BHA: praxis dependence

["Howard Engleskirchen,WSU/FAC" <howarde@xxxxxxxxxx>]

Howie --	

Thanks for the "no longer praxis-dependent" quote.  Can you give any
explanation of what this means?  What does it mean for truth to be "praxis=
--
dependent?"  Certainly I don't think that the truth of things is praxis de=
pendent.
Things are what they are and the truth about them is what it is.   But I d=
on't see
how there can be access to the truth of things except through practice.  I=
s
Bhaskar here saying something to contradict that?


Great to hear from you again!

Howard

Howard Engelskirchen
Western State University

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Howie Chodos'  message:

Hi,

Partly inspired by this discussion, and partly on account of having
(foolishly) committed to giving a paper on truth in a week=92s time (which
has left me no time to really take an active part in the discussion), I=92=
ve
been re-reading sections of Plato Etc., which seem to suggest that
Bhaskar=92s notion of objective/alethic truth implies a different line on
practice than the one Howard just argued. In general I think Howard=92s po=
int
about practice is important, as I, too, am struggling with what to make of
Bhaskar's notion of alethic truth.

Howard argued that "In other words alethia, the truth of things, cannot be
understood by us apart from our agency, and it is the historical error of
philosophy to suppose that it could.  We access the truth of things throug=
h
transformative negation." I have appended below an excerpt from what RB
says on pp. 63-4. I have included his condensed definition of the =91truth
tetrapolity=92 so people will see what he is referring to, although it is =
the
final sentence that explicitly denies the connection between praxis and
objective/alethic truth.

Howie Chodos


>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>


	An adequate theory of truth must take into account the fact that it is a
many-layered concept, in which there are four basic components:  which I
will nominate the *truth tetrapolity*:

(a) truth as *normative-fiduciary*, truth in the 'trust me--act on it'
sense. Trust is of course itself a complex concept, as we shall see in the
next chapter, but we can take its paradigmatic locutionary force here to b=
e
in inter-subjective communication;
(b) truth as *adequating*, as 'warrantedly assertable', as epistemological=
,
as relative in the transitive dimension;
(c) truth as *referential-expressive*, as a bipolar ontic-epistemic dual,
and in this sense as absolute; and, the sense I have already introduced,
(d) the truth as *ontological*, no longer tied to language-use per se and
in this sense objective and in the intransitive dimension, typically
achievable when referential detachment (see =A71) occurs; and a special ca=
se
of which is
(d') truth as *alethic*, i.e. the truth of or reason for things, people an=
d
phenomena generally (including in science most importantly causal
structures and generative mechanisms), not propositions.

[...] Thus we go from subjective certainty [to] subjective facthood [to]
objective truth [to] alethic truth. Note two points in particular about th=
e
tetrapolity. It is the difference between (b) and (c) that accounts for th=
e
difference between warranted assertability and truth. Second objective,
referentially detached, truth at (d) and (d') is no longer
praxis-dependent, or tied to language-use, although of course claims to it
are. It is sui genenris ontological.



Howard

Howard Engelskirchen
Western State University


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