RE: BHA: causal bearers in the social world

["howard Engelskirchen" <lhengels@xxxxxxx>]

Hi Ruth!

Does  the contradiction have to be quite as stark as you put it?  Social
structures are relations.  Now in what sense are relations causal or
causally efficacious?  They are such in virtue of the things of which they
are relations.  Suppose a fire, water and buckets.  Each person can grab a
bucket and run to the fire.  Or buckets can be passed along the line.  The
causal efficacy of the water on the fire depends on the form of social
relation used.  Water is the cause that extinguishes the fire.  Bodies
moving buckets get the water to the fire.  But how those bodies are
arranged makes a causal difference.  So we can say that the social
structure in play makes a causal difference without arguing that relations
move buckets.  Bodies do.

Howard

> [Original Message]
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff@xxxxxxxx>
> To: <bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
 > Date: 5/3/2002 10:40:04 PM
> Subject: BHA: causal bearers in the social world
>
> Hi Mervyn, all,
>
> Okay, this is a really basic question, but I am genuinely unsure of the
answer.
>
> Mervyn, you wrote that according to Bhaskar's current thinking,
>
> >nothing whatsoever can happen except in and through
> >the activity of people. Only people and their ideas and activities are
> >the active force (efficient cause) in history.
>
> What I want to know is whether or not Bhaskar thinks or has ever thought
that social structures are causal bearers.
>
> Benton early on charged Bhaskar with falling into methodological
individualism ... and the charge is understandable, given certain passages
in PON.  Nonetheless, given that the analogy between causal mechanisms in
nature and social structures (an analogy that is itself unmistakably and
explicitly distinguished from a parallel analogy between causal mechanisms
in nature and individuals' essences)  --  given that the analogy makes no
sense if social structures are not actually things that bring about
effects, I have so far interpreted Bhaskar as ... well ... not really
meaning it, when it sounds as though he is saying that it is only
individuals who are causal bearers.  Individuals are the only bearers of
intentions, yes, but electrons aren't *intentional* actors, so not being
capable of  *intentional* action isn't necessarily enough to preclude
structures being analogues to causal mechanisms in nature.
>
> I haven't been completely happy with this reading, but again, it is the
only way I can figure to make sense of the analogy between causal
mechanisms in nature and social structures, upon which the extension of
transcendental realism to social science rests.  [I appreciate that social
structures are themselves reproduced by individuals, but, as noted above,
Bhaskar is clear in PON to affirm two different analogies:  natural causal
power - social structure (chapter 2), natural causal power - individual
essence (chapter 3).  The former authorizes (critical) naturalism with
respect to social science, the latter authorizes it with respect to
psychology.
>
> Given that I am right this moment writing a chapter in which I attribute
to Bhaskar the view that social structures are causal mechanisms (and thus
by extension causal bearers), and  argue against Ellis (not to mention all
methodological individualists) that such a view is defensible, I am really,
really, REALLY keen to hear how other people read Bhaskar on this point.
Is it only individuals who effect consequences, according to Bhaskar, or
are social structures also causal bearers?
>
> [One reading, come to think of it, might be to say that it is only
individuals who can effect *change*, which is a very specific kind of
consequence.]
>
> Thanks all,
> Ruth
>
>
>
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--- howard Engelskirchen
--- lhengels@xxxxxxx
---




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