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AUT: Some tenative observations
- Subject: AUT: Some tenative observations
- From: "George Pennefather" <poseidon@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 26 Sep 1999 09:54:25 +0100
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A few tentative observations on East Timorese developments.
It is clear that the imperialist forces that have descended on East =
Timor to ostensibly protect the civilian population against the =
pro-independence "militia" are a mere pretext for direct imperialist =
intervention to protect and advance the class interests of the =
imperialist bourgeoisie.
Now that the cold war period is effectively over imperialism no longer =
relies in the same way on the kind of regime that has ruled over =
Indonesia. Consequently it can suffer a facade of East Timorese =
independence involving formal democratic structures.
Imperialism has directly intervened in East Timor in order to protect =
and develop its oppressive hold over the world. East Timor will be =
effectively another "invisible" colony of imperialism. Australian =
capitalism is required to do Washington's work for a variety of reasons. =
One of them is Beijing. If Washington was to walk into East Timor as the =
main player China would become increasingly worried concerning the =
former's strategic intentions. China is highly sensitive to any direct =
intervention by Washington in that part of the world. Consequently =
direct military intervention by the Americans would most probably lead =
to a deterioration in relations between Beijing and Washington. At a =
time when relations between them have already deteriorated after its =
intervention in Kosova and its bombing of the Chinese embassy Washington =
would merely reduce the options available. Some other powers in that =
part of the world would experience greater uneasiness with a relatively =
large scale American military intervention too.
Any direct military intervention by the US might encourage closer =
co-operation between Russia and China. Already these two powers have =
been drawing closer together in the face of the growing power of =
American imperialism. Direct military intervention in East Timor would =
only encourage Russia/ Chinese unity. Furthermore it might also lead to =
greater unity between these two powers and other lesser powers under the =
threat from an increasingly powerful interventionist Washington. =
Consequently Washington has to avoid making moves that would foster =
unity around a Russian/Chinese axis. In view of this the ideal player =
for the role of chief bourgeois crusader is Australia. It is an "Asian" =
power and has been conducting itself over the last while --before the =
current difficulty- within that context rather than as a Western power =
within Asia.=20
Jakarta, on the other hand, if forced could play the Asian card and =
thereby increase bourgeois instability in that region. This could only =
but upset Washington strategic plans. This is what Washington fears even =
though it is a highly unlikely scenario. Jakarta can play this card by =
making things difficult for Cosgrove in East Timor through its =
deployment and reactivation of --its Trojan horse-- the "militia" in =
East Timor. By re-activating this force it can make things so difficult =
for Australia as to undermine its ability to impose and maintain =
imperialist stability in East Timor. As the situation there deteriorates =
--getting increasingly messy-- Canberra would be forced to pour more and =
more troops into the island. This force the Australian bourgeoisie to =
introduce conscription. This development together with the body bags =
returning home could adversely impact on the Australian regime. The =
conditions for the emergence of a mass anti-war protests might be =
created. There is always the remote possibility then that East Timor =
could lead to growing bourgeois instability in Australia itself and the =
consequent radicalisation of Australian politics. Apart from all this =
Australia would be effectively finished as a regional power --for some =
time-- capable of conducting the current kind of intervention in that =
region. Obviously neither Canberra nor Washington would be pleased with =
such a state of affairs. This would significantly upset Washington's =
strategic plans since no longer could it hope to use Australia to serve =
as its lieutenant in that region. Canberra's loss of credibility would =
further destabilise the situation in that part of the world and =
correspondingly strengthen China's regional status.
Furthermore Washington, under such circumstances, would be forced to =
intervene militarily in East Timor thereby exposing its naked =
imperialist aggressive intentions to other powers in that region thereby =
prompting them to seek protection under a Russia/China umbrella. The one =
thing Washington does not want is a Russian/Chinese bloc that includes =
other Asian powers. To avoid this Washington might be prepared to hand =
back East Timor to Indonesia.=20
At present the main danger facing many powers in the world is the =
growing power of US imperialism in the absence of an effective =
counterweight as the Soviet Union had been until its demise. With the =
Soviet "menace" gone it is becoming increasingly clear that the American =
"menace" is the new kid in town. It is becoming increasingly clear US =
imperialism, under the guise of "humanitarianism", is the new and =
growing danger to the freedom and sovereignty of many countries. What is =
now being gropingly sought is an effective counterweight to American =
expansionism --its new frontierism. The one thing that can unite China, =
Russia and Europe is their fear of an increasingly powerful US. The one =
thing they share in common is their growing fear of Washington. Among =
Washington's aims is the conduct of a strategic policy in such a way as =
to hinder and even prevent such a growing unity which might prove be =
extremely threatening to the US. In the aftermath of the cold war we are =
living in a period where a radical readjustment in international =
relations is proceeding. This readjustment introduces great uncertainty =
and fluidity to the world situation. This is why the waters are so muddy =
and will even get muddier before they settle down--if they do.
If Washington gets enmeshed in East Timor it can quite easily be =
perceived as a nakedly imperialist aggressor that must be challenged. =
The emergence of such a perception can quite easily lead to huge =
difficulties for Washington. It must be remembered too that the =
Indonesian control of West Timor serves as a base from which various =
kinds of attacks can be launched against any forces based in East Timor. =
This gives Indonesia a natural strategic advantage over both Australia =
and the United States. Even if a formal East Timorese independence is =
established a permanent Australian or American force may have to be =
permanently stationed in East Timor. This means that Indonesia depending =
on the situation can use West Timor as a base from which to launch =
attacks or sorties on either the security forces based in East Timor as =
a means of destabilising the situation or as a means of exerting =
leverage on Washington. Depending on how the situation evolves this =
kind of activity can be used to make Washington look like an imperialist =
aggressor and even weaken its grip on Asia. Washington does not want to =
have to abandon its "ethical" foreign policy since it has been in the =
recent past quite effective at concealing its real aggressive and =
oppressive intentions. It has also been a useful strategic device for =
rally support for its actions.
A big problem facing Indonesia is the instability it has been =
experiencing against the backdrop of recent economic meltdown. In =
exerting any leverage this may weaken its resolve. There is always the =
danger that Washington can threaten Jakarta with further domestic =
destabilisation if attempts to use its leverage to discredit Canberra. =
However there are limits to such threats since Washington may fear the =
break up of Indonesia to its own class interests. And then under =
conditions where things are so bad Jakarta may believe it has little to =
loose.
Warm regards
George Pennefather
Be free to check out our Communist Think-Tank web site at
http://homepage.tinet.ie/~beprepared/
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<DIV align=3Djustify>A few tentative observations on East Timorese=20
developments.</DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify> </DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify>It is clear that the imperialist forces that have =
descended=20
on East Timor to ostensibly protect the civilian population against the=20
pro-independence "militia" are a mere pretext for direct imperialist=20
intervention to protect and advance the class interests of the =
imperialist=20
bourgeoisie.</DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify> </DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify>Now that the cold war period is effectively over =
imperialism=20
no longer relies in the same way on the kind of regime that has ruled =
over=20
Indonesia. Consequently it can suffer a facade of East Timorese=20
independence involving formal democratic structures.</DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify> </DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify>Imperialism has directly intervened in East Timor =
in order to=20
protect and develop its oppressive hold over the world. East Timor will =
be=20
effectively another "invisible" colony of imperialism. Australian =
capitalism is=20
required to do Washington's work for a variety of reasons. One of them =
is=20
Beijing. If Washington was to walk into East Timor as the main player =
China=20
would become increasingly worried concerning the former's =
strategic=20
intentions. China is highly sensitive to any direct intervention by =
Washington=20
in that part of the world. Consequently direct military intervention by =
the=20
Americans would most probably lead to a deterioration in relations =
between=20
Beijing and Washington. At a time when relations between them have =
already=20
deteriorated after its intervention in Kosova and its bombing of the =
Chinese=20
embassy Washington would merely reduce the options available. Some other =
powers=20
in that part of the world would experience greater uneasiness with a =
relatively=20
large scale American military intervention too.</DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify> </DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify>Any direct military intervention by the US might =
encourage=20
closer co-operation between Russia and China. Already these two powers =
have been=20
drawing closer together in the face of the growing power of American=20
imperialism. Direct military intervention in East Timor would only =
encourage=20
Russia/ Chinese unity. Furthermore it might also lead =
to greater unity=20
between these two powers and other lesser powers under the threat =
from an=20
increasingly powerful interventionist Washington. Consequently =
Washington=20
has to avoid making moves that would foster unity around a=20
Russian/Chinese axis. In view of this the ideal player for the role =
of=20
chief bourgeois crusader is Australia. It is an "Asian" power and =
has been=20
conducting itself over the last while --before the =
current difficulty-=20
within that context rather than as a Western power within Asia. =
</DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify> </DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify>Jakarta, on the other hand, if forced could =
play the=20
Asian card and thereby increase bourgeois instability in that region. =
This could=20
only but upset Washington strategic plans. This is what Washington fears =
even=20
though it is a highly unlikely scenario. Jakarta can play this card by =
making=20
things difficult for Cosgrove in East Timor through its deployment and=20
reactivation of --its Trojan horse-- the "militia" in East Timor. By=20
re-activating this force it can make things so difficult for Australia =
as=20
to undermine its ability to impose and maintain imperialist =
stability in=20
East Timor. As the situation there deteriorates --getting increasingly =
messy--=20
Canberra would be forced to pour more and more troops into the island. =
This=20
force the Australian bourgeoisie to introduce conscription. This =
development=20
together with the body bags returning home could adversely impact on the =
Australian regime. The conditions for the emergence of a mass anti-war =
protests=20
might be created. There is always the remote possibility then that East =
Timor=20
could lead to growing bourgeois instability in Australia itself and the=20
consequent radicalisation of Australian politics. Apart from all this =
Australia=20
would be effectively finished as a regional power --for some time-- =
capable of=20
conducting the current kind of intervention in that region. Obviously =
neither=20
Canberra nor Washington would be pleased with such a state of affairs. =
This=20
would significantly upset Washington's strategic plans since no longer =
could it=20
hope to use Australia to serve as its lieutenant in that region. =
Canberra's loss=20
of credibility would further destabilise the situation in that part of =
the world=20
and correspondingly strengthen China's regional status.</DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify> </DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify>Furthermore Washington, under such circumstances, =
would be=20
forced to intervene militarily in East Timor thereby exposing its naked=20
imperialist aggressive intentions to other powers in that region thereby =
prompting them to seek protection under a Russia/China umbrella. The one =
thing=20
Washington does not want is a Russian/Chinese bloc that includes other =
Asian=20
powers. To avoid this Washington might be prepared to hand back East =
Timor to=20
Indonesia. </DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify> </DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify>At present the main danger facing many powers in =
the world is=20
the growing power of US imperialism in the absence of an effective =
counterweight as the Soviet Union had been until its demise. With the =
Soviet=20
"menace" gone it is becoming increasingly clear that the American =
"menace" is=20
the new kid in town. It is becoming increasingly clear US imperialism, =
under the=20
guise of "humanitarianism", is the new and growing danger to the freedom =
and=20
sovereignty of many countries. What is now being gropingly sought is an=20
effective counterweight to American expansionism --its new frontierism. =
The one=20
thing that can unite China, Russia and Europe is their fear of an =
increasingly=20
powerful US. The one thing they share in common is their growing fear of =
Washington. Among Washington's aims is the conduct of a strategic policy =
in such=20
a way as to hinder and even prevent such a growing unity which might =
prove be=20
extremely threatening to the US. In the aftermath of the cold war we are =
living=20
in a period where a radical readjustment in international relations is=20
proceeding. This readjustment introduces great uncertainty and fluidity =
to the=20
world situation. This is why the waters are so muddy and will even get =
muddier=20
before they settle down--if they do.</DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify> </DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify>If Washington gets enmeshed in East Timor it can =
quite easily=20
be perceived as a nakedly imperialist aggressor that must be challenged. =
The=20
emergence of such a perception can quite easily lead to huge =
difficulties for=20
Washington. It must be remembered too that the Indonesian control of =
West Timor=20
serves as a base from which various kinds of attacks can be launched =
against any=20
forces based in East Timor. This gives Indonesia a natural strategic =
advantage=20
over both Australia and the United States. Even if a formal East =
Timorese=20
independence is established a permanent Australian or American =
force may=20
have to be permanently stationed in East Timor. This means that =
Indonesia=20
depending on the situation can use West Timor as a base from which to =
launch=20
attacks or sorties on either the security forces based in East Timor as =
a means=20
of destabilising the situation or as a means of exerting leverage on =
Washington.=20
Depending on how the situation evolves this kind of activity can =
be used=20
to make Washington look like an imperialist aggressor and even weaken =
its grip=20
on Asia. Washington does not want to have to abandon its "ethical" =
foreign=20
policy since it has been in the recent past quite effective at =
concealing its=20
real aggressive and oppressive intentions. It has also been a useful =
strategic=20
device for rally support for its actions.</DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify> </DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify>A big problem facing Indonesia is the instability =
it has been=20
experiencing against the backdrop of recent economic meltdown. In =
exerting any=20
leverage this may weaken its resolve. There is always the danger that =
Washington=20
can threaten Jakarta with further domestic destabilisation if attempts =
to use=20
its leverage to discredit Canberra. However there are limits to such =
threats=20
since Washington may fear the break up of Indonesia to its own class =
interests.=20
And then under conditions where things are so bad Jakarta may believe it =
has=20
little to loose.</DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify> </DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify>Warm regards<BR>George Pennefather</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify>Be free to check out our Communist Think-Tank web =
site=20
at<BR><A=20
href=3D"http://homepage.tinet.ie/~beprepared/">http://homepage.tinet.ie/~=
beprepared/</A></DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify> </DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify> </DIV></BODY></HTML>
------=_NextPart_000_0036_01BF0805.1DC56E40--
--- from list aut-op-sy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
- Thread context:
- AUT: Howard doctrine,
George Pennefather Tue 28 Sep 1999, 21:46 GMT
- AUT: English Chiapas al Dia 175 I,
CIEPAC Tue 28 Sep 1999, 16:09 GMT
- AUT: (fwd) (en) Italy, CORELLI concentration camp for deportees IN FLAMES - QUESTIONS IN PARLIAMENT (fwd),
Steve Wright Mon 27 Sep 1999, 21:41 GMT
- AUT: (fwd) (en) [caravan99] thoughts and actions (2)about the Autumn, the European fortresses and the borders (fwd),
Steve Wright Mon 27 Sep 1999, 11:47 GMT
- AUT: Some tenative observations,
George Pennefather Sun 26 Sep 1999, 08:54 GMT
- Re: AUT: globalisation?,
rc-am Sun 26 Sep 1999, 06:25 GMT
- AUT: Reformist FARC,
George Pennefather Sat 25 Sep 1999, 15:31 GMT
- AUT: Chiapas al Dia 176 E,
CIEPAC Fri 24 Sep 1999, 19:14 GMT
- AUT: English Chiapas al Dia 174 I,
CIEPAC Fri 24 Sep 1999, 18:45 GMT
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