Re: BHA:reasons as causes

["Andrew Brown" <Andrew@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Thanks Howard,

First let me 'correct' my own previous post, then move on to
Spinoza.

I previously suggested that, for CR/DCR, thought had to be causal
in such a way as to be irrreducibly real, ie. to fulfil the 'causal
criterion' for reality. In this sense, thought must be like any other
stratum. Now, this still seems true to me. Surely, we can agree
that this is the general approach RB takes in PON? In PON, RB
asks if there is a real stratum to which 'psychology' is applicable
(to oversimplify rather). To answer in the affirmative he establishes
that reasons are irreducible causes.

However, I went on to suggest that in general this entails the
*efficient* causality of strata, hence of thought. But how stupid I
am, because in the very same book, PON, RB has gone on at
length about the nature of social structures as *material* causes!!!
So here is one stratum (or set of strata), viz. 'society', which
qualifies as real due to its *material* causality, rather than its
efficient causality. This undermines my previous argument, it
seems.

Moreover, RTS goes on quite a bit about material causality doesn't
it? Can't we say that an 'efficient' cause is some actual event
'trigger', such as the flicking of a switch, and a material cause is
the structure of what is triggered, eg. the electric circuit of which
the switch is part. In which case CR would turn out to be a
manifesto for the reinstatement of material causality into
philosophical discourse. And, more to the point, strata would
essentially be grasped as material causes (rather than just efficient
ones). Thus thought, in that case, must, for CR, be an irreducible
material cause. It need not be an efficient one.

So there we are, I have completely changed my mind in one day!

Now Spinoza:

Yes, I would say the generally recognised hallmark of Spinoza is
his argument that thought and extension are two attributes of the
same substance. Thought and extension are not two different
things, but two different expressions of the same thing. This must
be at odds with the view that thought is merely one stratum
amongst many others. So I don't think Spinoza was a critical
realist. And, yes, as you know, I think Marx took up Spinoza's
essential position on this fundamental point, so I don't think Marx
was a critical realist either. But there clearly remains much scope
for a CR theory of thought between the apparent extremes of
Spinozist identity and Cartesian dualism.

Many thanks,

Andy

On 29 Nov 2000, at 16:42, lynne engelskirchen wrote:

> Andrew --
>
> Thanks.  The Aristotelian stuff need not be of concern.  What since the
> Renaissance we commonly think of as causality is pretty much Aristotle's
> efficient causality.  With the beginning of the modern philosophy of
> science formal and final causes were ignored and material cause taken for
> granted so that left cause as efficient cause.  So the question is whether
> reasons are a cause the way you normally think of cause.
>
> But if the question is a separate stratum which does have the kind of power
> you suggest, isn't that exactly contrary to Marx's Holy FAmily quote -- a
> distinct stratum of thought is impossible to separate out.  Instead matter
> is the substratum of all change.   And anyway what about Spinoza?  Hasn't
> Marx just lifted this point from Spinoza?
>
> Howard
>
>
>
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