Re: BHA: Re: causal criterion of existence

["Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus@xxxxxxx>]

Hi Ruth--

As I steal a bit more time from the index I'm supposed to be creating.....

> But a few things (at different levels of argument):  First, granting for a
> moment this INSANE position (!), shouldn't we say that the basis for
> de-onts' powers is different from that of onts' powers?  I.e., since
de-onts
> are things that don't exist, it is unlikely that the basis for their
powers
> is material.

Depends on what you mean by "material."  If you mean "physical," then you'll
have to say that social relations don't have powers or exist either.  I
suspect you don't want to go that way!  But if you mean "having material
effects," then de-onts (absences) can very much have material effects and
hence be "material."  Space (distance) in gravitational relations has a
clear material effect, for instance, even though it is not a physical
object.  (BTW, I don't think it's quite satisfactory to think of de-onts
merely as "things that don't exist," since -- at least as I see it -- they
each have a determinate or specific nature.)

>                  If everything, existent and non-existent
> alike is a powerful particular, then the term doesn't mean much, and the
> causal criterion for existence (we need a new word - this category of
> "existence" includes things that don't exist) loses its force I think.

It seems to me that it does have force: it means precisely what RB has been
arguing, namely that absences are real, and that the domain of the real
consists of both presences and absences (onts and de-onts).

> Which brings me back to my original question:  Jan's list is lovely.  But
it
> doesn't tell me WHY I should think of the absence of a thing as itself a
> thing. It still seems like so much creative re-description, rather than a
> compelling case for an ontology that includes an infinite numbers of
> non-existent "things," a substantial portion of which aren't even "things"
> in the first place, but rather states of affairs, rendered thing-like.
(Or
> "de"-thing-like.)  Again, I know that I can, but why SHOULD I think of the
> fact that David is downstairs rather than in my study as a thing, called a
> de-ont?

Well, I certainly don't recommend thinking of absences as "things"!  David's
absence from your study is *not* a thing in itself, I agree.  It may,
however, be an absence *for you* (i.e., in relation to you), in which case
it has material effects (such as, "absence makes the heart grow fonder").
It may also be an absence for David!  This is one reason I suspect that
absences are mainly relational, and maintain that they each have a specific
character.

Incidentally, David's absence from your study could simultaneously be a
presence for you, if (for example) he's busy in the kitchen making you tea
and a nice bowl of soup.

I hope you feel better quickly!  Gotta absent myself now.  Cheers, T.

---
Tobin Nellhaus
nellhaus@xxxxxxxx
"Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce




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