RE: BHA: truth

["Wallace Polsom" <wallace@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Louis wrote:

"Any correspondence theory is based on the idea that on the one hand we have
a lot of concepts at our mental disposal and on the other hand we can
identify a lot of things in the world, so we judge truth by seeing if our
concepts match up with the things in the world.  The problem is that we need
concepts in order to identify things in the world that match up with out
concepts!" [Note: Louis's full message is quoted below.]

Devitt's correspondence theory does not require that we match "concepts"
with "things" in the way you describe. Rather, in the case of proper names
(for instance), it requires 1) reference fixing, i.e., the causal grounding
of a name--I believe pretty much any sound sequence will suffice here--in an
object, and 2) reference borrowing, i.e., causal (social) connections
between the those who were present when the reference of the name was fixed
and those who were not present, thereby providing the latter with
opportunities to acquire the ability to use the name to designate the thing.

Wallace



++++++++++++

Ruth,

It seems your questions have got the attention of the list!

My memory of Bhaskar is that he does not plump for a correspondence theory
of truth, although he agrees that there is an element of truth to it (if I
may put it that way).  Any correspondence theory is based on the idea that
on the one hand we have a lot of concepts at our mental disposal and on the
other hand we can identify a lot of things in the world, so we judge truth
by seeing if our concepts match up with the things in the world.  The
problem is that we need concepts in order to identify things in the world
that match up with out concepts!  I suggest that any correspondence we have
between concepts and the world has to be derivative, at least in part, of
more basic matters.  (Of course, idealists and positivists are already
running away from realism altogether.)

Roughly, I think Bhaskar is saying that the truth of surface phenomena is
their underlying structure.  Certain molecular structures comprise the truth
of the phenomenon of liquidity, etc.  He thinks this, alethic truth, is a
necessary ingredient in all other uses of "truth".  If the concept of
"truth" is tied exclusively to the question of epistemology, the only
recourse a realist has is to opt for a correspondence theory and then to go
round in circles with idealist or positivist conceptions.

Louis Irwin




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