Re: BHA: Re: Another try

[Louis Irwin <lirwin1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Ruth,

I think the key to your question lies in distinguishing determinate from
indeterminate absences.  Determinate absences are those which are in some
way causally related to us, like the difference between a specific monsoon
that did not occur in contrast to those that never occur in my backyard (as
in my post to Caroline).  Of all the roads I never took, only some of them
count as determinate absences.  The absence of critical realist concepts
which prevented me from solving a problem I was working on is a determinate
absence, whereas my not devising a theory that won't be propounded for
another 500 years is indeterminate.  Not all the things I failed to think
yesterday should be counted as real; only those that are causally linked to
me should.

Louis I.

>I still don't see what is of *ontological* significance here.
>Epistemologically significant yes, but ontological I don't get.  I mean,
>just as our thinking something ought not to be confused with the reality of
>its existence or non-existence, so, it would seem, our *not* thinking
>something ought not to be so confused.  Now, perhaps I am making a category
>error here, in confusing the reality (or not) of the object of thought with
>the reality (or not) of the thought itself, but even corrected, the
>existence of the thought doesn't imply the existence of the *lack* of the
>thought.  All *kinds* of things happen, especially in our minds, but are we
>to count every twist and turn of our consciousness -- and, more to the
>point, every twist and turn that our consciousness *doesn't take -- as a
>metaphysical entity?  If all the things that I didn't think yesterday are to
>count as real, or, to put it differently, if reasons are not just causes,
>but -- which is not the same thing -- ontological entities, then how ought
>we to understand the concept of the epistemic fallacy?




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