book are relevant for CR. Here are a few:
> > >
> > >       1. The Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics, in
> > particular Bohr's
> > >anti-realist position. Bohr's argument would seem to imply that
> > what happens
> > >and exists in closed systems is entirely of a different kind that what
> > >happens and exists outside the lab. Bohr's interpretation of quantum
> > >mechanics and science would seem to have implications sharply at
> > odds with
> > >the answer CR offers to the question, "What must the world be like for
> > >science to be possible?" (see the essays by Fine and Musgrave).
> > >
> > >       2. Brian Ellis' distinction between causal, functional,
> > model-theoretic,
> > >and systemic explanations. CR typically focuses on causal
> > explanations, and
> > >I am unaware of anywhere that CR addresses the other forms of explanation
> > >and their role in science. If Ellis is correct, then CR is at
> > best a partial
> > >account of science.
> > >
> > >       3. John Worrall's account of structural realism. This
> > seems akin to CR
> > >accounts, except "structure" for Worrall has to do with formal properties
> > >(e.g., Maxwell's equations) rather than the nature (structure)
> > of the thing
> > >possessing these properties. Might it not be possible to extend
> > this formal
> > >account to what critical realists mean when they speak of structure (i.e.
> > >necessary internal relations) without requiring an ontological
> > commitment to
> > >the stuff making up such relations?
> > >
> > >       4. The Maxwell-Bridgman criterion for physical reality,
> > namely that "an
> > >entity is physically real if it manifests itself in more than
> > one way." This
> > >resembles the CR emphasis on independent corroboration (cf. RTS ch. 3).
> > >
> > >       5. Papineau's presentation of realism boiling down to two
> > propositions:
> > >the
> > >independence of the world (i.e. the existence of an intransitive
> > dimension)
> > >and the possibility of knowledge of the world (i.e., that the transitive
> > >dimension is more than a social ritual). The latter seems to suggest a
> > >question, "What must the world be like for scientific knowledge to be
> > >possible?" that one would expect CR to ask.
> > >
> > >Although these issues are interesting, what concerns me is the seeming
> > >disconnect between CR and mainstream philosophy of science. Does
> > anyone have
> > >insight into this disconnect? Why do mainstream philosophers seemingly
> > >ignore CR? Why does CR seemingly avoid questions that seem central to
> > >mainstream philosophy? (I realize CR wants to make a Copernican
> > revolution,
> > >but a major part of the agenda is resolving issues that mainstream
> > >philosophy cannot resolve. Surely this is true with, for
> > instance, Bhaskar's
> > >claim that CR resolves the problem of induction. But why then are so many
> > >other issues that seem central for mainstream philosophy of
> > science, such as
> > >the problems posed by quantum theory, seemingly absent from CR?)
> > >
> > >This question is motivated by a fear of mine. About a year from now I'm
> > >scheduled to give a talk on CR at a conference of philosophers.
> > I have this
> > >terrible fear that, after they stop their hysterical laughter, they will
> > >tell me that most of the solutions that CR purports to give were
> > discussed
> > >long ago and discredited by mainstream philosophers. When I was
> > finishing my
> > >doctorate, I was on the job market and gave a talk at Penn,
> > where something
> > >very much akin to this scenario happened. Today, I do think the people at
> > >Penn were wrong, but at the time I was unprepared for their
> > reaction to my
> > >talk and did not have an appropriate response. Once in a
> > lifetime is enough
> > >to go through an experience like this. Can anyone help me assuage my
> > >anxiety?
> > >
> > >       Best,
> > >
> > >       Marsh Feldman
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >     --- from list bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
> >
> > --
> > Mervyn Hartwig
> > Editor, Journal of Critical Realism (incorporating 'Alethia')
> > 13 Spenser Road
> > Herne Hill
> > London SE24 ONS
> > United Kingdom
> > Tel: 020 7 737 2892
> > Email: <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >
> > Subscription forms:
> > http://www.criticalrealism.demon.co.uk/iacr/membership.html
> >
> > There is another world, but it is in this one.
> > Paul Eluard
> >
> >
> >
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> >
>
>
>
>
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