Re: BHA: Emergence

[Mervyn Hartwig <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Ruth, Viren,

I don't have time to go into this in any detail. Rightly or wrongly,
Bhaskar does seem committed to the reality of conceptual emergence and
conceptual stratification, deploying both concepts in DPF. Note 18 in
FEW, p. 35 explicitly regards conceptual stratification as included
within ontological stratification.

Viren writes:

>Hence by completely breaking with the dualistic framework, we
>>can say that Kantianism is to Hegelianism was biology is to beliefs.

The emergence of Hegelianism 'from' Kantianism would be a fairly untidy
example - Bhaskar's paradigm case seems to be that of scientific
revolutions, e.g. the emergence of Einsteinian physics from Newtonian.
This is not wholly as biology is to beliefs, rather it involves the
emergence of strata within 'beliefs' or the conceptual sphere (just as
there are emergent life-forms within the biological sphere) - the
qualitative leap is not as great. Still, it seems to meet the criteria
of emergence - the Einsteinian system has a novelty that can't be
deduced or induced from, or reduced to, the Newtonian system, and it can
react back on it. In elaborating his account of the epistemological
dialectic in science in the early pages of DPF Bhaskar explicitly draws
on the Hegelian epistemological dialectic, including the key concept of
preservative negation or sublation (the higher order system of concepts
both annuls and preserves as a 'negative presence' the lower order one,
etc.). One of the key notions seems to be that this conceptual
stratification mirrors the stratification of the world that science
investigates - Einsteinian physics doesn't so much 'supersede' the
Newtonian systm as go beyond and incorporate it because it goes deeper
into the strata of its subject matter. (This also illustrates the
presence of 'layers' of the past in the conceptual sphere.)

>The key question is then how do
>>we determine the ontological level of a particular entity or class of
>>entities?

Good question! Off the top of my head: in terms of that theory with the
greatest explanatory power in relation to the ontological depth of its
subject matter.


Ruth writes:

>I don't see how, QUA belief systems, different metaphysical positions can be
>said to differ in ontological status.

I don't see how you don't see, except on the assumption that you hold
(perhaps as a result of a reification of the epistemology/ ontology
distinction) that belief systems are somehow not included within
ontology. Or is it that you can't see how one belief system can emerge
from the other? Another example of the latter might be the emergence of
the DCR system of concepts from the CR one - neither inducible nor
deducible from CR and reacting back on it.

Mervyn



Ruth Groff <rgroff@xxxxxxxx> writes
>Hi Viren,
>
>You wrote:
>
>Now, I see that you are saying that Hegelianism is at a different ontological
>level than is
>>Kantianism.  Hence by completely breaking with the dualistic framework, we
>>can say that Kantianism is to Hegelianism was biology is to beliefs.  The
>>key here seems to be that we should not think of concepts as all on the
>>same ontological level.
>
>
>This may indeed by what Mervyn is saying, but I don't understand it.  Certainly
>different belief systems (e.g., Kantianism, Hegelianism, transcendental
>dialectical critical realism, etc.) may contain different claims about what
>exists, and the basic properties thereof (i.e., have different ontologies).  It
>is also the case that some belief systems can be seen to presuppose others.  But
>I don't see how, QUA belief systems, different metaphysical positions can be
>said to differ in ontological status.
>
>r.
>
>
>
>>This is somewhat counter-intuitive, but then my
>>intuitions are probably overly Cartesian. The key question is then how do
>>we determine the ontological level of a particular entity or class of
>>entities?
>>
>>Viren
>>
>>On Sat, 23 Mar 2002, Mervyn Hartwig wrote:
>>
>> > Hi Viren
>> >
>> > Just one comment on your post, which raises a number of important
>> > issues.
>> >
>> > >Does for example, Hegelianism emerge from Kantianism?  Of
>> > >course, here we are not dealing with ontologically different levels, but
>> > >I am not sure whether ontological difference is an essential part of
>> > >conceptual emergence, in Bhaskar's view.
>> >
>> > I think the answer to your question is Yes, but of course not just from
>> > Kantianism, and human creativity is always involved in conceptual
>> > emergence. But I don't know why you say that ontological difference
>> > isn't involved. On the Bhaskarian conception everything is real or
>> > within ontology, including conceptual emergence and stratification.
>> > Concepts are distinct from the world, but are constellationally included
>> > within it.
>> >
>> > Mervyn
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > viren viven murthy <vvmurthy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes
>> > >Hi Ruth and other friends:
>> > >
>> > >Your comments were extremely helpful.  I had clearly misunderstood
>> > >Bhaskar's concept of emergence and need to spend some time with it.  In
>> > >DPF, he succinctly defines emergence in the manner you describe:
>> > >
>> > >"A relationship between two terms such that one term diachronically or
>> > >perhaps synchronically arises out of the other, but is capable of reacting
>> > >back on the first and is in any event causally and taxonomically
>> > >irreducible to it."(397)
>> > >
>> > > I think that I was confused because in his chapter on emergence,
>> > >Bhaskar seems constantly to associate it with novelty:
>> > >
>> > >"In emergence, generally, new beings (entities, structures, totalities,
>> > >concepts) are generated out of pre-existing material from which they
>> > >could have been neither induced nor deduced."(49)
>> > >
>> > >So on this reading, to say morality is emergent is to say that it is new
>> > >with respect to the pre-existing material from which it is generated.  I
>> > >suppose, here the pre-existing material is the body.
>> > >
>> > >I had interpreted emergence in a more simplistic manner as "to come to
>> > >being through evolution."  Now I would like to inquire about the
>> > >relationship between these two conceptions of emergence or the
>> > >relationship between emergence and change. Bhaskar links the two in the
>> > >following manner:
>> > >
>> > >"Emergence entails both stratification and change.  But if, as I have
>> > >argued, all changes are spatio-temporal, and space-time is a relational
>> > >property of the meshwork of material beings, this opens up the phenomena
>> > >of emergent spatio-temporalities."(53)
>> > >
>> > >So in Bhaskar's view, time and space, which are the conditions for change,
>> > >themselves emerge from material beings.  He later goes on to note that
>> > >conceptual change exploits the past or exterior cognitive
>> > >resources.  Hence I wonder whether he would say that new ideas emerge from
>> > >old ideas and that the present emerges from the past.  Clearly the present
>> > >is causally irreducible to the past, but I wonder whether Bhaskar would
>> > >say that the present arises out of it.  If he agrees to this, the only
>> > >thing preventing us from saying that the present emerges out of the past
>> > >would be the idea of the present causally affecting the past.  More
>> > >specifically, with respect to ideas, could one morality emerge from
>> > >another.  Does for example, Hegelianism emerge from Kantianism?  Of
>> > >course, here we are not dealing with ontologically different levels, but
>> > >I am not sure whether ontological difference is an essential part of
>> > >conceptual emergence, in Bhaskar's view.
>> > >
>> > >Viren
>> > >
>> > >On Thu, 21 Mar 2002, Ruth Groff wrote:
>> > >
>> > >> Hi Viren:
>> > >>
>> > >> I only have a minute, and I'm going to HAVE to resist really getting into
>this
>> > >debate ,,, but I wanted to say that I'm not sure that we are using the term
>> > >emergence in the same way.  When I say that I think that moral beliefs,
>like
>> > >other beliefs, are "emergent," what I mean is that they are predicates of
>> > >persons and not of physiological or biological processes.  Another way to
>say it
>> > >is that beliefs only come into existence at a given ontological level; they
>> > >presuppose and are contingent upon, but are neither equivalent to nor
>reducible
>> > >to, the physiological entities upon which they supervene.  Same with
>entities
>> > >like "society" vis-a-vis individuals.  You seem to mean by the term
>something
>> > >less technical, more like "develops out of, over time," or something along
>those
>> > >lines.
>> > >>
>> > >> Not sure if this changes anything in terms of your position, but at least
>it
>> > >might clarify mine.
>> > >>
>> > >> Gotta go -- sorry not to engage more substantively with your post.  I'm
>sure
>> > >others can do it more justice anyway.
>> > >>
>> > >> Warmly,
>> > >> Ruth
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>      --- from list bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>> > >>
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >     --- from list bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>> >
>> > --
>> > Mervyn Hartwig
>> > Editor, Journal of Critical Realism (incorporating 'Alethia')
>> > 13 Spenser Road
>> > Herne Hill
>> > London SE24 ONS
>> > United Kingdom
>> > Tel: 020 7 737 2892
>> > Email: <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> >
>> > Subscription forms:
>> > http://www.criticalrealism.demon.co.uk/iacr/membership.html
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >      --- from list bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>>      --- from list bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
>
>
>     --- from list bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---

--
Mervyn Hartwig
Editor, Journal of Critical Realism (incorporating 'Alethia')
13 Spenser Road
Herne Hill
London SE24 ONS
United Kingdom
Tel: 020 7 737 2892
Email: <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Subscription forms:
http://www.criticalrealism.demon.co.uk/iacr/membership.html



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