Re: BHA: truth

[Colin.Wight@xxxxxxxxxx (Colin Wight)]

Hi Ruth,

I haven't come across the deflationary view myself, so maybe I can't be of
any help. But it does seem to me that the stuff you are talking about
resonates with vague and long forgotten overtones of Russell's
differentiation between 'atomic propositions', 'molecular propositions', and
subject/predicate distinctions - in short symbolic logic. Don't ask me to
explain all this, I could if pushed but I'm sure someone like Louis could do
it so much better.

However, the crux of the matter seems to be in your claim:


>
>Anyway, it's something like this:  if, from the deflationary perspective,
>the sentence "It is true that the cat is black" means the same thing as the
>sentence "The cat is black", then isn't the real question "What in the world
>am I doing when I claim that the cat is black?"  And isn't this question
>being begged?

Like I say, I haven't come across the deflationary perspective before, but
it seems to me you have got it right and that the sentence "It is true that
the cat is black" does not mean the same thing as the sentence "The cat is
black". The first expresses a claim about the statement that the "cat is
black" to the effect that this statement is true, the second ("The cat is
black") only makes the statement and may well be false (the cat could be
pink with blue spots). In which case what it is for a sentence to actually
*BE* true is not something that language alone can decide. Or as RB might
say reference (realism) is inexorable.

Dunno if this helps, I tend to stay away from this stuff (the list of stuff
I tend to keep away from seems to be growing everyday).

Thanks,



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Dr. Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Tel: (01970) 621769

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