RE: BHA: truth

[Louis Irwin <lirwin1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Wallace,

>Devitt's correspondence theory does not require that we match "concepts"
>with "things" in the way you describe. Rather, in the case of proper names
>(for instance), it requires 1) reference fixing, i.e., the causal grounding
>of a name--I believe pretty much any sound sequence will suffice here--in an
>object, and 2) reference borrowing, i.e., causal (social) connections
>between the those who were present when the reference of the name was fixed
>and those who were not present, thereby providing the latter with
>opportunities to acquire the ability to use the name to designate the thing.

Actually, this seems to be pretty much Kripke's views on mames.  Anyway, why
is it a correspondence theory at all?  Sure, language is tied to the things
it names.  If that is all it takes to be a correspondence theory, then any
realism implies a "correspondence theory".

Louis Irwin



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