BHA: RE: Causal powers of absence - are they real?

["Marshall Feldman" <marsh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

But Hans, the argument in RTS is:

	1. The absence or presence of onts (i.e., things that in principle could be
present) allows for variation in experience.

	2. The structure of things may give them causal powers, one of which may be
the power to change (itself or something else). This is not absence, except
in the sense that stage 1 of development precedes stage 2 and both cannot be
present simultaneously. Moreover Stage 1 may become Stage 2, Stage 2', Stage
2", etc. depending on various things (the way the thing's causal powers
work, contingent presence or absence of other real onts, etc.)

In short, I don't find the argument (at least in the abbreviated form you
present it) compelling that we can only explain change by appealing to
absences (de-onts). If, on the other hand, the argument is a variation of
"change is only possible if everything is not always co-present at once,"
then I buy the argument but fail to see that it gives us much insight.

		Marsh

> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:owner-bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]On Behalf Of Hans
> Ehrbar
> Sent: Friday, June 26, 1998 2:22 PM
> To: bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: BHA: Causal powers of absence - are they real?
>
>
>
> I hear some of you say that everything that can be explained
> in terms of absences could also be explained in terms of
> presences, and it is impossible to tell which explanation is
> better.
>
> I will try to argue here that this is wrong:
>
> First of all, this kind of argument is not specific to
> absences.  With the same justification one could also say:
> everything that happens in society can also be explained in
> terms of the individuals involved, and it is impossible to
> tell which explanation is better.
>
>
> But we know that methodological individualism is wrong.
> How do we know that it is wrong?  By a second-order argument.
> The argument is: if methodological individualism were right,
> i.e., if reality were not stratified, then science would
> not be possible.
>
>
> We therefore also need a second-order argument
> for the causal efficacy of absences.  Bhaskar's argument
> is:  if absences were not causally efficacious, i.e.,
> if reality were clogged with presences, then change
> would not be possible.
>
>
> Hans Ehrbar.
>
>
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>



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