Re: BHA: SEPM

[HDespain@xxxxxxx]

Dear Mervyn,

Could you further elaborate where it is, or how it is that in FEW the
'substance' (as refered to in PON1:124-5 and PON2:98) as '"soul'
consetelationaly contains the mind and enters and departs bodies (as a set of
dispositions)" as you wrote in your most recent post?

It is clear to me that Bhaskar's (seemingly) commitment to reincarnation has
the soul entering and departing bodies, but it is not at all clear to me that
soul contains mind.  This seems contingent upon both (as you labeled them)
(2) and (1), i.e. substance as the bearer of particular "powers", and in
relation to complex forms of matter?  Which in turn is dependent upon social
formation (i.e. the "social cube") and "primary polyadization", which grounds
"existential constitution" (DPF:140-144).

Moreover, SEPM  as I understand it, is mainly a defense against reductionism
of mind to matter, and that the powers of mind do not exist apart from
matter.  It is a  critique of materialism.  This seems consistent with the
*novella* of reincarnation in FEW.

Finally, Bhaskar's critique against idealism is the epistemic fallacy itself,
and even sooner the distinction between the transitive and intransitive
dimensions.  So I am not at all sure "that Bhaskar at that stage (1979) left
the way open for idealism".
Although SEPM does leave it open the possibility of some form of
"Spiritualism".
And TDCR develops this possibility.

Hans D.


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