AUT: re: fambly values/social deviance

[andrew robinson <ldxar1@xxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Harald, just found your post as well; as usual, you
don't get what I'm saying:

"I am uncertain of the value of a repetion of the
'responsibility' thread, Andrew"

Take it up with Tom, he started it!

"If you think yourself 100 per cent a slave of un-
controllable forces,"

The point is not that the self is CONTROLLED by other
forces, but that the self IS nothing but a set of
uncontrollable forces which is misrecognised as a
totality.  Zizek recently explained it well: the self
or subject is like the user interface of a computer.
The user interface makes the computer seem like a
totality, but in fact what's going on are a
multiplicity of programs and functions within the
computer.  It would seem absurd to call the computer a
"self", because of this interface.  And yet, the human
"self" is nothing more than such an interface, behind
which are many operations of desires, neurochemical
forces, etc.  It no more makes sense to hold a human
self "responsible", than it does to shout at a
computer interface because one of the programmes isn't
working properly.

Your recurring binary - EITHER free will, OR robotic
external determination - is itself the phantasy which
keeps you from seeing the central point of my argument
- that determination is in large part INTERNAL (or
relational, i.e. internal plus external), but that it
is not thereby UNITARY or WILLED in the traditional
sense.  That people have free desire (so to speak),
but not free will.  Or, to put it better, that desire
has a freedom of its own, and that freedom for the
self is NOTHING BUT either an affirmation for freedom
for desire, or a repressive formula for its
repression.

"nor any positsion from
where it would be even imaginable to oppose capitalist
relations, rape or war. "

You have never explained why this follows.  It is
quite possible to oppose a force, without thereby
having to impute "responsibility".  For instance, one
can oppose (say) floods, and even take action to
prevent flooding (from building flood walls to
stopping climate change), without implying that floods
are an agent, or an act by an agent.  One can
therefore oppose capitalism, rape, war, etc., as
phenomena, without any reference to "responsibility" -
one opposes them as destructive forces, rather than
condemning them as individual acts.

It is also possible for an entity which is not a
responsible, unitary self to "oppose" something.
Animals for instance "oppose" when they feel like it -
a dog might "oppose" a postal worker by biting his leg
for example.  Does this mean the dog is a responsible
self, and that the dog sees the postal worker as a
responsible self?  Surely not.  One could even speak
of a computer programme which "opposes" something -
for instance, a spam blocker programme which "opposes"
spam.  Yet a programme has no selfhood at all, it
simply functions in a certain way.

"The very words and freedom and
autonomy are rendered meaningless."

No, they change in meaning.  Freedom and autonomy of
desire (primacy of desiring-production over social
production), instead of freedom and autonomy of a
(non-existent) molar self.

"And there will be no
ground from where one could understand "personal
reactions to social circumstances (drug use, family
breakups etc.)" sociologically, as this already pre-
supposes moral values. "

One can understand and respond, and one can oppose (or
support) something, without "moral values" in the
traditional sense - see above on dogs and computer
programs which "oppose".

"As did for instance, Das Kapital."

Did Marx say capitalism is the fault of a small group
of capitalists who commit crimes against others and
who should be punished, to restore a harmonious
society?  Or did he say that capitalism is a social
system and that to effect it, one has to change social
relations, not target individual capitalists?

"To me such postions comes over as merely a
modernized version of the belief in demons"

And what if these modern "demons" really exist, and
can be shown to exist?  Is it not, then, necessary to
affirm their existence?

"a true slave morality,"

If you are using this in a Nietzschean sense, then you
are completely wrong, because personal responsibility
if absolutely central to a Nietzschean slave morality
(in order to become responsible, one must be treated
as responsible, and develop a reactive structure... I
can find the quote I think...)

"The differentiation between moralism and morals
are in no way some kind of idiosyncratic usage by
me. The former involves simple condemnation and
punishment, with no or little effort to understand
the whys, nor the effects of ones actions, while the
latter puts the main emphasis on the results, the
future and
not the past. "

Fair enough.  At last, a definition of moralism.
Well, I'll hold you to it, since you keep accusing me
of moralism, and none of these occasions am I engaged
in "simple condemnation and punishment", but always in
some kind of future-oriented critique.

"On the other hand, if you take the next step,
and say that human beings cannot be other than
walking robots, demonocally preprogrammed ... then
you in all reality, apart from the self-contradictory
and irrational in such a viewpoint, you are almost
bound to only reinforce the moralist forces."

This makes no sense whatsoever - to oppose something
is to reinforce it?!  I would say, rather, that to
give an inch to the moral majority is to give a mile,
because by affirming they are right to some degree,
you affirm their belief in their own rightness and
just confirm yourself to be a weak-willed waverer.

In the rightist worldview in its most typical forms,
there are three kinds of people - the decent people
(rightists), the anti-social (people who disagree
strongly and militantly or who deviate strongly from
rightist standards), and the flip-floppers (who
identify with the "decent" community but hold back
from endorsing the whole rightist agenda).  There is
no point trying to be a flip-flopper because it just
reinforces their sense of being the in-group and
convinces them you are inferior.  It is only by
identifying with the voiceless in their model - by
becoming the Other, the "anti-social" - that one can
confront the rightists with a discourse they cannot
answer.

Also, the point here is not some crude political
instrumentalism, but an affirmation of fact.  The
nonexistence of the molar self is demonstrated by
evidence from many fields.  Are you, Harald, saying we
should discount and throw to the winds this evidence,
because it is politically uncomfortable and
inconvenient, because it takes us beyond the version
of political correctness imposed by the moral
majority?!?!?!  You may be prepared to compromise with
the powerful in such ways, but I am not.  I do not
manipulate my belief or disbelief in scientific
statements based on political exigencies.

"This again involves an understanding
of that people often tend to be contradictory,  and
this the great value of being able to have more than
one thought in ones head at a time. ( I am not able
to take your "Yeah, it's called schizophrenia" comment
seriously, surely you must understand that this is a
figure of speech.)"

You should know better than this Harald.  I have
Asperger syndrome, I don't "get" figures of speech.
If you want me to understand, say what you mean
literally.  As far as I'm concerned, "two thoughts in
your head" means schizophrenic.  Not that I've
anything against schizophrenics, but at the same time,
I recognise that a lot of people are NOT
schizophrenic, and therefore do not have two thoughts
in their head at the same time.  Now, if your figure
of speech has referential meaning, you should be able
to rephrase or explain it in directly referential
language, so I know what you mean.  If you can't, this
implies that it has no such meaning and is a kind of
Orwellian doublethink.

"Somewhat interesting in this context is Bakunin's
turning
Rousseau on his head, pretty much saying: people are
everywhere
born unfree but with the capacity of attaining freedom
and
developing their individualities through the combined
forces of
society. "

I've read plenty of Bakunin and never come across this
- where does he say it?  From what I can tell, Bakunin
usually explains either in terms of class or
nationality/ethnicity.  And Bakunin attaches a great
importance to "irrational" emotions (anger, and having
nothing to lose), as roots to social change.  In fact
I would tend to call Bakunin's theory (like
Stirner's), a confused, contradictory prefiguration of
a politics of desire.

"And then it becomes a question
of finding a middle ground of making demands on
oneself
and others, and try understanding the whys, so that to
bring
out a higher level of freedom and the power to take
responsibility over one's life."

A lot of bad metaphors there - higher versus lower, a
"middle ground" (to never follow through to its
conclusion, to compromise on desire)...  Precisely the
opposite, I suspect, of Bakunin's "freedom that does
not stop at the border of others' freedom, but expands
through contact with others".  Yours is, rather, a
liberal conception.

Not, BTW, that there's anything necessarily wrong with
emphasising mediation and mutuality, but it needs to
be understood pre-individually.  Bakhtin's dialogism
is a good start, because for Bakhtin, dialogue is not
a collision of two entities or monologues, but rather,
a mutual penetration of subjectivities which, for its
very possibility, depends on the molecularity and
openness of those who (or rather, the discoruses
which) enter into it.  In other words, effective
dialogue is not a dialogue of individuals (who in any
case will typically "change their minds" and be
unreliable), but a dialogue of desires and discourses
constructing a kind of social relation which is
actually realisable, instead of simply being a matter
of empty intent.  (c.f. also Guattari's essay on the
formation of social relations in La Borde, in the
"Molecular Revolution" collection).

"You seem to be caught within a dualistic model, where
just
because the moralists speak much about
responsibiliity,
this can simple be overcome by denying its validity
altogether.
This is no more rational than opposing Bush endeless
mantras about freedom, by opposing freedom
as such. It is wholly reactive."

You misunderstand my motives.  I oppose the ontology
of individual responsibility, not because I loathe the
Bushites, but because it is
1) disproven by a bulk of evidence, and
2) incomprehensible to me on a personal level.

And BECAUSE of this opposition, I oppose the Bushites
and their proposals, which are based on a belief I
take to be unfounded, misleading and oppressive.  You,
on the other hand, conform to the dominant common
sense and do not criticise its deepest categories,
thereby tying yourself by invisible threads to the
status quo.



		
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