Re: BHA: Knowledge as a social product

[Mervyn Hartwig <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Ruth, Marko

>The only thing that is frustrating is what seems to me to be your effort,
>Mervyn, to render a positivist account of knowledge consistent with critical
>realism.

Hang on. I haven't even mentioned a positivist account of knowledge. All
I've done basically is support Marko's anti-constructionism (in the
usually sense of constructionism, and I think it would be less
misleading if CR spoke of the production rather than construction of
knowledge - why this slippage, I wonder) together with the notion that
science makes genuine discoveries (which is not at all incompatible with
the production of knowledge) and his notion that there is a core
universal human nature, which is crucial to the emancipatory project,
and that we can know a good deal about it. I.e. notwithstanding any
defects in his theory of knowledge, I think Marko's had important things
to say.

Mervyn


Ruth Groff <rgroff@xxxxxxxx> writes
>Hi all,
>
>
>Mervyn, you wrote:
>
>' Scientific knowledge is socially produced knowledge *of* intransitively
>existing
>objects. Presumably that is far more acceptable to you, Marko, than just
>to say that it is a social production.
>
>
>It may be more acceptable to say it this way, but there is still the matter of
>the actual content.  There are three different points being made (of course
>related).  One has to do with the ontological status of knowledge; one has to do
>with the ontological status of the things that scientists, let's say molecular
>chemists, produce knowledge of; one is the claim that knowledge is knowledge OF
>something.
>
>
>My understanding of this debate with Marko is that we all agree that the
>properties of molecules are mind-independent.  Yes?
>We also all agree that knowledge is necessarily knowledge of something.
>The thing that there is actually disagreement about, it seems to me, is the
>ontological character of knowledge.
>
>
>Specifically, Marko contends that, as he put it, knowledge is not "produced."
>Rather (as he puts it), it is discovered.  And often by single individuals --
>who need not be thought of as being engaged in activity that is social.
>
>
>If we are to take him at his word that this is, indeed, his position, then Marko
>(along with many others in the world, it must be said) accords a very different
>ontological status to knowledge (of mind-independent objects) than do proponents
>of non-positivist accounts of knowledge, such as critical realism -- according
>to whom knowledge (including, e.g., "facts"), is taken to be a product of
>necessarily social human activity.
>
>
>[Critical realism, it is worth noting, differs from some other non-positivist
>accounts because in critical realism the view (a) that knowledge is a product is
>combined with the view (b) that certain features of the natural world are mind-
>independent, and the view (c) that competing knowledge-claims can be rationally
>assessed.  In contrast to critical realism, some non-positivist accounts of
>knowledge are coupled with ant-realism about the natural world and/or with
>relativism.]
>
>
>Personally I have no problem with Marko adhering to a positivist theory of
>knowledge.  Really.  In my first or second post I pointed to some assumptions
>connected to his position that he might want to look at if he wanted to really
>understand the critical realist critique of it.  But that's about it.  I think
>it is useful for someone who is encountering any position for the first time to
>see how the new ideas might differ from the ones that they currently hold.
>Maybe after some consideration they will adopt some of the new ideas; maybe
>instead they will only come to better understand why they hold the beliefs that
>they do hold.
>
>
>The only thing that is frustrating is what seems to me to be your effort,
>Mervyn, to render a positivist account of knowledge consistent with critical
>realism.  I'd rather say to Marko (Hi Marko) "Look, critical realism is a non-
>positivist theory of knowledge, combined with a realist ontology.  Go figure."
>So consider it said.
>
>Warmly,
>Ruth
>
>
>I have no problem with agreeig
>
>
>
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--
Mervyn Hartwig
Editor, Journal of Critical Realism (incorporating 'Alethia')
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