Re: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science

[Mervyn Hartwig <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Marsh, Ruth,

I think the crucial thing is that Papineau comes out of the positivist
tradition (which as you know Bhaskar submits to withering critique), and
is still fundamentally operating within it in many respects, as are many
who call themselves 'realists' of one kind or another. Even Ellis, e.g.,
in his reductionism is still operating within it. Politically, too, this
kind of approach is supportive of the status quo, and the 'critical' in
critical realism is just too radical for them. The whole tradition
accepts Hume on facts and values.

>Bohr's interpretation of quantum
>mechanics and science would seem to have implications sharply at odds with
>the answer CR offers to the question,

[snip]

>But why then are so many
>other issues that seem central for mainstream philosophy of science, such as
>the problems posed by quantum theory, seemingly absent from CR?


Chris Norris has a whole book on the quantum dispute from a CR
perspective, reviewed by Doug Porpora in JCR. Bhaskar in DPF and
elsewhere deploys a concept of 'quantised' causality, and his view of
the radical relationality or connectivity of the world is almost
certainly strongly influenced by quantum theory.

>I am unaware of anywhere that CR addresses the other forms of explanation
>and their role in science. If Ellis is correct, then CR is at best a partial
>account of science.

I've cited Bhaskar's defense of functionalist explanation a number of
times on this list, and John Mingers recently posted a bibliography of
his CR writings on systems theory.

As for giving a talk on CR to a conference of mainstream philosophers,
my advice is, if you're not a professional philosopher (and I believe
you're not), don't do it! What would be the point? Give a talk on a CR
approach to whatever you're into (community planning, isn't it?) to an
audience that's interested in that subject.

Ruth writes:

>So I think that mainstream philosophers don't know about Bhaskar because he
>hasn't undertaken to force himself upon the discipline.

The other side of this coin, of course, is that their minds are so
imprisoned within mainstream dogmas that 'force' is necessary.


Mervyn



Marsh Feldman <MarshFeldman@xxxxxxx> writes
>Hi friends,
>
>I'm reading sections of _The Philosophy of Science_, ed. David Papineau.
>(Oxford 1996). The back cover describes the book thus:
>
>       "This volume contains the most important contributions to the recent
>debate
>on the philosophy of science. The
>       contributors crystallize the oft heated arguments of the last two
>decades,
>assessing the skeptical attitudes within
>       philosophy of science and the counter-challenges of the scientific
>realists."
>
>The cover goes on to list Papineau's credentials, among which it lists these
>books: _For Science in the Social Sciences_ (1978), _Reality and
>Representation_ (1987), and _Philosophical Naturalism_ (1983).
>
>I am troubled by this book. Despite its topic and the obvious relation
>between it and CR, it doesn't mention CR. The index has no references to
>Bhaskar, and thus far I've found only one reference to anything typically
>considered part of CR. (A passing reference to Harre and Madden on p. 170,
>which the author uses as an example of one of two realist approaches to
>causality. Harre and Madden represent the natural necessity approach, while
>the other approach is Humean.) Similarly, a quick glance at key works in CR
>(RTS, PON, Essential Readings) shows almost no overlap with the authors in
>this anthology (one reference to Nancy Cartwright is all I found).
>
>Yet many of the issues in this book are relevant for CR. Here are a few:
>
>       1. The Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics, in particular Bohr's
>anti-realist position. Bohr's argument would seem to imply that what happens
>and exists in closed systems is entirely of a different kind that what
>happens and exists outside the lab. Bohr's interpretation of quantum
>mechanics and science would seem to have implications sharply at odds with
>the answer CR offers to the question, "What must the world be like for
>science to be possible?" (see the essays by Fine and Musgrave).
>
>       2. Brian Ellis' distinction between causal, functional, model-theoretic,
>and systemic explanations. CR typically focuses on causal explanations, and
>I am unaware of anywhere that CR addresses the other forms of explanation
>and their role in science. If Ellis is correct, then CR is at best a partial
>account of science.
>
>       3. John Worrall's account of structural realism. This seems akin to CR
>accounts, except "structure" for Worrall has to do with formal properties
>(e.g., Maxwell's equations) rather than the nature (structure) of the thing
>possessing these properties. Might it not be possible to extend this formal
>account to what critical realists mean when they speak of structure (i.e.
>necessary internal relations) without requiring an ontological commitment to
>the stuff making up such relations?
>
>       4. The Maxwell-Bridgman criterion for physical reality, namely that "an
>entity is physically real if it manifests itself in more than one way." This
>resembles the CR emphasis on independent corroboration (cf. RTS ch. 3).
>
>       5. Papineau's presentation of realism boiling down to two propositions:
>the
>independence of the world (i.e. the existence of an intransitive dimension)
>and the possibility of knowledge of the world (i.e., that the transitive
>dimension is more than a social ritual). The latter seems to suggest a
>question, "What must the world be like for scientific knowledge to be
>possible?" that one would expect CR to ask.
>
>Although these issues are interesting, what concerns me is the seeming
>disconnect between CR and mainstream philosophy of science. Does anyone have
>insight into this disconnect? Why do mainstream philosophers seemingly
>ignore CR? Why does CR seemingly avoid questions that seem central to
>mainstream philosophy? (I realize CR wants to make a Copernican revolution,
>but a major part of the agenda is resolving issues that mainstream
>philosophy cannot resolve. Surely this is true with, for instance, Bhaskar's
>claim that CR resolves the problem of induction. But why then are so many
>other issues that seem central for mainstream philosophy of science, such as
>the problems posed by quantum theory, seemingly absent from CR?)
>
>This question is motivated by a fear of mine. About a year from now I'm
>scheduled to give a talk on CR at a conference of philosophers. I have this
>terrible fear that, after they stop their hysterical laughter, they will
>tell me that most of the solutions that CR purports to give were discussed
>long ago and discredited by mainstream philosophers. When I was finishing my
>doctorate, I was on the job market and gave a talk at Penn, where something
>very much akin to this scenario happened. Today, I do think the people at
>Penn were wrong, but at the time I was unprepared for their reaction to my
>talk and did not have an appropriate response. Once in a lifetime is enough
>to go through an experience like this. Can anyone help me assuage my
>anxiety?
>
>       Best,
>
>       Marsh Feldman
>
>
>
>     --- from list bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---

--
Mervyn Hartwig
Editor, Journal of Critical Realism (incorporating 'Alethia')
13 Spenser Road
Herne Hill
London SE24 ONS
United Kingdom
Tel: 020 7 737 2892
Email: <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Subscription forms:
http://www.criticalrealism.demon.co.uk/iacr/membership.html

There is another world, but it is in this one.
Paul Eluard



     --- from list bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---