BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science

["Marsh Feldman" <MarshFeldman@xxxxxxx>]

Hi friends,

I'm reading sections of _The Philosophy of Science_, ed. David Papineau.
(Oxford 1996). The back cover describes the book thus:

	"This volume contains the most important contributions to the recent debate
on the philosophy of science. The
	contributors crystallize the oft heated arguments of the last two decades,
assessing the skeptical attitudes within
	philosophy of science and the counter-challenges of the scientific
realists."

The cover goes on to list Papineau's credentials, among which it lists these
books: _For Science in the Social Sciences_ (1978), _Reality and
Representation_ (1987), and _Philosophical Naturalism_ (1983).

I am troubled by this book. Despite its topic and the obvious relation
between it and CR, it doesn't mention CR. The index has no references to
Bhaskar, and thus far I've found only one reference to anything typically
considered part of CR. (A passing reference to Harre and Madden on p. 170,
which the author uses as an example of one of two realist approaches to
causality. Harre and Madden represent the natural necessity approach, while
the other approach is Humean.) Similarly, a quick glance at key works in CR
(RTS, PON, Essential Readings) shows almost no overlap with the authors in
this anthology (one reference to Nancy Cartwright is all I found).

Yet many of the issues in this book are relevant for CR. Here are a few:

	1. The Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics, in particular Bohr's
anti-realist position. Bohr's argument would seem to imply that what happens
and exists in closed systems is entirely of a different kind that what
happens and exists outside the lab. Bohr's interpretation of quantum
mechanics and science would seem to have implications sharply at odds with
the answer CR offers to the question, "What must the world be like for
science to be possible?" (see the essays by Fine and Musgrave).

	2. Brian Ellis' distinction between causal, functional, model-theoretic,
and systemic explanations. CR typically focuses on causal explanations, and
I am unaware of anywhere that CR addresses the other forms of explanation
and their role in science. If Ellis is correct, then CR is at best a partial
account of science.

	3. John Worrall's account of structural realism. This seems akin to CR
accounts, except "structure" for Worrall has to do with formal properties
(e.g., Maxwell's equations) rather than the nature (structure) of the thing
possessing these properties. Might it not be possible to extend this formal
account to what critical realists mean when they speak of structure (i.e.
necessary internal relations) without requiring an ontological commitment to
the stuff making up such relations?

	4. The Maxwell-Bridgman criterion for physical reality, namely that "an
entity is physically real if it manifests itself in more than one way." This
resembles the CR emphasis on independent corroboration (cf. RTS ch. 3).

	5. Papineau's presentation of realism boiling down to two propositions: the
independence of the world (i.e. the existence of an intransitive dimension)
and the possibility of knowledge of the world (i.e., that the transitive
dimension is more than a social ritual). The latter seems to suggest a
question, "What must the world be like for scientific knowledge to be
possible?" that one would expect CR to ask.

Although these issues are interesting, what concerns me is the seeming
disconnect between CR and mainstream philosophy of science. Does anyone have
insight into this disconnect? Why do mainstream philosophers seemingly
ignore CR? Why does CR seemingly avoid questions that seem central to
mainstream philosophy? (I realize CR wants to make a Copernican revolution,
but a major part of the agenda is resolving issues that mainstream
philosophy cannot resolve. Surely this is true with, for instance, Bhaskar's
claim that CR resolves the problem of induction. But why then are so many
other issues that seem central for mainstream philosophy of science, such as
the problems posed by quantum theory, seemingly absent from CR?)

This question is motivated by a fear of mine. About a year from now I'm
scheduled to give a talk on CR at a conference of philosophers. I have this
terrible fear that, after they stop their hysterical laughter, they will
tell me that most of the solutions that CR purports to give were discussed
long ago and discredited by mainstream philosophers. When I was finishing my
doctorate, I was on the job market and gave a talk at Penn, where something
very much akin to this scenario happened. Today, I do think the people at
Penn were wrong, but at the time I was unprepared for their reaction to my
talk and did not have an appropriate response. Once in a lifetime is enough
to go through an experience like this. Can anyone help me assuage my
anxiety?

	Best,

	Marsh Feldman



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