Re: BHA: exciting threads!

[Mervyn Hartwig <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Ruth,

I suggest you consult e.g. the section called 'Theory of art and theory
of truth' in Jarvis, *Adorno*, pp.110-14, plus Chs 7 & 8).

There is IMO no way Adorno's position can be assimilated to an epistemic
theory of truth. Doug Porpora gave a very clear statement of the
difference between an 'epistemic' and an 'alethic' theory in the last
Alethia:

****
The epistemic conception of truth is the conception shared by positivism
and postmodernism. It defines truth in terms of epistemic criteria.
According to the epistemic conception, truth is what is yielded by some
idealized way of knowing. When our way of knowing approaches the ideal,
we get truth. It is easy to see the connection with positivist
foundationalism. It is easy too to see the vulnerability of the
epistemic conception of truth to postmodern doubt. If there are no
certain methodological foundations, no unimpugnible methodological
ideals, then there is no truth.

In contrast, according to the alethic conception, truth is not defined
epistemically. Rather, truth is determined by the way the world is,
however we come to know that. According to the alethic conception, a
claim or belief is true if and only if the world is as claimed or
believed. It is the world or alethic truth that makes our claims true or
false and not our way of knowing which is the case. It follows that a
claim or belief may be true without our being able to demonstrate it.
Norris refers to this as a verification-transcendent understanding of
truth. Most of us who are critical realists endorse it.
****

Adorno is clearly in the 'alethic' camp, although he doesn't use that
concept to my (not comprehensive) knowledge. Even re art, he espouses
'the priority of the object'. Like Bhaskar, he explicitly rejects
correspondence (and coherence) theories of truth, espousing a complex
'constellational' theory which seems to have affinities with Bhaskar's
dialectically interrelated 'truth tetrapolity'. And like Bhaskar, as
*Finale* makes clear, he adopts 'the standpoint of redemption' - in
Jarvis' words 'truth is conditional upon a reconciled ... society; and
upon a reconciliation between subject and object [culture and nature] -
which is by no means to say their undifferentiated unity.'

With the exception of those parts of *FEW* which countenance the
attainment of absolute undifferentiated unity in moments of
'transcendental indentity consciousness', this fits Bhaskar to a tee.
This is not to say that there are not important differences, especially
centering on ontology, and perhaps a greater pessimism on Adorno's part.
But when Adorno speaks of the necessary conditionality of thought this
is surely encapsulated in Bhaskar's notions of epistemic relativism and
corrigibility and his anti-foundationalism - except for *FEW* where he
does speak, not of an epistemological vantage point but (in effect) an
ontological one, which makes knowledge of the abolute possible. I think
this latter notion is dubious, but don't think there is any *necessary*
connection between it and the alethic theory of truth articulated in
DPF, ie espousal of the latter doesn't entail commitment to the former
(though doubtless there is a developmental logic that can be followed in
that direction.)


Mervyn





Ruth Groff <rgroff@xxxxxxxx> writes
>Hey guys,
>
>I really want to get into the ontological stratification discussion, but
>can't do it today.  So don't all go away!
>
>On Adorno.  I wanted to respond to the text that Mervyn posted.
>
>
>I've snipped (horrors!) the part that I wanted to focus on:
>
>"To gain such perspectives without velleity or violence, entirely from
>felt contact with its objects - this alone is the task of thought.
>
>...
>
>But it is also the utterly impossible thing, because it presupposes a
>standpoint removed, even though by a hair's breadth, from the scope of
>existence, whereas we well know that any possible knowledge must not
>only be first wrested from what is, if it shall hold good, but is also
>marked, for this very reason, by the same distortion and poverty which
>it seeks to escape."
>
>To me, this passage sums up the fundamental difference between Adorno and
>Bhaskar.  Adorno, it seems to me, sees a problem -- indeed, THE problem --
>where Bhaskar does not. Even before we get to the point in Bhaskar's
>thinking at which he introduces the notion of "alethic truths" that we can
>know, Bhaskar seems to take for granted as possible, indeed as relatively
>unproblematic (as Colin has argued, and I agree) that which Adorno is
>compelled to regard as impossible.
>
>This is at the heart of why I have always thought of Adorno as THE thinker
>that one has to be able to deal with, if one is to defend Bhaskar's thought
>from serious criticism.
>
>But it doesn't sound as though any of those who have posted are much
>bothered by what I see as such a profound difference between the two.  If
>this is so, and you're not much bothered, or you don't see any big divide,
>would any of you guys mind helping me to see why?
>
>Warmly,
>Ruth
>
>
>
>
>
>     --- from list bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---

--
Mervyn Hartwig
13 Spenser Road
Herne Hill
London SE24 ONS
United Kingdom
Tel: 020 7 737 2892
Email: mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx


     --- from list bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---