Re: BHA: what is the role of philosophy?

[Mervyn Hartwig <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Phil, Dick, Ruth,

>As far as spirit is concerned, I think that it exists but am not sure where
>to put it, if you see what I mean,

Bhaskar (that alleged 'subjective idealist') currently seems to be
saying what you yourself seem to be groping towards here - that mind is
enfolded in matter and vice versa within a stratified and differentiated
cosmos monistically conceived. The difference is a) that you say this is
a (metaphysically) materialist position, whereas he says more plausibly
that it is neither to accept nor reject materialism; and b) he says
metaphysical materialism is a rather undeveloped concept, which you deny
in theory but affirm in practice via the delightful forthrightness of
the above. (Try putting it in a box with a hefty lock on it?)

>Hegel is supplying us (humanity)
>with a categorial system which is powerfully reflective of the real
>constitution of the universe, in the sense that it enables us - for the
>first time in history - to be conscious of our place in the universe.

This sounds exactly like Bhaskar's 'categorial realism'. So why is
Bhaskar a subjective idealist and Hegel - not an objective idealist -
but a materialist? In reality Hegel is by common consent an objective
idealist, and Bhaskar imo is a metaphysical realist (full stop - neither
materialist nor idealist, whether objective or subjective).

Mervyn



Phil Walden <phil@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes
>Hi Dick,
>
>Some sort of response interspersed with our text:
>>
>>
>> >According to Hegel, the role of philosophy is to develop
>> knowledge towards
>> >the Absolute.  The concept comes to know itself as the Absolute
>> Idea.  (And
>> >before Dick tells me that "only people can come to know
>> themselves" I will
>> >appeal to the dialectics of nature - something which had the stamp of
>> >approval of not only Hegel but also Marx and Engels).  Thus the point of
>> >philosophy is to facilitate the coming-to-know itself of the Absolute
>> >through the exercise of reason.  Nothing is unknowable - there
>> are none of
>> >Kant's things-in-themselves - since the mere positing of a thing's
>> >unknowability means that it exists and is therefore knowable.
>> Scepticism is
>> >thus refuted by reason.
>>
>> For me, an essential attribute of being a person is being a self-knowing
>> knower.
>
>Isn't that the same as an autonomous ego, almost Sartrean even?  Or does
>"self-knowing knower" mean something very different?
>
>  I have no problem with the notion of non-human persons (I never
>> met one I didn't like).
>
>I do not understand what a non-human person could be.  Does that make me an
>incorrigible atheist?  Anyway, any elaboration you can give of what a
>non-human person might be would be gratefully received.
>
>  For me, then, the Absolute coming to know itself
>> is a process of the Absolute becoming a person.  I like the idea that
>> philosophy, and perhaps even other forms of human inquiry, might
>> be a part
>> of this process.  Those of us who in our small ways struggle to know
>> participate in a much bigger process.
>>
>> One of my problems with Hegel is that he puts too much weight upon the
>> concept -- this shows up in your assertion: "The concept comes to know
>> itself as the Absolute Idea."   I believe that concepts result from
>> insights into experience, and that concepts must be expressed in
>> ways that
>> allow us to judge them as more-or-less true or false.   But
>> Hegel's vision
>> is grand.
>
>Dick, you say that concepts result from insights into experience.  But
>surely some contribution to our concepts is made by nature and external
>material reality.  Isn't it the attempt to establish concepts and the truth
>by trying to deny nature (matter?) that leaves us unable to judge concepts
>as true or false?
>>
>> I also wonder if all concepts come to know themselves as the Absolute
>> Idea.  Do they all converge into one AI, or can each develop into
>> a unique
>> AI.   The vision of multiple Absolute Ideas might not be
>> self-contradictory, perhaps we will just have to wait for better
>> knowledge
>> of the meaning of "absolute."
>
>Well, I hold a monist conception of the Absolute according to which there is
>one material (and dialectical) universe in which there is no fundamental
>ontological hiatus between thought and reality, i.e. they are both matter.
>As far as spirit is concerned, I think that it exists but am not sure where
>to put it, if you see what I mean, but I suspect a good answer would lie in
>a thorough reading of Hegel on the question.
>
>Regards,
>
>Phil
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Dick
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>
>
>
>     --- from list bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---

--
Mervyn Hartwig
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