Re: BHA: negativity wins

[Mervyn Hartwig <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Ruth,

>Jeeze.  Am I really the only one who is not prepared to adopt an ontology of
>de-onts?

Cripes. Choose your own ontology? Isn't the world supposed to be the way
it is independently of the way we choose to believe it to be?

>we are being asked to grant that the category of "what exists" (or
>"ontology," as Bhaskar puts it on p. 47) includes all of the people, places,
>things, events, processes, states of affairs, etc., that don't exist and/or
>didn't take place.

This is the complete opposite of what I'm asking. Any wonders you think
it's 'nutty'! :) The sentence should read 'includes *the absence* of
states of affairs etc that *do* exist and/or *did* (in the past) or
*could* (in the future).'

>>Fourth, all causality and change involves absenting existing states of
>>affairs.
>
>Here too, the question I asked was why we SHOULD think of it in this way.
>Why not think of all causality and change as ... I don't know ... the
>exercise of a power, or the bringing about of something other than that
>which was there before?  Of course both of these alternatives could be
>translated into "absenting an existing state of affairs."  And the "existing
>state of affairs" phrase can even ITSELF be translated into "an absence" (as
>in "transformative negation = the absenting of an absence).  But I just
>don't see what weight this carries.

Here you concede the whole case, it seems to me - that causality is or
centrally involves absenting. What could carry more 'weight', at least
within a CR framework, than causality? CR's whole ontology is 'an
ontology of causal powers'. You want to wriggle out of this and say, No,
we could call it something else. Of course we could - we could call
nuclear fission something else too, but it's real processes we are
talking about.

>But my question was "Why SHOULD we think of acting in this way -- as
>"absenting" a state of affairs?"

I answered this question, and gave an example. Human agency entails
making a difference to the world, i.e. changing an existing state of
affairs, and there is no change that does not involve absenting (if you
disagree, please give an example - but it appears from the above that
you now agree).


>But I
>think that I *have* raised a number of important questions that haven't
>actually been answered yet.  E.g., "In virtue of what internal
>characteristic are de-onts causal agents?"

Clear answers have been provided, but you keep putting your own
monovalent gloss on them. To repeat, neither onts nor deonts are causal
agents in their own right, only in relation to one another. There are no
such things as purely negative or purely positive existences. The
monovalent assumption informing your questions is that there are only
positive existences and that only they are causal. IMO Bhaskar rightly
calls this a dogma.

>And,
>"If it is the case that *everything* that does not exist, did not happen,
>etc., is real -

This is the complete opposite of what is being claimed (see above).

>>... All change is absenting, not of absences but of existing states of
>affairs. Absenting absences ie constraints is specific to dialectical argument.
>
>But surely the presence of a constraint counts as a state of affairs.

Only if you will allow 'state of affairs' in the negative. See the
etymology of 'deont' as 'lack, bind, constraint' etc. Many constraints
are negative presences (on desire, on conatus or striving to be or
flourish), e.g. the mistake in an argument that prevents one from
reaching a more adequate conclusion; the absence of food that prevents
me from satisifying my hunger; the monovalent assumptions that prevent
you from understanding what I'm saying, etc. In such cases one can quite
properly say that, in abolishing the constraint, one is absenting an
absence (a negative *presence*).

>So
>what you're saying is that only those states of affairs that constitute a
>constraint are (and ought to be) properly construed as "absences."  But this
>is just nutty.

You said it, not me.


Mervyn




Ruth Groff <rgroff@xxxxxxxx> writes
>Hi Jan, Mervyn, Tobin,
>
>Thank you, you guys, for your responses.  I'm about to give up.  Sigh.  I'm
>totally unconvinced.  And I'm so frustrated that I can hardly bear it that I
>don't know how to refute a position that seems to me to be ... just... well,
>silly, frankly.
>
>Jeeze.  Am I really the only one who is not prepared to adopt an ontology of
>de-onts?
>
>O well.  Here's a few responses here and there, but, as I said, mostly I'm
>just frustrated beyond belief that I don't know how to refute this.
>
>Mervyn, you (kindly) wrote:
>>Nobody is asking you to grant the *positive* existence of de-onts - they
>>are *negative* existences. Positive existences are 'onts'. You are being
>>asked to grant the *reality* of both, to see that being is bi- or poly-
>>valent, not mono-valent.
>
>That's fine.  The language is difficult.  The point, as I understand it, is
>that we are being asked to grant that the category of "what exists" (or
>"ontology," as Bhaskar puts it on p. 47) includes all of the people, places,
>things, events, processes, states of affairs, etc., that don't exist and/or
>didn't take place.  In Bhaskar's words: "We thus have the theorem: ontology
>> ontics > de-onts." (47)  No?
>
>
>>The arguments for the reality of negative existents are set out I think
>>pretty clearly in the section of DPF we have been discussing.
>>
>>First, we can refer to them - they can be referentially detached (eg
>>Pierre's absence from the caf), which is the argument for ontology in
>>general, positive as well as negative (so if this is rejected, CR as a
>>whole must be - if ontology is not revindicated, CR is nothing.).
>>Pierre's absence cannot be rephrased in purely positive terms because
>>his presence somewhere else does not mean the same as his absence from
>>the caf, any more than your own presence in Canada means the same as
>>your absence from the room I'm sitting in.
>
>Okay, I know zilch about the philosophy of language.  The claim here is that
>anything to which we can refer must, in virtue of our being able to refer to
>it, exist -- or, if you prefer, "be real."  I want to know what other
>philosophers of language have to say about this.
>
>The second part - the part about the significance of the cafe personnel -
>has to do with a theory of meaning, I'm sure of it, but again, I don't know
>enough to comment.
>
>>Second, there could be no human agency without absence, for absence is
>>transcendentally necessary for human agency to occur - in acting we
>>absent an existing state of affairs, bringing about a state of affairs
>>that would not otherwise have obtained; ie we change the world.
>
>But my question was "Why SHOULD we think of acting in this way -- as
>"absenting" a state of affairs?"
>
>
>>Fourth, all causality and change involves absenting existing states of
>>affairs.
>
>Here too, the question I asked was why we SHOULD think of it in this way.
>Why not think of all causality and change as ... I don't know ... the
>exercise of a power, or the bringing about of something other than that
>which was there before?  Of course both of these alternatives could be
>translated into "absenting an existing state of affairs."  And the "existing
>state of affairs" phrase can even ITSELF be translated into "an absence" (as
>in "transformative negation = the absenting of an absence).  But I just
>don't see what weight this carries.
>
>>These are the arguments for the the reality of de-onts (negative
>>existences) and the necessity for a central category of absence or
>>negation. You don't 'HAVE to' accept them or anything else, but if you
>>want to discuss Bhaskar's position you do need to address them instead
>>of simply asserting that Bhaskar seems to be just redescribing, playing
>>with words etc.
>
>Well, I've admitted that I am frustrated with my shortcomings here.  But I
>think that I *have* raised a number of important questions that haven't
>actually been answered yet.  E.g., "In virtue of what internal
>characteristic are de-onts causal agents?"  And "Do *all* de-onts have
>causal effects, or just some of them?  What makes the difference?"   And,
>"If it is the case that *everything* that does not exist, did not happen,
>etc., is real - and therefore, according to Tobin, a potential causal agent,
>then what, if anything, can fail to meet the causal criterion for
>existence/reality?"
>
>>... All change is absenting, not of absences but of existing states of
>affairs. Absenting absences ie constraints is specific to dialectical argument.
>
>But surely the presence of a constraint counts as a state of affairs.  So
>what you're saying is that only those states of affairs that constitute a
>constraint are (and ought to be) properly construed as "absences."  But this
>is just nutty. I mean, patently, a constraint is not a good example of an
>absence!  Again, sure, it can be re-described that way, if for some reason
>you want to: my being held down by David when we leg wrestle is the absence
>of my not being held down when we wrestle.  But the fact that you can
>express "x" as "~(~x)" doesn't mean anything!
>
>O well.  I have to go now.  I'm really tired.  I'm still sick and I have a
>wack of exams to grade tomorrow.  I'm not actually sure about that "powerful
>particular" phrase.  I confess that I began using it recently because so
>many others were.  I figured that I had just not caught it.  Can someone
>else give a citation for it?  In the meantime, I'll look.
>
>Warmly,
>Ruth
>
>
>
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