Re: BHA: SEPM

[Mervyn Hartwig <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Dear Hans,

'The soul constellationally contains the mind'. I have no direct textual
warrant for this. It is a) an inference I made from reading FEW, which
was then b) informally confirmed by Bhaskar to me over a drink. (Those
were his very words, unfortunately not elaborated.)

I think it makes a lot of sense textually - the soul (described as 'the
continuant' in relation to 'intentional states' p.60) engages in a
dialectical *learning* process from life to life, an 'advanced' soul so
to speak can remember past lives, etc.

While so far as I can tell FEW never explicitly uses the concept 'mind',
clearly what we think of as mind is assimilated to 'dispositional
realism'. Thus at p. 52 the soul is said to be, like God, an ultimatum,
characterized by dispositional identity with its own powers - not an
occurrent thing, but a disposition to be embodied or disembodied. The
passage then immediately goes on to talk of beliefs, emotions, desires
etc as ingrained dispositions to behave in certain ways 'which can be
carried on and discharged in the future, including, if unrealised in
this life, in future lives'.

But equally clearly, since the soul is engaged in a trans-lives learning
process, and achieves liberation via 'the cessation of the intentional
state of attachment' (52), it doesn't carry the whole contents of each
individual mind with it...

In the Addendum (below) I set out my understanding of the relationship
between spirit; soul or Self; and the empirical person or self (which
includes as I understand it, mind). It might help to make what I'm
trying to say clearer.

>Moreover, SEPM  as I understand it, is mainly a defense against reductionism
>of mind to matter, and that the powers of mind do not exist apart from
>matter.  It is a  critique of materialism.  This seems consistent with the
>*novella* of reincarnation in FEW

I agree.

>Finally, Bhaskar's critique against idealism is the epistemic fallacy itself,
>and even sooner the distinction between the transitive and intransitive
>dimensions.  So I am not at all sure "that Bhaskar at that stage (1979) left
>the way open for idealism".
>Although SEPM does leave it open the possibility of some form of
>"Spiritualism".
>And TDCR develops this possibility.

What you have in mind here I think is 'subjective' idealism. I meant
objective or ontological idealism, which is fully compatible with
'spiritualism' in your sense.

Mervyn


ADDENDUM

The three fundamental TDCR categories, pertaining respectively to the
zones of absolute, relative and demi-real being, are (1) spirit or pure
dispositionality; (2) soul or the essential Self and (as its historical
and social inflection) dharma; and (3) the empirical self/person
[including 'mind'], subject to the historical and social determinations
of karma. (1) constellationally embraces and is ingredient in all things
whatsoever. (2) is (1) manifesting itself in (emergent) relative being,
not just at the level of the individual person but in people-in-society-
in-nature-in-the-cosmos (all developing and expanding). This is spirit
as 'concretely singularised' (inner and outer). It is our human nature,
the essence of (3) our empirical selves, which is both transhistorical
and translocal (we are one species) and historically and locally
mediated and changing, constituted in and through our relations with
other humans and beings. (Bhaskar's 'spirit' thus does not correspond to
Hegel's 'Geist', rather to Hegel's 'Idee'; 'Geist' in Bhaskarese is
'soul'.)

If we construe (1) in pre-TDCR terms as 'causal power', 'potentia',
'energy', or 'possibility', rather than 'spirit', critical realists of
whatever ilk can certainly accept that it is ingredient in (2) and (3)
without saturating them, i.e. without their being reducible to it.
Further, that the 'ultimate' source of the pulse to human freedom, truth
and morality must lie there too (as possibility), such that the 'ideal'
is indeed 'necessarily possible' in some, at least inchoate, sense. It
is true that Bhaskar's frequent assertion that people are God seems to
preclude such an interpretation. This very fact, however, together with
the consideration that if we are indeed God we could never have fallen
into demi-reality, argues that we should view that assertion as 'a
manner of speaking', opting instead for the view (also frequently
stated) that we are godlike rather than God (cf. Daly 2000).





HDespain@xxxxxxx writes
>Dear Mervyn,
>
>Could you further elaborate where it is, or how it is that in FEW the
>'substance' (as refered to in PON1:124-5 and PON2:98) as '"soul'
>consetelationaly contains the mind and enters and departs bodies (as a set of
>dispositions)" as you wrote in your most recent post?
>
>It is clear to me that Bhaskar's (seemingly) commitment to reincarnation has
>the soul entering and departing bodies, but it is not at all clear to me that
>soul contains mind.  This seems contingent upon both (as you labeled them)
>(2) and (1), i.e. substance as the bearer of particular "powers", and in
>relation to complex forms of matter?  Which in turn is dependent upon social
>formation (i.e. the "social cube") and "primary polyadization", which grounds
>"existential constitution" (DPF:140-144).
>
>Moreover, SEPM  as I understand it, is mainly a defense against reductionism
>of mind to matter, and that the powers of mind do not exist apart from
>matter.  It is a  critique of materialism.  This seems consistent with the
>*novella* of reincarnation in FEW.
>
>Finally, Bhaskar's critique against idealism is the epistemic fallacy itself,
>and even sooner the distinction between the transitive and intransitive
>dimensions.  So I am not at all sure "that Bhaskar at that stage (1979) left
>the way open for idealism".
>Although SEPM does leave it open the possibility of some form of
>"Spiritualism".
>And TDCR develops this possibility.
>
>Hans D.
>


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