RE: BHA: reply to Andy

["Phil Walden" <phil@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Andy, Ruth,

Andy, I have heard you present a paper based on the ideas of Spinoza and
Ilyenkov and it was very provocative. I didn't agree at the time and I
advocated Adorno's line that when you cognize an object there is always a
residuum that remains uncognized, in other words there is no isomorphism
between subject and object.

Why do I like Adorno's position? Because it seems to me a way of retaining
dialectics whilst responding to a problem of Hegelian (and much Marxist)
dialectics - that they collapse the distinction between dialectical logic
and objective material reality and end up imposing their dialectical
categories on a recalcitrant reality. As I read him, Adorno is not
advocating a form of scepticism because he is in favour of the use of
dialectical categories in cognition, and he believes that explanatory
theories about society cannot be developed without dialectics.

Andy, correct me if I am wrong but you seem to be advocating a form of
reflection theory. Is it akin to the reflection theory defended by Lenin in
Volume 14 of which there are still traces in Volume 38? In your opinion, can
Spinoza and Ilyenkov overcome the problem with isomorphism that I have
outlined above? Please post your response to Ruth on the list as this is, in
my view, an incredibly important topic.

Phil


> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:owner-bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]On Behalf Of Andrew
> Brown
> Sent: 27 January 2001 14:40
> To: bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: BHA: reply to Andy
>
>
> Ruth,
>
> I've done a bit of debating on this list on such stuff, which was
> extremely very helpful to me, but it's tough going. Instead, I'm
> currently rewriting something along these lines and will send it to
> you when finished (will send you the old stuff now).
>
> One thing: basically, only people who are already thinking along
> similar lines have been receptive to my expression of the view that
> the non-identity of thought and object is a problem of the
> magnitude that you imply in your earlier post. Probably down to my
> inability to express the point (or me being plain wrong). Marxist-
> Hegelians, critical realists and dialectical critical realists
> often think
> I'm making a fuss over nothing.
>
> Many thanks,
>
> Andy
>
> On 27 Jan 2001, at 9:20, Ruth Groff wrote:
>
> > hi Andy,
> >
> > You wrote:
> > >Well, I'm bothered! Bothered enough to reject the nonsense of a
> > >'non-isomorphism' of thought and object in favour of an
> > >interpretation of Spinoza. But very few other people are bothered
> > >(whether critical realists or not).
> >
> > Elaborate!
> >
> > Please!
> >
> > Ruth
> >
> >
> >
> >      --- from list bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
>
>
>
>      --- from list bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>



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