AUT: English Chiapas al Dia 174 I

[CIEPAC <ciepac@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

ENGLISH VERSION OF "CHIAPAS AL DIA" BULLETIN No. 174
CIEPAC
CHIAPAS, MEXICO
(September 12, 1999)


BETWEEN THE WORDS AND THE ACTS,
BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR
(Second Part)


In his Fifth State of the Union report, President Ernesto Zedillo
whitewashed the Army's image by referring to the enforcement of Plan DN-III
in the Coast and the Sierra during the natural disaster caused by the rains
in September of 1998.  He did not, however, mention the excessive presence
of the armed forces in Chiapas.  We will now discuss this process.

The government's strategy has been the same for the Chiapas conflict as for
the strike by students at the Autonomous University of Mexico:  applying
the policies of exhaustion, orchestrating clashed between groups affiliated
with the government and those opposed to it, a lack of willingness to
resolve the problems, the carrying out television campaigns to negate the
just demands, while the government makes efforts to convince the public
that in both cases they are driven by legal actions aimed at pacification.

The government is trying to win the public to its side, through a strong
propaganda effort, deployed on the internet, radio, television and in the
press.  This is part of their policy of reinforcing the demands of state
actors, who are urging the government to take a hard line and who want a
more active role in the chiapaneco conflict, in order to fence in the
EZLN's national struggle.

It is in this milieu that Governor Albores Guillen has been increasingly
repositioning state police forces in the Selva, and where they are taking a
more active role, so much so that the state police are now in at least five
locations in the Selva.  There is a state government Political Commissioner
(Iran Camacho Zenteno) in Amador Hernandez, and Governor Albores is
demanding the state's "autonomy" from the federal government in order to
resolve the conflict.  It is this logic that led him to call for the
creation of a state COCOPA, while, at the same time, and in a threatening
tone, he broadcast a speech in the community of San Quintin, close to La
Realidad (where Subcomandante Marcos can presumably be found) saying that
"the EZLN is a paper tiger and we're going to show that in actions, I'll
assume the risks" (La Jornada newspaper, 8/12/99).  In order to legitimize
their actions and words, the state government has vainly made many efforts,
organizing marches, rallies and demonstrations in their support.  But
things have not gone well for them, with, in many cases, not more than a
hundred persons showing up.

The counterinsurgency is, thus, advancing at different timetables and
times.  What is evolving today has many aspects, but we shall only mention
a few.  One such is the policy of community division, and the introduction
of roads as part of the creation of a war infrastructure.  Another is the
wearing down of sectors opposed to the government, and especially to
isolate the EZLN.  This policy is, of course, being dictated from the
highest levels of the federal government, ordering the state government and
all the police forces and institutions to enforce a policy of "divide and
conquer" in Chiapas.

In those places and regions where there is no police or military presence,
it is the municipal presidents who are carrying out this policy.  They
order PRI representatives to cut off electrical and water service, to
control the sale of basic goods in the Conasupo stores.  Everything is
deployed against the zapatistas, against PRD activists, organized civil
society, independent social organizations, against catechists and against
everything that is opposed to the regime.  Along these lines, special
mention should be made of the building of new Catholic chapels by PRI
activists, who are trying to separate themselves from the parishes
belonging to the Diocese of San Cristobal.  They argue that they do not
want "to get involved in politics," but what they are trying to do is to
set the stage that will, in the midterm, be favorable for the
deconstructing of the Diocese pastoral line, and which will allow the
entrance of religious groups that are against the pastoral line, such as
the "Apostles of the Word," the "Amartulis," "Legionnaires of Christ,"
etcetera.

In the majority of cases, the state government utilizes the municipal
presidents to fan the flames of internal conflicts, especially in those
places where the PRI is in power.  The state press reports news items every
day in which the affected communities and sectors denounce municipal
presidents and PRI representatives in the communities for exacerbating the
conflicts, whether it be cutting off electric or piped water service to
those in civil resistance, trying to force them to change their positions
and to join the PRI.  In the majority of these cases, Public Security
Police put themselves at the service of the PRIs, lending them protection
when confrontations occur.  An example of this took place in the community
of El Portal, municipality of Comalapa, in July, when PRIs showed up with
weapons and fired on 40 EZLN support bases when they were trying to
reconnect the water service that had been cut by PRIs.  A group of Public
Security police officers were present during these incidents, and they did
not act to disarm the PRIs.  Instead, they allowed them to fire, wounding 2
persons, and they then detained 3 persons who were put in jail.  Incidents
such as this happen every day in Chiapas.

Another aspect has been the selective delivery of funds to only those
communities that belong to the PRI, ignoring the opposition.

The Roads and the Army

The building of roads is part of the counterinsurgency policy, since - if
the government wanted to create development in the communities - it should
continue the San Andres negotiations until it reached Table 3 (Wellbeing
and Development) in the negotiations between the Government and the EZLN.
It should be remembered that the negotiations were suspended on September
2, 1996, because president Zedillo failed to carry out the accords signed
at the First Table (Indigenous Rights and Culture) on February 16, 1996.
Zedillo refused to honor what he had signed, and he proposed new
legislation in the matter.

As progress is made towards a peaceful solution, militarization should
decrease.  The opposite occurred, however:  paramilitarization increased,
new violent groups were emerging that acted against EZLN support bases, and
the number of displaced grew.

However, as everyone knows, the EZLN - through the Autonomous
Municipalities - began a policy of resistance, conditional on the carrying
out of the San Andres Accords.  The highways are being built as a war
infrastructure, and it is being done in order to provoke the zapatistas,
while saying "they [the zapatistas] are opposed to development."  The
recent incidents created by the topographical studies for the building of a
road in Amador Hernandez, in Ocosingo, demonstrate this.  There are other,
very similar cases, such as the branches of roads they are trying to build
between El Eden and Francisco Villa, between La Esperanza and Guadalupe
Tepeyac, and one other between the community of Veracruz and Santo Tomas,
all of them in the municipality of Las Margaritas.  Other examples are
those in the communities Santa Martha and Betania and the stretch between
Las Tacitas-La Sultana in Ocosingo.  The community of Moises Gandhi, the
municipal seat of the Che Guevara Autonomous Municipality, denounced
attempts by the PRI and the Army to cross the Autonomous Municipality from
Cuxulja and past the community of Virginia.

The stretch of road between Amador Hernandez and San Quintin has not been
suspended  The topographical studies for the building of the road have
simply been diverted towards the community of Nuevo Chapultepec.  The
common - and strategical - element of the roads in Ocosingo is that they
all lead to San Quintin, where there is a very large air strip and more
than 3000 soldiers in the largest military operations center close to La
Realidad.  Similarly, the other road works in the municipality of Las
Margaritas - that have been, up to this point, suspended because of the
zapatista resistance - connect with the road that goes from Las
Margaritas-La Realidad-San Quintin.  The roads they are attempting to build
would appear to be the closing of the pincers on the EZLN General Command.

The conflict going on in Los Chimalapas, in the municipality of Cintalapa,
is also due to the building of a road between the municipality of
Ocozocoautla, Chiapas and Cozoleacaque, Veracruz, where the army recently
established itself in the communities of Rodulfo Figueroa and Cal y Mayor,
in the municipality of Cintalapa.  It is also one of the excuses the state
government is using to attack Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia and to strike at
him prior to his being declared the official candidate of the Opposition
Alliance for the year 2000 elections.

Along with the motive of building roads, is the excuse of reforestation and
the fight against drugs.  Sufficient motives for the federal Army, Public
Security Police and other police forces to have been repositioned in other
locations of strategic value.

According to the count made by CIEPAC, so far this year, in Ocosingo alone,
the Army has taken up new positions in about 30 locations, particularly in
the Montes Azules Biosphere in the Selva Lacandona.  One of the places
where there was the greatest increase in checkpoints and camps was in the
Canada of Palestina, entering at Palenque, until it connects with the
Canada of Taniperlas.  Police and military forces have been installed in a
total of 35 sites, with the municipalities of Cintalapa, Mazapa de Madero,
La Trinitaria, Ocosingo and San Cristobal de Las Casas being among the most
notable.

Because of this, the Law for Dialogue, Conciliation and a Dignified Peace
in Chiapas - which has kept alive the hopes for the renewal of negotiations
- has become superfluous in the current situation.  It has served the
government for strictly decorative purposes, with their words of dialogue
and negotiation, while their actions speak of war.  The only aspect of the
law that is in effect is the existence of the Commission of Concordance and
Peace (COCOPA), since the cease-fire had already been broken on January 12,
1998, when Public Security Police fired on social organizations of the
Coalition of Autonomous Organizations of Ocosingo (COAO) when they were
holding a march in that municipality, killing Guadalupe Mendez of the
municipality of Altamirano.  Soldiers recently detained three indigenous
and wounded two others in the community of San Jose la Nueva Esperanza in
the municipality of Las Margaritas.

The COCOPA has been the only place to which social organizations and
sectors affected by the war have been able to take their protests.  But the
COCOPA has many limitations  as a coadvisory body.  It is not a mediation
body, and therefore its scope of action is much reduced.  One of the
largest stumbling blocks is that everything is decided by consensus.  It is
enough for just one of its members, therefore - generally legislators from
the official party of the PRI - to not be in agreement, in order for them
to not take actions for peace.

Nonetheless, recent events in Amador Hernandez, the introduction of more
than 5000 soldiers into the Selva Lacandona - and especially into the
Montes Azules Biosphere - have managed to put Chiapas on the front pages of
the national and international press.  Once again, those social actors
concerned with what goes on in Chiapas are going to re-emerge.  The
caravans, the international protests, like those in Spain, Argentina, the
United States and others, are present once again.  Once again the political
parties, NGOs, organized students, the Church, are appearing on the on the
scene, in order to protest what is happening in Chiapas.  Instead of
isolating the EZLN, it is again securing the support of national and
international sectors.  Their communiques are once again appearing,
impacting at all levels, denouncing what is taking place.  The national and
international press are showing interest in interviewing Subcomandante Marcos.

The government, however, in the middle of an election campaign, is trying
to move all the pieces it has within its reach in order to legitimize
Francisco Labastida Ochoa as the official candidate.  Thus the Episcopal
Commission for Reconciliation in Chiapas made a visit to Chiapas in August,
in order to meet with the state government, the Bishops of the Diocese of
San Cristobal, and, lastly, with representatives of some of the displaced
from the Northern and Los Altos regions of Chiapas.

The government is trying to have the Bishops be the ones to convince the
displaced to return, without taking into consideration the causes that gave
rise to the forced displacements, such as militarization and
paramilitarization.  The visit by the Bishops to Chiapas was manipulated by
the government.  The day after their meeting with the government, local
newspapers ran photographs on the front page of the meeting with the state
government, giving the false impression that they supported the
government's policies.  The visit by the Bishops was also the smokescreen
put up over the criticisms being made by PRI presidential aspirants of
Roberto Albores Guillen, for his having put the entire machinery of his
government at the disposal of Francisco Labastida Ochoa during his trip to
Chiapas.

Given the current situation, those actors in civil society must reassert
themselves and make concrete proposals for the solution in Chiapas, based
on the 10 CONAI-COCOPA points, which will allow the negotiations to be
revived.

Following the wide participation by civil society in the March 21 Consulta,
it was noted that that civil society is alert to what is going on in
Chiapas.  However, as long as there are no reasons or proposals to motivate
them, they remain immobile.  They act only in intermittent waves, in
response to the risks of the renewal of war.

Today, civil society must move towards the building of an intermediation
with credibility and the trust of the actors in the war (federal
government-EZLN), which will seek alternative measures for the definitive
solution to the chiapaneco problems, without ignoring the national problems.

Note:  You can find a map with the new 1999 military positions in Chiapas
on the web page.


Onecimo Hidalgo

Center   of   Economic   and    Political    Investigations   of  Community
 Action,   A.C.
CIEPAC
CIEPAC, member of the "Convergence of Civil Organizations for Democracy"
National Network (CONVERGENCIA), and member of RMALC (Mexico Action Network
on Free Trade)

 ******************************************
Translated by irlandesa for CIEPAC, A.C.
******************************************

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CIEPAC, A.C.
Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Políticas de Acción Comunitaria
Eje Vial Uno Número 11
Col. Jardines de Vista Hermosa
29297 San Cristóbal, Chiapas, MEXICO

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