BHA: Epistemological relativism, cont.

[Ruth Groff <rgroff@xxxxxxxx>]

Hi Marko, Marsh,

Marsh wrote:
"It seems to me that the issues you [Marko] raise have been addressed adequately by Bhaskar in two ways. First, he points out the
fallacy in confusing human knowledge with the reality outside human knowledge. This is the epistemic fallacy. Second, he distinguishes between the transitive and intransitive dimensions of science. It seems to me these two aspects of Bhaskar's theory solve the problems you discuss. If you disagree, why?"

In my previous post, I tried to articulate what I thought were your {Marko's] underlying objections.  I'm wondering, Marko, whether what I said was accurate.  Here's the bulk of the post, again:

>It sounds to me as though you are frustrated with transcendental realism because you think that the epistemological component of the position undermines the ontological component.  It sounds as though you believe that only a positivist theory of science is consistent with scientific realism, and with a realist metaphysics more generally.    It also sounds as though you believe that only a positivist account of knowledge is consistent with the belief that many of our knowledge-claims are true.  Implicit in this claim is the idea that the concept of truth is best defined in relation to a specific set of methodological norms, such that "true" actually MEANS "Arrived at via a certain methodology."

>Your position vis-a-vis Bhaskar's philosophy of social science, meanwhile, is less clear to me.  What I mean by this is that you say that you are a reductionist (and I take you at your word about this).  But you also say that you believe in the existence of social wholes, which is understandably surprising, given your claim to be a reductionist.  If you do actually believe that social wholes exist, and that they emerge from, or perhaps supervene upon, individual entities [and similarly that mental properties both exist and emerge from physiological properties], than you hold the position that Bhaskar terms "synchronic emergent powers materialism" -- which position is at odds with a reductionist programme, precisely in that it allows for the existence of said emergent properties/entities!  On the face of it, anyway, it sounds as though you find yourself pulled in both directions here.
>
>In terms of the first point, the only thing that I would say is that if you are genuinely persuaded that scientists read theories off of nature, without engaging in any significant shaping or formulating of those theories, you should at least jettison the anti-realism about causality that is traditionally at the heart of positivist accounts of science.  Anti-realism about causality is a far bigger wrench to throw in the works of scientific realism than is the idea that scientific theories are things that human beings construct, in the context of the social practice of knowledge-production.

Warmly,
Ruth



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