This is an example of the epistemic fallacy. The world's
existence does not depend on our knowledge of it. Our knowledge is
fallible and socially constructed. This does NOT necessarily imply our
knowledge is wrong. It simply (1) means that the reality of the world does
not depend on our knowledge and (2) we can always be wrong. Socially
constructed knowledge is not necessarily fiction, although it likely has
biases and blind spots. The practice of dismissing anything but a
"God's eye view of the world" as falsehood is a typical
positivist practice.
Take what you wrote above. Would you say the world according
to Newton's physics was real or not? If it was real, when Einstein came
along did it become unreal? Knowledge changes, grows, and perhaps shrinks.
This does not mean the object of knowledge does so in the same
way.
Newton's
physics was most definitely real and still is. There exists a great
falsehood in much discussion about Einstein's general theory of
relativity. Take Newtonian gravity. Newton discovered the inverse square
law and had to rely on "spooky action at a distance" to explain
Gravity. Einstein explained Gravity as the curvature of
space-time but notice that GR contains Newton as a low energy
approximation in much the same way that M-theory would contain GR as a low
energy approximation. Newton was not displaced, our "knoweledge" of
gravity became much more deeper it did not "change". To see that Newton is
"real" just ask NASA-they still use Newton. One can even derive classical
physics from Quantum Mechanics, for instance one can derive Maxwell's
equations from QM. Of course what you assert to be the epistemic fallacy
of course may be false, if one takes the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM
seriously (which a realist would not do of course). But even if we accept
the claim, which we should not, does that mean that Einstein came up with
a new theory becuase he was living in a different society from Newton?
Both Newton and Einstein used the scientific method that has nothing
to do with "geo-historical" processes. Note also that space and time are
absolute in Minkowski's 4-manifold.
The particular example
of Newton and Einstein is perhaps unfortunate since, as you say, one can
derive much of classical mechanics from QM. Nonetheless, Newton's theory
was incomplete and, insofar as it stated universal laws without
appropriate qualification for extreme cases (in terms of speed, mass, or
energy), it was wrong because the laws do not apply under such conditions.
However, this is all a diversion from the
issue.
The history of science
is replete with examples in which theories were totally discarded in favor
of new theories. Kuhn, Harre, and others have written on this.
Well-rehearsed examples include the Ptolemaic theory of planetary motion,
phlogiston, and spontaneous generation. There's also a literature
questioning the so-called scientific method. On one hand, studies of
science (including Kuhn, but particularly people like Latour) shows
convincingly that science involves a whole lot more that the scientific
method and that many important scientific discoveries do not fit the model
of the scientific method. On the other, by what virtues does the
scientific method produce legitimate knowledge rather than simply provide
a template that keeps people busy?
Nonetheless, all this
is besides the point. Even if science progressed linearly, with no
paradigm shifts or revisions, that still would not be grounds for claiming
that the reality of science's object depends in any way on the correctness
of science. You might want to look at Richard Bernstein's Beyond
Objectivism and Relativism. Although I have severe criticism of many
aspects of the book, Bernstein's discussion of the Cartesian anxiety is
right on target. By this he means that element of Western culture that
cannot accept the limits of human knowledge or its
fallibility.
To see
that epistemic relativism is false consider Mathematics. Is a mathematical
theorem socially constructed?
Mathematics is a special case in that in is not
the study of something external to itself. I believe Husserl had
a name for such sciences. Nonetheless, mathematics most certainly is
socially constructed. One has simply to look at mathematical programming
or probability to see that certain practical concerns outside mathematics
motivated its development in certain directions. Von Neumann, Nash, and
that whole group at Princeton during the forties got their "juice" from
the war effort and defense funding. Some of the most famous mathematical
problems have names that make quaint references to historically specific,
socially constructed practices ("the traveling salesman problem," game
theory, Buffon's (did I spell that right?) needle problem,
etc.).
Beyond this we can look at mathematical axioms
and their fundamental elements. Consider number theory, for
instance. It's been a long time since I studied it, so I have a hard time
recalling specific details, but it definitely builds from smaller,
discrete units to larger ones. The undefined terms and basic elements, as
well as the logical structure based on them, bear an uncanny
resemblance to the atomism and individualism so prevalent in Western,
liberal thought. In principle, there is no reason why the undefined terms
and fundamental elements of an axiomatic system could not be relations,
networks, or processes that are logically prior to individuals. Do you
suppose the fact that number theory build its logic the other way is
accidental? Do you think that all mathematical concepts can be expressed
equally and have the same meaning in all languages?
Nonetheless, this again is really not the issue
when we speak of epistemic relativism. Although I believe knowledge is
socially constructed (we haven't even begun to discuss more blatant
examples like the bias in medical research towards drugs and other
profitable cures and away from nutritional and other low-cost cures that
do not have the backing of large corporations), knowledge could be
something else and we could still face the issue of epistemic relativism.
To see this, we'd first have to define much more clearly what we mean by
social construction and then pose a situation in which social construction
is completely absent. This means we'd have to posit a situation devoid of
concepts influenced by the scientists' life history, in which gender is
irrelevant to the quality and quantity of science produced, funding
doesn't influence what's studied or how, the costs of scientific equipment
is devoid of social influence (some non-social process sets relative
prices so that the ease with which one does one kind of science versus
another does not depend on socially constructed costs), language has no
effect on what we do or can think, scientific journals and their practices
have no effect on what people study, prestige and old-boy networks play no
role in who gets appointed to what lab or who gets published, university
politics and practices have no effect on scientific development, etc.
Next, once we've distilled all social influence out of science, we would
just have to posit a single, linearly developed, asocial body of
scientific knowledge. Now, to address the issue of epistemic relativism,
we need to pose the following question. Must this body of asocial,
linearly developed knowledge be the only correct depiction of the world?
Or, is it possible that there might be another, different body of (perhaps
equally asocial, linearly developed) knowledge that is equally or more
correct? (Let's leave "correct" undefined for now.) Epistemic relativism
simply holds that knowledge is always fallible and that more than one
understanding of the world may be correct. This does not mean that ALL
such understandings are correct, only that two or more may be
correct.
BTW, how do you know that Newton and Einstein
both used the scientific method? Did you use the scientific method to test
this hypothesis? Did you consider the possibility that they also may have
used something else in addition and this, rather than the scientific
method, accounts for their accomplishments?
Human
nature is most certainly not socially constructed. Human social forms
arise as a result of our biological natures. The fact that we can form
such societies must have something to do with our biological/cognitive
makeup. This is the only way can say that human nature is space and time
invariant. Are we to suppose that human nature was different in 1965? That
human nature in China differs from human nature in the US? As for
water/steam etc, these matters can be explained from the atomic
hypothesis. It is a well known scientific fact that Chemistry reduces
to Physics, i.e. Quantum Mechanics. My bank account is real and the
US constitution etc to the extent that I make them real. They are not real
indepedent of human agency. I am most certainly "natural" and whatever I
do can ultimately be explained through naturalism.
I don't know what you mean by
human nature or, for that matter, by "human." Are you positing a
constant human nature for all humans starting 1,000,000, 100,000, 10,000,
1,000, 100, or 10 years ago? Are you assuming human nature is a
characteristic of individual humans rather than of humanity as a whole?
What specifically would count as human nature? There's so much variability
among humans and human societies that we'd have to discard most
characteristics to find that essential kernel that you're calling human
nature. Without defining this kernel more clearly it's impossible to
evaluate your claim since your claim is a mixture of examples and bold
assertions. If you're saying human nature includes such generalities as
(1) people communicate with each other, (2) they transform the material
world in order to survive, and (3) they only exist in societies, I'll
grant you there's such a thing as human nature. However, I don't think
that takes us very far. If I understand correctly what you're saying, you
believe that social things like your bank account can be explained,
ultimately, by quantum mechanics. Let's not use your bank account as an
example, since that's your private information. Let's take something
related but more public. Please outline an explanation for the "dot com"
crash, as well as the relative development of computer-related firms in
Silicon Valley versus Boston's Route 128 in terms of the quantum mechanics
that underpins biological nature?
Note
that humans are not the only organism's to have societies so if we assert
that there exists some unnatural form of existience, "social kinds", are
termite societies a part of this unnatural domain? If not, why not?
Again, there's a whole literature on
"nature" as a social construct. Of course everything in the world is part
of the world, so nothing is outside nature. The fact that people live in
societies is not "unnatural." The point is that human societies vary and
have their own histories and geographies. The point is also that human
societies have their own causal powers and dynamic properties. Capitalist
societies have business cycles, feudal societies do not. Attitudes and
behaviors regarding sex in nineteenth century South Sea Islands were
different from those in Victorian England. The largest buildings at the
centers of human settlements have been pyramids, coliseums, churches, and
World Trade Centers. If everything can be reduced to biological nature,
how would you explain such variations?
An epistemic
relativist has no justification in asserting that anything is real. He is
not therefore a realist.
Let's test this. I
believe viruses cause disease by taking over certain cellular functions,
but I recognize that this may be wrong or that another explanation may be
equally legitimate. Does this mean that viruses must not be real or that
they really do not cause disease this way? At the very least it would seem
you'd have to concede that I have the right to claim viruses may
really cause disease as described. In your opinion, what would one
need to go beyond this and assert legitimately that viruses
probably cause disease by taking over cell functions or just
that viruses cause disease by taking over cell functions? I don't see how
the truth or falsity of these assertions would be affected by me changing
my tune and saying I'm right ("I'm always right, and I never lie" --
Firesign Theater) or that only this explanation could possibly be
correct.
Marsh
Feldman