BHA: Causal powers of absence - are they real?

[Hans Ehrbar <ehrbar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

I hear some of you say that everything that can be explained
in terms of absences could also be explained in terms of
presences, and it is impossible to tell which explanation is
better.

I will try to argue here that this is wrong:

First of all, this kind of argument is not specific to
absences.  With the same justification one could also say:
everything that happens in society can also be explained in
terms of the individuals involved, and it is impossible to
tell which explanation is better.


But we know that methodological individualism is wrong.
How do we know that it is wrong?  By a second-order argument.
The argument is: if methodological individualism were right,
i.e., if reality were not stratified, then science would
not be possible.


We therefore also need a second-order argument
for the causal efficacy of absences.  Bhaskar's argument
is:  if absences were not causally efficacious, i.e.,
if reality were clogged with presences, then change
would not be possible.


Hans Ehrbar.


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