RE: BHA: truth

["Wallace Polsom" <wallace@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi again,

Doug wrote (and Ruth and Colin expressed a certain fondness for) the
following:

> Although I can no longer find where, my old mentor, Joe Margolis, makes a
> distinction that seems close to the one Wallace cites from Devitt and
which
> I find helpful.  He says that correspondence with reality cannot be the
> _criterion_ of truth for the reason Louis mentions (no independent access
> to reality) but it can (and, presumably, should) still be the _meaning_ of
> truth.

But in _A Realist Theory of Science_, Bhaskar states:

"But this theory [i.e., Tarski's theory of truth] cannot help us to resolve
the problems posed by the apprehension of the general relativity of our
knowledge: viz. that whenever we speak of things or events etc. in science
we must always speak of them and know them under particular descriptions,
descriptions which will always be to a greater or lesser extent
theoretically determined, which are not neutral reflections of a given
world. Expistemological relativism, in this sense, is the handmaiden of
ontological realism and must be accepted.... Epistemological relativism
insists only upon the impossibility of knowing objects except under
particular descriptions. And it entails the rejection of any correspondence
theory of truth. A proposition is true if and only if the state of affairs
that it expresses (describes) is real. But propositions cannot be compared
with states of affairs; their relationship cannot be described as one of
correspondence. Philosophers have wanted a theory of truth to provide a
criterion or stamp of knowledge. But no such stamp is possible. For the
judgement of the truth of a proposition is necessarily intrinsic to the
science concerned. There is no way in which we can look at the world and
then at a sentence and ask whether they fit. There is just the expression
(of the world) in speech (or thought)" (249).

++++++++++

Now, it is important to note that Michael Devitt is not a fan of
transcendental arguments. He mentions Bhaskar a few times in _Realism and
Truth_, citing especially pages 248 to 250 of _A Realist Theory of Science_,
but he does not do so because he agrees with Bhaskar's pronouncements on
these pages. Instead, Devitt is concerned to defend (correspondence) truth.
Here's a sample:

++++++++++

"Objection (5): All this talk of truth is idle and 'metaphysical', for we
are only entitled to claim that something is true if we know it with
absolute certainty, and we do not know this of anything (Chalmers 1976:
124-7; Bhaskar 1975: 248-50).

"Answer: This old and surprisingly common objection involves a simple
mistake. Claims of truth do not imply any claim of certainty or
unrevisability (Maxim 5 [see below]). 'Snow is white' is true if and only if
snow is white. Whatever evidence or lack of it we have for snow being white
is evidence or lack of it for the truth of 'Snow is white'. So to assert
that a scientific statement is true involves no greater epistemological
commitment than simply asserting the statement itself, something with even
the radicals do. Indeed, to assert that a statement is only approximately
true involves less epistemological commitment than to assert it. Friends of
the truth-related notions can be as fallibilist as anyone.

"Objection (6): The view is of no interest unless it is accompanied by some
instructions on how to tell the degree to which a theory is true, how to
tell whether one theory is closer to the truth than another, how to tell
whether we are achieving our aim of approaching the truth. In the absence of
criteria, such talk is meaningless (Chalmers 1976: 124-7; Bhaskar 1975:
248-50; Laudan 1981: 32).

"Answer: As it stands the objection is too extreme; for it depends on a
verificationist theory of meaning. However, it raises an important matter.
Something needs to be said on the epistemic problems it stimulates. What
needs emphasizing that those problems exist in much the same form whether we
talk of truth or not. How does the enemy of truth tell whether to adopt a
theory? How does he tell whether one theory is better than another? How does
he tell whether science is progressing? These are very difficult questions,
but there is no reason in principle whey the friend of truth could not
simply adopt whatever the enemy of truth said in answer to them, saying, for
example, 'Yes, that is how I tell one theory is closer to the truth than
another.' If the enemy of truth is a fallibilist, the friend can go along
with him, further adding, 'Of course I may be wrong in my judgement, just as
you may be.'

"There is one final objection which I will mention now, but set aside until
later. It is claimed that such doctrines as Realism and Correspondence Truth
require the impossible: that we have 'direct access to independent reality,
without the medium of theory (Bhaskar 1975: 248-50). The doctrines are
alleged to commit the empiricist sins of confusing the 'object of knowledge'
with the 'real object' (Althusser and Balibar 1968: 51-69). This objection
strikes me as completely misguided. I shall answer it when discussing
Putnam, who puts it vividly (12.6)." (_Realism and Truth_ 177-178)

++++++++++

[Answer] "What realists believe is that we can judge whether theories are
true of reality, _the nature of which_ does not depend on any theories or
concepts..... The picture that lies behind the caricature of realism is ...
one of our theorizing _from scratch_, locked within our minds. But we are
not starting from scratch in epistemology and semantics: that is the point
of Maxim 3. We can use well-established theories in physics, biology, and so
forth, we already have the entities, divided into kinds, and relations which
those theories posit. And if we _were_ starting from scratch, sceptical
doubts would condemn us to instantaneous solipsism (5.5) Putnam puts the
epistemic and semantic carts before the ontological horse [when he argues
that the operational and theoretical constraints on our knowledge of reality
are accessible to the mind, whereas causal relations to a mind-independent
world are not].

"To put the carts back where they belong, we take a naturalistic approach to
epistemology and semantics. Reflection on our best science has committed us
to the many entities of the largely impersonal and inanimate world (5.7 and
7.1). We go on, naturalistically, to seek an explanation of that small part
of the world in which there are problems of knowledge and reference: people
and language (5.8). The resulting theory has no special authority: it is
just one theory among many of the world we live in. It is possible that this
theory should lead us to change the view of what exists that we have
obtained from other theories. But great changes are unlikely. it is
particularly unlikely that the theory will lead us to question the
independence of what exists from theories and theorists, which is the
obvious starting place for an epistemology. All the judgements of our theory
will be theory-laden, of course. But that is no worry, for it is part of the
theory that the judgements of _all_ theories are theory laden. Finally,
epistemic and semantic relations are no more inaccessible than other
relations. Theorizing about the relations between a thought or expression
and an object no more requires a God's Eye View than does theorizing about
the relation between, say, David Frost and Richard Nixon." (_Realism and
Truth_ 232)

++++++++++

I couldn't resist ending there! ;)

++++++++++

Maxims

     _Maxim 1_ In considering realism, distinguish the
               constitutive and evidential issues.
     _Maxim 2_ Distinguish the metaphysical (ontological)
               issue of realism from any semantic issue.
     _Maxim 3_ Settle the realism issue before any
               epistemic or semantic issue.
     _Maxim 4_ In considering the semantic issue,
               don't take truth for granted.
     _Maxim 5_ Distinguish the issue of correspondence
               truth from any epistemic issue.
                                (_Realism and Truth_ 302)

And this:

"_Correspondence Truth (x)_  Sentences of type x are true or false in virtue
of: 1) their structure; (2) the referential relations between their parts
and reality; (3) the objective and mind-independent nature of that reality"
(_Realism and Truth_ 302).

++++++++++

Now, is anyone else confused by Bhaskar's stand on correspondence theories
of truth? Bhaskar says we can only speak of and know things, events, etc.,
under particular, theory-laden descriptions, that epistemological relativism
and ontological realism go hand in hand, and that this "entails the
rejection of any correspondence theory of truth." In the next sentence (!)
Bhaskar says that "A proposition is true if and only if the state of affairs
that it expresses (describes) is real," but follows this with the claim that
"propositions cannot be compared with states of affairs; their relationship
cannot be described as one of correspondence." What is going on here?

Two questions:

Question (1): So Bhaskar doesn't like the term "correspondence." Ironically,
Devitt's defense of truth (see above) reinforces many Bhaskarian themes, but
that's beside the point, which is that Bhaskar's own account seems to me to
appeal precisely to some sort of correspondence, though what Bhaskar giveth
with one hand he immediately taketh away with the other. Ok, so what exactly
is the relationship between our descriptions of reality and "the structures
and ways of acting of things that exist and act independently of thought"?
Doesn't Bhaskar owes us a MUCH more detailed account? Or have I
misunderstood?

Question (2): This one touches on Doug's recent post responding (positively)
to my presentation of Devitt's ideas. Why is it better to talk about
correspondence as the "meaning" of truth than it is to talk, as Devitt does,
about correspondence as part of a (scientific) "explanation" of truth? I
would have thought at Devitt's "causal theory of reference" would be very
attractive to critical realists, for whom "causal criteria of existence" is
akin to a mantra.

Sincerely,
Wallace




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