RE: BHA: truth

["Wallace Polsom" <wallace@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Louis wrote:

"If the concept of 'truth' is tied exclusively to the question of
epistemology, the only recourse a realist has is to opt for a correspondence
theory and then to go round in circles with idealist or positivist
conceptions."

Just a short note from the peanut gallery.

Michael Devitt, for one, does not tie the concept of truth to the question
of epistemology, though he does opt for a correspondence theory of truth. He
is very clear about this. For instance, he writes:

"Truth is one thing, evidence for it quite another." (_Realism and Truth_
36)

"In sum, to hold to Correspondence Truth is to believe in a notion of truth
that is not explained in terms of evidence. Questions of evidence are
epistemic ones quite distinct from the constitutive question of the nature
of truth. Doubtless, when the correspondence theorist confronts epistemic
questions, then for most interpretations of 'possible evidence', he will
accept that a sentence might be false even though all possible evidence
counted for its truth. However, on the most liberal interpretations--those
not tied to human capacities--he might well reject it" (_Realism and Truth_
37)

Devitt's position is worth mentioning because Ruth's initial questions about
truth arose in relation to her reading of Devitt's book.

According to Devitt, truth has a robust explanatory role in our theory of
higher animals and their languages; in other words, it is needed to explain
the role mental and linguistic symbols play in our lives. This is not to say
that truth is needed to explain our linguistic or other behaviour; rather,
it is needed to explain "meaning," i.e., "the properties of symbols that
enable them to play a variety of social roles" (_Realism and Truth _296_),
properties such as stimulus independence, arbitrariness, medium
independence, and so on. Correspondence theorists explain meaning in terms
of truth, they explain truth in terms of reference and structure, and they
explain reference in terms of causal links between linguistic symbols and
world.

Devitt and Sterelny propose a causal theory of reference for certain basic
terms in _Language and Reality_, a book which I've recommended to you all
before (and which, if I'm not mistaken, Louis has dismissed as "actualist").
But they do not present their theory as a done deal but rather as a work in
progress.

Here's Devitt again:

"My approach to truth naturalizes semantics, just as we earlier naturalized
epistemology. A consequence of this naturalization is that Realism is
settled first, epistemology and semantics afterwards. This is appropriate,
for the common-sense and scientific theories on which Realism is based are
in far better shape than any theory in epistemology or semantics" (_Realism
and Truth_ 297).

I'm the wrong guy to defend Devitt--I simply don't have a strong enough
grasp on the material--but I continue to think his work deserves more than a
passing glance.

Wallace
wallace@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

The Web Site for Critical Realism
http://www.usask.ca/hru/criticalrealism/





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