BHA: Irony (encore une fois)

[MSPRINKER@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

               State University of New York at Stony Brook
                       Stony Brook, NY 11794-3355

                                            Michael Sprinker
                                            Professor of English & Comp Lit
                                            Comparative Studies
                                            516 632-9634
                                            24-May-1998 01:06pm EDT
FROM:  MSPRINKER
TO:    Remote Addressee                     ( _bhaskar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx )

Subject: Irony (encore une fois)

Sorry to be a nag about this but I have some difficulties
with the way in which irony has been handled so neatly and
cleanly by the pro-Habermassians in this discussion.

The problem with an ironic utterance, as Paul de Man never
tired of reminding us, is that there is no way of distinguishing
it from a non-ironic utterance if the two have the same grammatical
and semantic form.  I know that naifs like Wayne Booth find
this wildly implausible, but all I can say is I'd love to
have a bunch of people like him sitting around the table at
my monthly poker game.  They would, on principle, have to believe
that every time I raised the bet, I had the cards to back
it up, or, at least, that if I were bluffing, there would
be some obvious signs to clue them in to my deception.  I tell
you, I'd be a very rich man if things actually worked that
way.

The opening sentence of PRIDE AND PREJUDICE has often enough
(not least by Booth) been taken as a textbook instance of
controlled irony.  But can we be so certain that Jane Austen
really "meant" it ironically, that its ostensible parody of
18th-century apothegms was just that?  We know Austen's admiration
for Samuel Johnson, who though witty, was no great ironist
when it came to moralizing.  Moreover, the plot of the novel
that follows that famous opening could be construed to confirm
its unproblematic (viz., non-ironic) truth, since both Darcy
and Bingham possess good fortunes and are, until the very end,
"in want of a wife."  I'd say the lady (Jane Austen) meant what
she said.  Nor do I find (any longer) much to laugh at in the
characteristic marriage market that is the main scene of action
in her novels.  It was socially a rather brutal competition
in which more were losers than winners.  But then Marxists always
take a dim view of the foibles of the bourgeoisie.

The Iago and Antony cases are similar:  there's nothing in
the grammar or lexical construction of the utterances that can
be used to determine with certainty the intention of the
speaker, his commitment to the truth of what he is saying
or his saying these things with an eye to deception (Iago)
or to being taken ironically (Antony).  That an utterance
is ironic is a question of inference, and one can often---
does often--infer incorrectly.  What can Habermas say but
that in any civilized discursive situation, the parties need
to be committed in some measure to the truth of what they
assert?  Would it not be pleasant to think so?  I'm sure I'd
like to have a bunch of Habermassians around the poker just as
much as I would relish playing against Wayne Booth.

Skeptically yours,

Michael Sprinker

p.s. Another small point.  It's been a long time, but isn't
the distinction between the illocutionary and perlocutionary
in Austin to do with the force of an utterance (illocution)
and its effect or effects (perlocutionary).  Austin makes the
point, I think, that the illocutonary force of an utterance,
however well-formed and however much sanctioned by social
agreement, cannot guarantee its perlocutionary effect.  Hence,
he just rules the latter out of discussion.  One sees why he
was mistrustful of so-called non-serious utterances like
literature.


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