critical-realism
mailing list archive
[ Other Periods  | Other mailing lists  | Search  ]
Date:  [ Previous  | Next  ]      Thread:  [ Previous  | Next  ]      Index:  [ Author  | Date  | Thread  ]

Re: BHA: Re: Another try

<html>
I had hope the absence of my pedagogical skills (which I can assure you
is a real absence), might have been evidence enough, but Ruth (persistent
as ever) forces my hand.<br>
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;I still don't see what is of *ontological* significance here.<br>
<br>
I'm not sure what the argument is here. Is the claim that only presences
can be ontological?<br>
<br>
Now, perhaps I am making a category<br>
&gt;error here, in confusing the reality (or not) of the object of
thought with<br>
&gt;the reality (or not) of the thought itself, but even corrected,
the<br>
&gt;existence of the thought doesn't imply the existence of the *lack* of
the<br>
&gt;thought.=A0 <br>
<br>
Well, no, one doesn't <i>necessarily </i>imply the other. But the absence
of the knowledge of how to drive a car does mean that one doesn't drive a
car; 'Why don't you drive Gran/Grandad? <i>Because </i>I don't know how
to son!' And the absence of any knowledge of the philosophy of Bhaskar
generally (although not always) entails silence in seminars on Bhaskar,
although in seminars on Hume, if one possesses knowledge on Hume, one can
be quite vocal. For all my poor pedagogical skills, I have often
(although not always) found a students lack of engagement in seminars
generally means the required knowledge is absent - which roughly
translated means they haven't done any reading. It certainly seems a
valid argument to say that student X does well in her/his exams because
of their interest in the subject (a causally effective presence), but
equally, the lack/absence of interest in the subject can be the cause of
the failure. <br>
<br>
gAll *kinds* of things happen, especially in our minds, but are we<br>
&gt;to count every twist and turn of our consciousness -- and, more to
the<br>
&gt;point, every twist and turn that our consciousness *doesn't take --
as a<br>
&gt;metaphysical entity?=A0 <br>
<br>
Well no, well I wouldn't anyway. But surely we want to take note of
differentiation. Some absences do have real causal effects and others
don't. Just as some presences do and some don't. This is a philosophical
argument about absences, not one based at the level of particular
absences.<br>
<br>
If all the things that I didn't think yesterday are to<br>
&gt;count as real, or, to put it differently, if reasons are not just
causes,<br>
&gt;but -- which is not the same thing -- ontological entities, then how
ought<br>
&gt;we to understand the concept of the epistemic fallacy? <br>
<br>
In what sense aren't reasons ontological? Again I must be missing
something here because I don't see the connection bewteen this point and
the epistemic fallacy. Are you intrepreting the ontological as the
material? This would certainly be rejected (I hope) by most CR'ers.<br>
<br>
Let me try a different example. After three days without water my body
sends signals to my brain and tells me I'm dehydrated - which a good
causal powers account could capture adequately. But what is the cause of
these signals? Why is my body sending these signals? The absence of water
perhaps? It's not such a wacky idea. In fact to me it would seem wacky
not to say that the lack/absence of water isn't the cause of the
dehydration - i.e. the body's signals. Now it seems to me that Caroline
wants to use a version of the 'causal powers' argument to find a
mechanism in which to locate the power. I accept that in RTS RB does
indeed seem to accept a 'causal powers' account, but perhaps that this is
one of those things which DPF marks a break from. <br>
<br>
Anyway, like i said in my original reply I share some of the concerns
about the overstetching of the use of absence. But that said, I don't
have any problem in talking of absences as real, and hence as things that
may have causal powers.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
<br>
<br>
<BR>
<div>-----------------------------------------------------------------------=
-</div>
<br>
<div>Dr. Colin Wight</div>
<div>Department of International Politics</div>
<div>University of Wales</div>
<div>Aberystwyth</div>
<div>Tel: (01970) 621769</div>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
</html>


     --- from list bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
[ Other Periods  | Other mailing lists  | Search  ]