RE: BHA: what is the role of philosophy?

[Richard Moodey <moodey001@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Phil,

Sorry for being so brief in my replies.  I find so often that I wait to
have time to give an extended reply to a post, then never do.

At 06:26 PM 05/06/2002 +0100, you wrote:
> Hi Dick,
>
> Some sort of response interspersed with our text:
> >
> >
> > >According to Hegel, the role of philosophy is to develop
> > knowledge towards
> > >the Absolute.  The concept comes to know itself as the Absolute
> > Idea.  (And
> > >before Dick tells me that "only people can come to know
> > themselves" I will
> > >appeal to the dialectics of nature - something which had the stamp of
> > >approval of not only Hegel but also Marx and Engels).  Thus the point of
> > >philosophy is to facilitate the coming-to-know itself of the Absolute
> > >through the exercise of reason.  Nothing is unknowable - there
> > are none of
> > >Kant's things-in-themselves - since the mere positing of a thing's
> > >unknowability means that it exists and is therefore knowable.
> > Scepticism is
> > >thus refuted by reason.
> >
> > For me, an essential attribute of being a person is being a self-knowing
> > knower.
>
> Isn't that the same as an autonomous ego, almost Sartrean even?  Or does
> "self-knowing knower" mean something very different?

It means something very different to me.  The Socratic injunction to know
thyself implies a capacity for self-knowledge which I call an essential
attribute of being a person.  But I know that I am not "autonomous," at
least in a Sartrean sense.  I am radically contingent -- I didn't choose to
be born, and I have no choice about whether or not to die.  Suicide as an
supreme act of freedom strikes me as pathetic.


>   I have no problem with the notion of non-human persons (I never
> > met one I didn't like).
>
> I do not understand what a non-human person could be.  Does that make me an
> incorrigible atheist?  Anyway, any elaboration you can give of what a
> non-human person might be would be gratefully received.

The Absolute coming to know itself is becoming a person, by my
understanding of "person."  I haven't read enough Hegel to give a concise
characterization of the Absolute.

I do not expect to have any close encounters of the third kind with
intelligent ETs, but I have no philosophical problem with admitting their
possibility.


>   For me, then, the Absolute coming to know itself
> > is a process of the Absolute becoming a person.  I like the idea that
> > philosophy, and perhaps even other forms of human inquiry, might
> > be a part
> > of this process.  Those of us who in our small ways struggle to know
> > participate in a much bigger process.
> >
> > One of my problems with Hegel is that he puts too much weight upon the
> > concept -- this shows up in your assertion: "The concept comes to know
> > itself as the Absolute Idea."   I believe that concepts result from
> > insights into experience, and that concepts must be expressed in
> > ways that
> > allow us to judge them as more-or-less true or false.   But
> > Hegel's vision
> > is grand.
>
> Dick, you say that concepts result from insights into experience.  But
> surely some contribution to our concepts is made by nature and external
> material reality.

I agree completely.

> Isn't it the attempt to establish concepts and the truth
> by trying to deny nature (matter?) that leaves us unable to judge concepts
> as true or false?

I don't deny nature or matter, and apologize for giving the impression that
I do.  I hold that we know nature through experience, insight, and
judgment.  Concepts are the expression of insights, but our insights and
concepts can be mistaking.  It is our capacity for error which makes it
necessary for us to reflect upon the truth or falsity of our propositions.

> >
> > I also wonder if all concepts come to know themselves as the Absolute
> > Idea.  Do they all converge into one AI, or can each develop into
> > a unique
> > AI.   The vision of multiple Absolute Ideas might not be
> > self-contradictory, perhaps we will just have to wait for better
> > knowledge
> > of the meaning of "absolute."
>
> Well, I hold a monist conception of the Absolute according to which there is
> one material (and dialectical) universe in which there is no fundamental
> ontological hiatus between thought and reality, i.e. they are both matter.

I believe that there is no fundamental ontological hiatus between thought
and reality -- thought is ontologically real --  or between matter and
spirit.  I suppose this sounds like a broken record, but I also think of
spirit in terms of capacity for self-knowledge.  But I have no problem with
saying that matter has the capacity for self-knowledge.   What is important
to me is affirmation of our capacity to know, and to know ourselves.  What
we call this capacity is "immaterial" to me.

> As far as spirit is concerned, I think that it exists but am not sure where
> to put it, if you see what I mean, but I suspect a good answer would lie in
> a thorough reading of Hegel on the question.

But life is short, and Hegel is long.  In my old age I have come to accept
that there are many great writers whose works I am not going to be able to
give a close reading.  My growth in knowledge of Hegelian thought is going
to have to come from people like yourself, who have given Hegel a thorough
reading.

Regards,

Dick



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