Re: BHA: Emergence

["Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus@xxxxxxx>]

Hi Mervyn--

> Model A                                    Model B
>
> polity sets boundary conditns for     economy sets boundary condns for
>
> economy                               polity
>
>
> coyote genetic mechanisms ditto       wolf GMs ditto
>
> wolf GMs                              coyote GMs

Before discussing your analysis, I'd like to make sure people know that, at
least in my understanding, coy-wolves (and coy-dogs) are real creatures,
albeit not common enough or integrated enough to constitute a species.

As I see it, there are two difficulties in the analysis above.  First,
society has a sui generis structure (in particular, the unique character of
the agent/structure relationship, and the already-stratified relationship
between polity and economy), so applying it as an analogy for genetics is
apt to be misleading.  Second, regardless of the suitability (or not) of the
analogy, by making the relationship between the wolves and coyotes one of
DNA, the analysis appears (at least on the surface) to give DNA an almost
deterministic importance, flattening other aspects of canine life while also
atomizing strands of DNA, whereas I think the issue at hand is the canine
world as a totality (comprising not just DNA, but social patterns such as
running packs and other characteristic traits or tendencies) and whether
something emerges superstructurally *out/above* that world as a result of
the interbreeding.  I think most of us would agree that with the rise of the
species homo sapiens, the expansion of certain comparatively rudimentary
capacities among simians (for example, the ability to create and use
symbols) led to a number of new powers coming into the world that are
clearly -- almost prototypically -- emergent in the superstructural sense.
But does anything like this happen with the rise of coy-wolves?  Is there
anything that departs from the norms of the canine world as a whole?  So
far, I don't think there's any evidence to that effect -- and the very need
to say, "we'd have to look at the evidence" is itself evidence that
superstructural formations are a contingent rather than a necessary aspect
of emergence generally.

Meanwhile, though wolf DNA and coyote DNA are different and their
compositions affect their interaction, both still count as DNA, and their
melding counts as DNA too.  Superstructural emergence does occur if one
"down-shifts" from the perspective of the canine world as a whole to one of
its enabling structures (in other words, the "newness" exists at the level
of DNA strands and the resulting pups).  But down-shifting like this doesn't
answer the question of superstructural emergence upwards, *above* the canine
world.  In other words, when a new development emerges into the canine world
from one of its underlying levels, must something new also develop out of
it?  And by down-shifting you immediately run into a problem:

> In the case of interbreeding it would seem impossible to determine which
> is the 'base level'

Shifting this back up to the canine world as a totality, as an effect of
interbreeding does that totality become a "base level" upon which a *new*
(irreducible) power emerges, or does the emergence of coy-wolves simply
consist of a variant within the genetic and behavioral norms among canines?
If it's a question of evidence, then superstructual emergence is a
contingent, not a necessary outcome.  You seem to admit as much when you
say:

>                I expect
> much would depend on the particular case - the metaphor of
> superstructuration might prove more fruitful in some cases,
> intrastructuration in others, and both in yet others.

To return to the human example, I would argue that human society emerged
*contingently* -- that nothing in nature predetermined the emergence of
human beings or the powers they possess.  By taking emergence as *requiring*
superstructural developments, you may end up having to say that human
society was a necessary and inevitable development from quarks on up.
Arguably, the proposition "emergence necessarily involves superstructural
developments" is a sort of contradiction in terms or even a denial of
emergence, because if a result is necessary then it can't be qualitatively
new and un-inferable from the original level.  So at this point in our
discussion the very concept of emergence could be at stake.

However, I'd like to back off from that warning, because in fact there *is*
some perspective-switching going on, and possibly even a goof on my part.  A
hint to the problem is a sentence above: "when a new development emerges
into the canine world from one of its underlying levels, must something new
also emerge out of it?"  "Emerging into" comes from the perspective of the
superstructural level (a new canine-type comes into the canine world from
its underlying genetics), and "emerging out of" takes the intrastructural
view.  So speaking of intrastructural emergence may mean taking the
perspective of what is in fact, relationally speaking, a superstructure!  In
that case, it's the notion of intrastructural emergence that's a sort of
contradiction in terms.

So, having merrily pulled the rug out from under myself, I have to say,
well, maybe you're right.  This time.  Don't make a habit of it.

T.

---
Tobin Nellhaus
nellhaus@xxxxxxxx
"Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce




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