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Re: BHA: Re: causal criterion of existence
Hi Tobin,
Thanks for that. Really.
But, okay, so de-onts are powerful particulars. And they (all of the
infinite number of "things" that don't exist) exercise the powers that they
do in virtue of what each one is like - their individual "characters"
(mostly relational, you suggest).
But a few things (at different levels of argument): First, granting for a
moment this INSANE position (!), shouldn't we say that the basis for
de-onts' powers is different from that of onts' powers? I.e., since de-onts
are things that don't exist, it is unlikely that the basis for their powers
is material.
Second, if everything that exists AND everything that doesn't exist is a
powerful particular, then what is the status of things that are *not*
powerful particulars? Or is it that everything that exists and only some of
the things that don't exist that are powerful particulars? Either way is
potentially a problem, I think. If everything, existent and non-existent
alike is a powerful particular, then the term doesn't mean much, and the
causal criterion for existence (we need a new word - this category of
"existence" includes things that don't exist) loses its force I think. On
the other hand, if only SOME de-onts are powerful particulars, then I
suspect that the reason why they are powerful and others are not is going to
lead back to onts; it will be onts that actually determine whether a given
de-ont is or is not a powerful particular.
Which brings me back to my original question: Jan's list is lovely. But it
doesn't tell me WHY I should think of the absence of a thing as itself a
thing. It still seems like so much creative re-description, rather than a
compelling case for an ontology that includes an infinite numbers of
non-existent "things," a substantial portion of which aren't even "things"
in the first place, but rather states of affairs, rendered thing-like. (Or
"de"-thing-like.) Again, I know that I can, but why SHOULD I think of the
fact that David is downstairs rather than in my study as a thing, called a
de-ont?
Sorry if my continuing cold is making me cranky,
Ruth
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