Re: BHA: truth

["Howard Engleskirchen,WSU/FAC" <howarde@xxxxxxxxxx>]

Howie --

Thanks for the "no longer praxis-dependent" quote.  Can you give any
explanation of what this means?  What does it mean for truth to be "praxis=
-
dependent."  Certainly I don't think that the truth of things is praxis de=
pendent.
Things are what they are and the truth about them is what it is.   But I d=
on't see
how there can be access to the truth of things except through practice.  I=
s
Bhaskar here saying something to contradict that?


Great to hear from you again!

Howard

Howard Engelskirchen
Western State University


> Hi,
>
> Partly inspired by this discussion, and partly on account of having
> (foolishly) committed to giving a paper on truth in a week=92s time (whi=
ch
> has left me no time to really take an active part in the discussion), I=92=
ve
> been re-reading sections of Plato Etc., which seem to suggest that
> Bhaskar=92s notion of objective/alethic truth implies a different line o=
n
> practice than the one Howard just argued. In general I think Howard=92s =
point
> about practice is important, as I, too, am struggling with what to make =
of
> Bhaskar's notion of alethic truth.
>
> Howard argued that "In other words alethia, the truth of things, cannot =
be
> understood by us apart from our agency, and it is the historical error o=
f
> philosophy to suppose that it could.  We access the truth of things thro=
ugh
> transformative negation." I have appended below an excerpt from what RB
> says on pp. 63-4. I have included his condensed definition of the =91tru=
th
> tetrapolity=92 so people will see what he is referring to, although it i=
s the
> final sentence that explicitly denies the connection between praxis and
> objective/alethic truth.
>
> Howie Chodos
>
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>
>
> 	An adequate theory of truth must take into account the fact that it is =
a
> many-layered concept, in which there are four basic components:  which I
> will nominate the *truth tetrapolity*:
>
> (a) truth as *normative-fiduciary*, truth in the 'trust me--act on it'
> sense. Trust is of course itself a complex concept, as we shall see in t=
he
> next chapter, but we can take its paradigmatic locutionary force here to=
 be
> in inter-subjective communication;
> (b) truth as *adequating*, as 'warrantedly assertable', as epistemologic=
al,
> as relative in the transitive dimension;
> (c) truth as *referential-expressive*, as a bipolar ontic-epistemic dual=
,
> and in this sense as absolute; and, the sense I have already introduced,=

> (d) the truth as *ontological*, no longer tied to language-use per se an=
d
> in this sense objective and in the intransitive dimension, typically
> achievable when referential detachment (see =A71) occurs; and a special =
case
> of which is
> (d') truth as *alethic*, i.e. the truth of or reason for things, people =
and
> phenomena generally (including in science most importantly causal
> structures and generative mechanisms), not propositions.
>
> [...] Thus we go from subjective certainty [to] subjective facthood [to]
> objective truth [to] alethic truth. Note two points in particular about =
the
> tetrapolity. It is the difference between (b) and (c) that accounts for =
the
> difference between warranted assertability and truth. Second objective,
> referentially detached, truth at (d) and (d') is no longer
> praxis-dependent, or tied to language-use, although of course claims to =
it
> are. It is sui genenris ontological.
>
>
>
>
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Howard

"What is there just now you lack" Hakuin

Howard Engelskirchen


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