Re: BHA: Emergence

[Mervyn Hartwig <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Ruth, Viren, all,

Sorry about the misunderstanding, Ruth. I think I pretty much agree with
your position as you've restated it. I wonder though whether we are
*just* talking about content when we speak of conceptual emergence.
Viren in effect raises the issue of the relative autonomy of the
conceptual, which seems to me ungainsayable - while in the long run the
way the world is wins out, the long run can be pretty long... Perhaps
you take this too far though, Viren, in the notion of 'bracketing' and
when you say:

>Hence two theories may deal with identical objects, but one
>may be ontologically "deeper" than the other, because it uses concepts in
>such a way that it can explain the objects in a more complete manner.  So
>the ontological depth of a theory is measured by its explanatory power
>rather than by the ontological depth of its content (the objects to which
>it refers).

If it explains more completely, surely, on realist premises, it is going
deeper (or wider) into its object in virtue of its more adequate
concepts?

On the other hand, your qualification, 'if it is true', Ruth, and your
reference to ideology raises the fascinating issue of conceptual
emergence in the sphere of false ideas (irrealism). Here, far from
emergent theories containing concepts whose content is ontologically
more basic, they progressively lose sight of and obscure the Real (while
tacitly presupposing it), and we enter the demi-real or web of maya, or
relative autonomy with a vengeance, in which the main content of
theories are previous mystificatory belief systems....

Mervyn



viren viven murthy <vvmurthy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes
>Hi Everyone:
>
>Let me see if I grasp the terms of the below dispute.  As I understand it,
>both sides agree that beliefs have an ontological status.  The question is
>whether a cluster of beliefs, such as Marxism, may be on a different
>ontological level than another system such as Hegelianism.  It seems  that
>Bhaskar's idea of conceptual emergence presupposes that this must be the
>case.
>
>I have been trying to understand this in terms of levels within levels, so
>that our answer to the question of whether Marxism, as a theory, is on a
>different ontological level than Hegelianism may depend on the domain to
>which we refer.  If we compare them both as ideas to beer or sandwiches,
>we may say that theories are on a different ontological level than are
>material entities.  However, if we limit our gaze to theories, we can say
>that Heglianism is on a different ontological level than is Marxism.  So
>perhaps, when we talk about conceptual emergence, we bracket other aspects
>of the universe.
>
>Ruth, I think this is what you are saying, but I would add that the issue
>may also involve the relationship between ideas in addition to content and
>meaning.  Hence two theories may deal with identical objects, but one
>may be ontologically "deeper" than the other, because it uses concepts in
>such a way that it can explain the objects in a more complete manner.  So
>the ontological depth of a theory is measured by its explanatory power
>rather than by the ontological depth of its content (the objects to which
>it refers).
>
>
>Best,
>
>Viren
>
>On Mon, 25 Mar 2002, Ruth Groff wrote:
>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> I can't pursue this at length either, but I have obviously not communicated my
>position well enough.
>>
>> Mervyn wrote:
>> >Ruth writes:
>> >
>> > >I don't see how, QUA belief systems, different metaphysical positions can
>be
>> > >said to differ in ontological status.
>> >
>> >I don't see how you don't see, except on the assumption that you hold
>> >(perhaps as a result of a reification of the epistemology/ ontology
>> >distinction) that belief systems are somehow not included within
>> >ontology.
>>
>>
>> No.  It's exactly the opposite.  I said,
>>
>> >  certainly different belief systems (e.g., Kantianism, Hegelianism,
>transcendental
>> > >dialectical critical realism, etc.) may contain different claims about what
>> > >exists, and the basic properties thereof (i.e., have different ontologies).
>>
>> For example, person A might argue that the only things that can be said to
>exist are things that can be observed.  Everything else is metaphysical mumbo-
>jumbo.  Person B might respond that there exist underlying dispositional
>properties, which give rise to those things which can be observed, and that such
>properties exist even if they cannot be observed.  In this case we can certainly
>say that B's theory, if it is true (and even if it isn't, although there the
>case is a little trickier) contains concepts whose CONTENT is ontologically more
>basic than those contained in A's theory.
>>
>> I continued:
>> >It is also the case that some belief systems can be seen to presuppose
>others.
>>
>> This relationship, of "presupposing" can take a number of different forms, I
>would say.  Kant's work presupposes Hume's for example; Marx's work presupposes
>Hegel's in an entirely different way.
>>
>> But in all of this we are talking about the content, or meaning of the ideas.
>If we shift categories, and talk instead about the ontological status *of ideas
>per se*, considered as one of the kinds things that exist in the world -- along
>with beer (the existence of which I know gives a lot of you guys pleasure),
>cats, nation-states, people, etc. -- then, in my view, all of the members of the
>kind have the same existential status.  Think for a minute about books.  Most of
>us would agree that books exist, though we probably disagree about exactly what
>a book *is*, ultimately.  Whatever one's preferred account is, however, what I
>object to (by analogy) is the idea that, AS a book, any *given* book's
>ontological status depends on its content.
>>
>> This seems to me to be a category mistake.  I may be wrong about this -- and I
>may even be willing to change my mind, or modify the position (for example, I
>probably would want to make certain general ontological claims about ideas that
>are ideological in the strict sense)  -- but the judgment is not based on
>excluding beliefs from my ontology.
>>
>> Warmly,
>> Ruth
>>
>>


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