RE: BHA: truth

[Ruth Groff <rgroff@xxxxxxxx>]

Hi Doug, and all,

Doug, you wrote:

>Although I can no longer find where, my old mentor, Joe Margolis, makes a
>distinction that seems close to the one Wallace cites from Devitt and which
>I find helpful.  He says that correspondence with reality cannot be the
>_criterion_ of truth for the reason Louis mentions (no independent access
>to reality) but it can (and, presumably, should) still be the _meaning_ of
>truth.

I like this.  Does he flesh this out somewhere I could take a look at? [And
speaking of references, I see Wally posted the RB article.  I didn't end up
finding it all that useful, but I'd be curious to hear what you and others
think.]

But back to alethia.  You wrote:

>Without intelligent beings to formulate beliefs and propositions, there
>would be no truth, but there still would be many truths -- the existence of
>water and its molecular structure, for example.  If I understand Colin
>correctly, this truth about water is what RB means by alethia.  If that is
what >RB means by alethia, I don't think I have a problem with it.  It
simply affirms >that certain realities are ontologically independent of us.

Two things.  First, I am inclined to agree that this is what Bhaskar's usage
achieves, but isn't such an affirmation an ontological, or metaphysical
matter, rather than the matter -- construed narrowly for the moment -- of a
proper understanding of the concept of truth?

Second, I know I raised this before, but I'm still bothered by it: on this
account of truth, what exactly is the difference between the concept of
"truth" and the concept of "cause"?  They seem to come awfully close together.

I for one am continuing to find this discussion really, really helpful, and
my offer for pizza still holds!

Warmly,
R.



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