Re: BHA: causal bearers in the social world

["Andrew Brown" <Andrew@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Ruth, Howard,

I think we can look through the list archives and find volumes of
material addressing this question.

But surely, in RTS and PON, the answer is clear: social strcutures
are *material* causes.

Andy

Date sent:      	Fri, 03 May 2002 22:48:52 -0400
To:             	bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
From:           	Ruth Groff <rgroff@xxxxxxxx>
Subject:        	BHA: causal bearers in the social world
Send reply to:  	bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

> Hi Mervyn, all,
>
> Okay, this is a really basic question, but I am genuinely unsure of the answer.
>
> Mervyn, you wrote that according to Bhaskar's current thinking,
>
> >nothing whatsoever can happen except in and through
> >the activity of people. Only people and their ideas and activities are
> >the active force (efficient cause) in history.
>
> What I want to know is whether or not Bhaskar thinks or has ever thought that social structures are causal bearers.
>
> Benton early on charged Bhaskar with falling into methodological individualism ... and the charge is understandable, given certain passages in PON.  Nonetheless, given that the analogy between causal mechanisms in nature and social structures (an analo
gy that is itself unmistakably and
explicitly distinguished from a parallel analogy between causal mechanisms in nature and individuals' essences)  --  given that the analogy makes no sense if social structures are not actually things that bring about effects
> , I have so far interpreted Bhaskar as ... well ... not really meaning it, when it sounds as though he is saying that it is only individuals who are causal bearers.  Individuals are the only beare
rs of intentions, yes, but electrons aren't *intentional* actors, so not being capable of  *intenti
onal* action isn't necessarily enough to preclude structures being analogues to causal mechanisms i
n nature.
>
> I haven't been completely happy with this reading, but again, it is the only way I can figure to
make sense of the analogy between causal mechanisms in nature and social structures, upon which the
 extension of transcendental realism to social science rests.  [I appreciate that social structures
 are themselves reproduced by individuals, but, as noted above, Bhaskar is clear in PON to affirm t
wo different analogies:  natural causal power - social structure (chapter 2), natural causal power
- individual essen
> ce (chapter 3).  The former authorizes (critical) naturalism with respect to social science, the
latter authorizes it with respect to psychology.
>
> Given that I am right this moment writing a chapter in which I attribute to Bhaskar the view that
 social structures are causal mechanisms (and thus by extension causal bearers), and  argue against
 Ellis (not to mention all methodological individualists) that such a view is defensible, I am real
ly, really, REALLY keen to hear how other people read Bhaskar on this point.  Is it only individual
s who effect consequences, according to Bhaskar, or are social structures also causal bearers?
>
> [One reading, come to think of it, might be to say that it is only individuals who can effect *ch
ange*, which is a very specific kind of consequence.]
>
> Thanks all,
> Ruth
>
>
>
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