Re: AUT: Progress

[chris wright <cwright@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

> Positivism (a bad placing of this term)

Fair enough...

would not be "passive" Being
> in Deleuze, if for Deleuze Being itself presupposes this
> internalization of difference. The difference is where "negativity" is
> situated. For the Hegelians its originary; for Deleuze it is
> derivative. By rooting progress to the negative, the Hegelian isn't
> able to account for affirmation (because if law negates phenomena,
> then the negation of phenomena equals what exactly? Not affirmation.

Eh?  I think this is an essential point for you (if law negates
phenomena, then the negation of phenomena equals what exactly?  Not
affirmation.)  However I admit that I have not got the slightest idea
what the hell that is supposed to mean.  That is not necessarily your
fault, but can you explain it in simple terms?  What do you mean by
'law'?  What do you mean by 'phenomena'?  What do you mean by 'law
negating phenomena'?

> Being thus has this weird relationship with Nothingness that while
> being very "complete" and "totaling" can only be so by abstracting
> being's "vitality" (to use Bergsonian language)). What "passivity" is
> in Deleuze's Being is thus not positivism but the derivative status of
> negativity (as far as I understand it).

By positivism, I did not have in mind post-Comte sociology, but the
seeming idea from your comment that Being 'is', a simple affirmation
Hegel would not stop at.  And as I do not understand your comment on the
derivative status of negtivity, I cannot be sure what you mean here
either.  I apologize, but I need to ask about these things because the
terminological differences make for added issues.

> The argument has been made before countlessly through this near
> mechanistic determinist reading of the Hegelian Marx that he
> "mispredicts" or "was wrong about" the fall of capitalism etc etc blah
> blah (we all heard that tired line before).

What does this mean?  It seems like a non-sequitir.\

The question it posed for
> the Marxian metaphysics was precisely along this point of discussion:
> where is the "freedom" of the subject situated within these
> antagonisms and negativities? Not only subjective freedom, but
> physical, chemical etc. Can Hegel account for them? Both Bergson and
> Deleuze (and separately Badiou) say that ultimately dialectics can't.
> I think its Bergson's metaphor that goes something like: dialectics'
> relationship with reality is like trying to drag a net through the
> sand and expecting to come out with the beach. (maybe that's wrong...
> but its something to that effect). This "perspective" is no doubt one
> of the reasons Foucault was so important for Negri, because he saw
> with him and not with a Hegelian Marx, a way to metamodelize "freedom"
> in a non-dialectical fashion that is still very Marxian (cf. the book
> of interviews with Foucault entitled Remarks on Marx).

"physical, chemical, etc.?"  Is that a joke?  You will pardon me if I
wonder what freedom molecules should have.  Again, I have no idea what
that means.

Badiou...  I was thinking about him in the discussion with Chris Hurl,
the whole 'spontaneity/event' thing is really Badiou's thing.  Zizek
loves that stuff.

Bergson's metaphor, disconnected from anything else, is just name
dropping and academicism.  That means nothing to me.

"metamodelize"?  Please speak clearly.  I mean, you put freedom in
quotes, but leave metamodelize out there as if that was a real word and
not some gibberish?

I can't respond to a word of this, Lowe.  I would like to, but you are
going to have clarify a bit in standard English.

Chris



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