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Given that my personal integrity has
been questioned by Tobin in what quite clearly passes for, in academic
circles, as personal abuse let me directly refute the charges directed at my
way. Before you, you will see a number of quotes that serves to disprove
these pathetic charges.
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(Tobin1)...Here we get to
Marko's question about how it is that I
oppose capitalism. (To which my
answer is Yes.) But the
question that I think needs to be asked is how it
is that my efforts to
think ethically led me toward marxism, whereas other
people engage in the
same activity and conclude that capitalism is best, or
Catholicism, or
whathaveyou.
(Tobin2)...All of these claims of what I said or implied are of course
ridiculous
nonsense, purely of Marko's invention and quite the opposite of
what I
actually think.
(Marko)> although Tobin is a Marxist
(Tobin3)... I don't recall
saying that either
(Tobin4)...Apparently, Marko, you think *I* am a blank slate for whatever
absurd claims
entertain you. You say you reject the sort of social
constructivism that
imagines we create the universe out of our heads, yet
here you are, creating
a Tobin out of your head that has no connection to
reality. You're
certainly welcome on this list and you can dispute
what I say as much as you
like, but dispute what I (and other people)
actually *say*. Cut the
ventroliquist act.
I thank you for extending the welcome but I dont believe it's
sincere. I have not put words into peoples mouth, merely attempted to
take what I perceive to be the logic of an argument to what I believe are its
conclusions. This stands in contrast to your dircect personal charges. Given
that I am a newcomer I will unsubscribe from the
list.
Original Message -----
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2002 4:11
PM
Subject: Re: BHA: Emergence
Hi all--
I'm having to catch up a bit....
Mervyn
wrote:
> Re the social construction thing: Marko is a newcomer to
the list who
> was attracted to Bhaskar via Chomsky's naturalism. He
found what he took
> to be Bhaskar's and CR's social constructionism
offputting. Instead of
> pointing out the important differences between
pomo etc constructionism
> and CR's position, the response has by and
large been to assert social
> construction and attack Marko's
reductionism (which btw I have *not*
> defended). At least, that's the
way I saw it. I, frankly, am interested
> in retaining Marko's interest
in CR, and of course such an interest is
> redundant in the case of
other discussants who are veteran addicts.
If you check the path of the
discussion, you'll see that my first foray
included precisely the sort of
distinction between pomo vs CR views of
social construction that you feel
should have been offered. I think I
presented it in a clear and
unabrasive manner, without any form of attack.
Marko simply ignored it and
proceeded as though any mention of the social
aspect of scientific analysis
was tantamount to the pomo position. For your
part, instead of
discussing the distinction further, you chose not to
contest Marko's
monolithic view and instead criticised what you rather
divisively called
the "'social constructionist' camp." Not a great way to
illuminate
the differences between CR and poststructuralism, or for that
matter
maintain collegiality. If your goal is to retain Marko's interest
in
CR, then focus your attention on explaining CR (and not on distorting
my
position). (Your most recent posts have begun to do
that.)
But enough of that. As for the "slippage" between "social
production" and
"social construction," on my part at least I suppose it
comes from years of
trying to drive a wedge into poststucturalists'
thinking, i.e. use a term
that sounds familiar and try to make 'em see it
requires more than
they
thought.
>
Bhaskar is in effect prepared to concede that
> scientific knowledge is
*not* exactly produced by means of knowledge
> alone - he himself
mentions 'technical tools' in the para above. I would
> rather say that
science is a practice (which is not reducible to thought
> alone), and
that Bhaskar's Althusserian heritage is a little too much to
> the fore
here.
[snip]
> That said, I think the later Bhaskar
especially is prone to slide into
> the 'by thought alone' or 'entirely
social' formulation (see esp. FEW).
> I think this is
problematic.
Yes, I agree with these paragraphs entirely, word for
word. Please read
that three times! I myself don't go quite as
far as Bhaskar appears to in
the passage I quoted. My point was to
make it clear that RB does emphasize
the social aspect strongly, and that
it is a crucial aspect of CR's
analysis. But by no means does that
entail that social construction (or
whatever term you choose) is the whole
of CR!
> I'm not sure what the issue is here. First you concede
that
>
> >the social production of knowledge
> >is
indeed a form of "intrastructural" emergence.
>
> That means, I
take it, that we can say (roughly) that the Einsteinian
> system of
ideas in physics is (intrastructurally) emergent from the
>
Newtonian.
Not precisely, in the sense that Newtonian mechanics was not
the *sole*
basis on which Einstein's theory of relativity emerged.
Nor could it be,
since it vastly departed from Newtonian assumptions.
So ideas from outside
Newtonian mechanics were involved. More
generally, it is not uncommon for
concepts and metaphors from one field to
be applied in another. So I would
rather say that Einstein's theories
emerged within scientific discourse as a
general field (or something along
those lines), and that similar processes
happen in most other sorts of
discourse.
> Then you say that we can't have different ontological
levels among
> ideas. But the above is, precisely, an example of the
emergence of a
> different ontological level among ideas. (You speak as
if emergence and
> ontological levels are two compeletely different
things - fair enough
> insofar as one is process and the other product,
perhaps, but I don't
> see your point: an ontological level is an
emergent stratum.)
As Marsh has excellently pointed out, there are
different sorts of
emergence; and as both of us have previously stated,
there are
"intrastructural" forms of emergence as well as
"superstructural." That
means that *not* all forms of emergence
involve the formation of higher
ontological levels (though obviously some
do). In the paragraph above, you
seem to require that *all* of them
do; I think that's mistaken. Also, I
haven't exactly denied that
there could be ontological levels among theories
or philosophies, but I'm
skeptical and need to see better defense of the
proposition. I don't
think explanatory power achieves
that.
>
Further,
> the ideas of the new theory will have been assessed in regard
to their
> explanatory power, and, in science, that they have greater
explanatory
> power is a necessary condition for the new theory to
emerge.
Yes -- but that doesn't entail the existence of differing
ontological levels
among theories as theories.
> >A wrong idea
is not a different sort of entity or at a different
> >ontological
level than a correct idea: it has a different relationship to
> >its
referent
>
> Yes, but this doesn't at all argue against conceptual
emergence as
> indicated above.
Quite right, it doesn't argue
against conceptual emergence. Nor was it
meant to argue against
conceptual emergence. I was debating the idea of
ontological *levels*
among theories. As there are different sorts of
emergence, my
argument was more specific than you make it out to
be.
>
I think you're confusing two
> things, which I can best get at by
analogy with genus and species. As an
> (emergent) genus ideas are all
in the same boat ontologically, just as
> all primates are primates. But
there may be emergent levels (species)
> within the genus (chimps, homo
etc), of which the above is an example.
> Viren has I think made this
point (essentially) too.
I agree that there are emergent levels among
species, but I'm not convinced
that these are *ontological* levels.
The problem may be that the term
"ontology" is -- in some hands anyway --
ambiguous between general ontology
(i.e. Bhaskar's distinction between the
real, the actual, and the
empirical), mode of existence (such as the sui
generis complex and partial
totality we call society; or how language
exists in a manner that differs
from the way bricks exist), and the
specific composition and structure of
particular entities within some
general stratum such as living creatures. I
tend to view the last of
these as (generally speaking) intrastructually
emergent, and not the real
subject matter of ontology, which I reserve for
the first two senses
(though analysis of specific entities often informs
ontology). (I'm
not sure what the proper term is for the third sense;
ontics, maybe?)
Following the meaning of ontology I'm working with, there
is for example no
major ontological difference between a theatrical
performance of *Hamlet*
and one of *Winnie the Pooh*, since they both
consist of live actors
performing characters and actions based on a script
and doing it in front
of a live audience; but there's a major ontological
difference between
watching a performance of *Hamlet* and reading the
script. Likewise,
while there are major differences between capitalism and
feudalism in their
structure and dynamics, they are *ontologically* the same
because they both
count as social structures (involving social relations,
productive forces,
political institutions, ideologies, etc). From this
perspective,
capitalism and feudalism are emergent in an intrastructural
sense (i.e.,
within the genus "societies"), and do not establish new
ontological levels
but only occupy the ontology all societies must have.
I think this is
consistent with the account of stratification you offer from
*Explaining
Society*, and I hope it explains my arguments about the
existence of
ontological *levels* among theories. Although come to think of
it, I
do want to hedge on that, but in a specific manner. The
question
originally arose in terms of comparing specific theories -- e.g.,
Hegelian
and Kantian philosophies, as philosophies, would be at different
ontological
levels. I think that philosophies can discuss (refer to,
etc) different
ontological levels, but I remain skeptical that *as
philosophies* they exist
at different ontological levels. But so far
I've only considered the
question of levels among articulated and conscious
thought products (or
processes) such as philosophies. There are
however metaphors, images,
unacknowledged premises and other "patterning
structures" which condition
and enable the ways we organize our thoughts,
and which may or may not be
conscious; arguably, these are at a "lower"
(more fundamental) ontological
level. Thus ideas are neither
generated or combined with absolute freedom,
nor generated or combined in
some rigid deterministic way, but rather they
are "motivated" in certain
directions by these underlying structures. I'm
not entirely certain
of this argument, but I think a case can be made.
Marko
wrote:
> So according to Tobin the cognitive revolution of the past
50
> years is a fallacy. I'd like to see the evidence for this claim.
So
> if "knowledge" of human nature is a social construction, and
we
> are the objects of that knowledge, it follows that there is no
such
> thing as human nature for human nature is a social
construction.
> Thus Tobin, upon this logic, agrees that we are a blank
slate an
> assumption shared with positivism.
All of these claims
of what I said or implied are of course ridiculous
nonsense, purely of
Marko's invention and quite the opposite of what I
actually
think.
> although Tobin is a Marxist
I don't recall saying
that either. I've drawn lots from Marx, no question.
But like Marsh,
there are lots of other things in my soup as well.
Apparently, Marko, you
think *I* am a blank slate for whatever absurd claims
entertain you.
You say you reject the sort of social constructivism that
imagines we
create the universe out of our heads, yet here you are, creating
a Tobin
out of your head that has no connection to reality. You're
certainly
welcome on this list and you can dispute what I say as much as you
like,
but dispute what I (and other people) actually *say*. Cut
the
ventroliquist act.
T.
---
Tobin Nellhaus
nellhaus@xxxxxxxx
"Faith requires us to
be materialists without flinching": C.S.
Peirce
--- from list bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
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