AUT: English Chiapas al Dia 173 I

[CIEPAC <ciepac@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

ENGLISH VERSION OF "CHIAPAS AL DIA" BULLETIN No. 173
CIEPAC
CHIAPAS, MEXICO
(September 11, 1999)


BETWEEN THE WORDS AND THE DEEDS,
BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR
(First Part)


THE WORDS OF PEACE

On September 7, the federal government launched a "new" strategy for
"peace" in Chiapas, with "completely new" elements.  The Secretary of
Government, Diodoro Carrasco Altamirano, accompanied by Governor Roberto
Albores Guillen and the coordinator of government bodies for dialogue and
negotiation, Emilio Rabasa, read the government proposal through an open
letter to the EZLN.  We will make some observations concerning the proposal
here.

According to the document:  "The Federal Government is deploying intensive
social and economic policies against poverty, of humanitarian aid to the
displaced, and of support to the marginalized communities in the state,
insisting on the renewal of dialogue with the EZLN.  President Zedillo has
reiterated that the measures with which to continue dealing with the
conflicts that concern Mexicans ' will be legality, never authoritarianism;
 tolerance, never violent confrontations;  and social responsibility, never
insensitivity or indifference'."

Concerning the above, it is enough to remember the obvious:  poverty in
Chiapas, military harassment and the worsening of conflicts have reached
such an extreme that there is fear that at any moment there could be
confrontations between indigenous, and between indigenous and the federal
Army.  The majority of the more than 21,000 displaced who do not agree with
state policies are not receiving the humanitarian aid that state and
federal governments say they are sending.  What the federal Government is
indeed deploying are more military camps and soldiers in the indigenous
communities (see Second Part).

The government proposal is based on six points.  We will review each one of
them:

1)  "The Government of the Republic has always been convinced of the
necessity of fully carrying out the San Andres Accords, which it signed
with the EZLN in February of 1996.  In order to honor its commitment, it
sent to the Congress of the Union a proposal for constitutional reform on
indigenous rights and culture.  For its part, the EZLN has expressed its
approval of the COCOPA proposal.

"In order to make progress towards the solution to the conflict, the
Government is calling on the Senate of the Republic to determine the
mechanism through which the committees can include, in their review, other
legislation and information in matters of indigenous rights and culture, in
the light of the Accords of San Andees Larrainzar.  These documents can be
sent jointly, by the Government and the EZLN.  And also, that the
legislative committees make it possible to listen to other points of view,
those of the EZLN and of other interested organizations and persons.

"With these completely new elements, we shall be able to call on the Senate
of the Republic to consider writing the constitutional reform on indigenous
rights and culture during the current regular session."

That is like saying:  "We are making another proposal, based on all the
proposals, laws, and on whatever anyone else wants to express an opinion
on."  In the joint communique from the now disappeared National
Intermediation Commission (CONAI) and the Commission of Concordance and
Peace (COCOPA), of January 22, 1998 - where they presented 10 conditions as
a strategy for disentangling the dialogue following the massacre at Acteal
- they stated, concerning the first, the fulfillment of the San Andres
Accords:  "The realization of the San Andres Accords in matters of
indigenous rights and culture, is the central issue in the crisis in which
the dialogue currently finds itself.  The renewal of the dialogue depends
fundamentally on their fulfillment.  The strategy for reactivating the
dialogue, then, should first be legislative reforms in indigenous matters."
 The CONAI and the COCOPA believe that the legislative proposal on
Indigenous Rights and Culture (Table 1) - based on the results of the San
Andres dialogue and formulated by the COCOPA legislators in November of
1996, at the request of the EZLN and the Federal Government - is the
document that both parties must present to the Congress of the Union for
its approval.

The EZLN announced its position on March 1, 1998, in a communique on this
point, which also forms part of its five conditions for renewal of the
dialogue:  "By deciding (President Ernesto Zedillo) to present their
indigenous legislative proposal to the Congress of the Union, the federal
Executive is failing to carry out the San Andres Accords in two senses:
one, because the Accords note that they should be presented to the bodies
of national debate jointly;  and the other, because the Executive's
proposal does not recognize the documents signed by its representatives in
San Andres.  It is based upon the federal executive's conception of the
indigenous problem, and not in the program of the new relationship between
the Indian peoples and the Mexican nation as, and how, it was agreed at the
dialogue table.  These accords received the support of national and
international civil society, of the chambers of Deputies and Senators, of
the National Intermediation Commission and of the COCOPA.  With its "new"
strategy, the Department of Government is mocking everyone (?)  The
unilateral action of presenting an indigenous legislative proposal - whose
approval had already been agreed to by legislators in agreement with
Zedillo - without the consent of the counterpart - the EZLN and the Indian
peoples - does not mean the disentanglement of dialogue.  On the contrary,
if it continues forward, dialogue will collapse definitively.  Confidence
and credibility are being destroyed through this action:  one cannot
dialogue and negotiate in order to reach agreements, if there is no
confidence that the parties are going to comply."

Meanwhile, the federal government is casting a web and setting a trap over
the historical memory of the process.  It proposes that the Senate
incorporate other legislation, analysis and information, which have already
been widely incorporated, discussed and reflected upon in the negotiating
process of Table 1, with hundreds of presentations and discussion tables in
order to create consensus.  It is exactly this process, in which civil
society participated so broadly, that the government does not want to
accept. What guarantees are there that the government would now carry out
the gathering of information?  In any event, it is now trying to move the
scene of discussions from the Chamber of Deputies and the Commission of
Concordance and Peace (COCOPA), made up of legislators from the various
political parties, to the Chamber of the Senate, which is controlled by a
PRI majority, or, rather, by the Executive branch.

The "completely new" aspect, the addition of a new actor, the Senate,
controlled by President Zedillo, is, in reality, the last bastion, where it
is relatively easy to pass new legislative proposals.  On the other hand,
it is proposing the approval of the legislative changes in indigenous
rights and culture matters during the next session of the Congress of the
Union, when the appearances by cabinet members and a review of the strongly
criticized Fifth presidential State of the Union will be imminent.

2)  "The EZLN is called upon to draw up an agenda for the complete carrying
out of the other commitments agreed to at San Andres, especially those
having to do with the development of the indigenous communities of the
state of Chiapas."

That is like saying:  "Now that I have already created new municipalities,
that I have unilaterally implemented a state law on Indigenous Rights and
Culture, that I have created Justices of the Peace, that have I granted
amnesty to the paramilitaries, that I have increased militarization, do you
have something to share?"

The federal and state governments have launched a legislative offensive in
which they have carried out unilateral actions, and which have, in some
cases, involved illegalities and a failure to comply with the commitments
of San Andres:  a) the Army continues its advance, both in numbers and
positions;  b) the new, recently created municipalities, in some instances
with imposed processes, with irregular and illegal mechanisms, such as
their recently created officials;  c) the justices of the peace;  d) the
recently approved State Law on Indigenous Rights and Culture;  e) the
imposition of counterinsurgent highways, such as in Amador Hernandez, and
now the warning signs that are being announced in the "Che Guevara"
Autonomous Municipality in the community of Moises Gandhi, through which
the army wants to run its new highway;  f) and the law granting amnesty to
the paramilitaries, among other unilateral measures.  Thus, what is still
obvious to Mexicans and the public is the government's lack of will to make
progress in the social, political, economic and military conditions that
would renew the dialogue of peace.

3)  "The Department of Government, in accordance with the Law, calls on the
proper bodies for the release of EZLN members or sympathizers who are not
involved in incidents of violence or rapes."

"In order to complete this process, we consider it necessary to examine,
along with the EZLN, the cases of persons whom they recognize as their
support bases, and who have been accused of infractions of the law, in
order to review the complaints against them."


  That is like saying:  "I just found out there are political prisoners,
and I didn't know that the ones I'd put in prison were zapatistas."  The
release of the zapatista prisoners was one of the CONAI and COCOPA's 10
conditions, as well as one of the EZLN's five, for the renewal of dialogue.
 And now we can celebrate the fact that the government has the political
will to release them.  The government, however, wants the EZLN to pay a
very high price:  to have them sitting down at the negotiation table in
order to listen to what the world already knows:  the names of the
prisoners of The Voice of Cerro Hueco who need to be released.  If the EZLN
sits down to discuss this, the government can refuse to accept the list of
prisoners, and another break-off in the dialogue would be very costly.

4)  "The Government will carefully review the denunciations of harassment
and other illicit acts that have been noted by various human rights
organizations, the communities themselves or persons affected.  The PGR
will establish a special program in order to learn about and review these
cases, providing the witnesses with the necessary protection through the
office that it will establish in the state of Chiapas."

"At the same time, measures shall be taken to ensure that in no case shall
groups or persons who have committed a crime go unpunished.

"Under the current conditions in the State of Chiapas, this action demands
the maximizing of measures in order to avoid that the prosecution of
offenders serve as an excuse for new injustices or irregularities.  It is
appropriate to examine, jointly, the actions that should be taken by the
Federal Government, the communities and the EZLN, independently of
political affiliation or social sympathies."

That is like stating:  "If you sit down to negotiate, I'll carry out the
law."  Not allowing crimes to go unpunished is an obligation in itself of
the government and the relevant law enforcement bodies.  It is a task they
should have completed years ago, when the communities, the statements, the
deaths, the displaced, the evidence and the thousands of denunciations were
more than sufficient to act according to the law.  Enforcement of the law
is not negotiable, nor can it be made conditional in order to establish
dialogue.  Justice is not a favor given by the authorities to the
indigenous communities or to society. It is not a concession, it is a
constitutional duty.  Likewise, the process of punishing those responsible
for the Acteal massacre has not been completed, in the same way that other
cases have gone unpunished.

5)  The Federal Government is especially interested in guaranteeing the
efficacy of dialogue, and it agrees to the establishment of a new
intermediation body, civil and nonpartisan, made up of Mexicans of
recognized impartiality, endowed with sufficient ability to convene, to
function as interlocutors and to make decisions, in order to hold
constructive meetings between, and with, the parties.  It also endorses the
importance of the COCOPA's coadvisory work, and it has invited it to
intensify the important charge conferred upon it by the Law for Dialogue.
We will proceed to reconstruct the government delegation in the Commission
of Monitoring and Verification, and to request the resumption of its work.

In this point, it would appear that the government wants, in reality, to
reactivate three fundamental instruments for dialogue:  a) The Mediation
that it destroyed in June of 1998 and which, with the currently proposed
elements, would reject out of hand the return of Bishop Samuel Ruiz;  b)
The Coadvisory work of the COCOPA legislators, which carries within in it
the seeds of its own demise:  the consensus of the political parties in
order to make decisions and public statements, which, with the PRI veto,
has always caused this body to be ineffective; and c) the Monitoring and
Verification of the accords that have not yet been carried out.

The reactivation of the COSEVER was also one of the 10 proposals of the
CONAI and the COCOPA.  At that time they stated that it depended, in large
measure, and in the first place, not so much on the governmental
representation in the body - that had not been discussed or analyzed,
despite the demands of some of the members -  but rather on the matters on
which they acted, which could, in fact, be the 10 conditions themselves.
The government never responded to this demand.  In addition, in a public
communique (April 1, 1998), members of the COSEVER -incumbents,
replacements and invitees of the EZLN - stated the reasons for which that
Commission had been inactive.

6)  The government representation that will be able to meet with the EZLN
will have sufficient decision making capacity and will to negotiate.  It
will be open to creating a negotiation agenda jointly with the EZLN, that
will include various measures in order to give immediate and urgent
attention to the communities who have been most affected by the conflict,
such as the return of the displaced to their communities of origin and a
mechanism for permanent communication between the parties.

That is like admitting:  "I deceived you before.  Now I will send someone
who will negotiate seriously."  This is one of the five conditions the EZLN
presented for the renewal of dialogue.  We celebrate the government's
political will to dialogue and to negotiate.  The government is, however
emphasizing immediate responses, and not the causes.  Not the problem of
how the displaced can return.  There, the indigenous stand alone, instead
of the government enforcing the law against the paramilitary groups that
displaced them, and against those who support, help, back and finance them.
 Similarly, the withdrawal of the military camps, who have also been the
cause of the displacements.

The government tried once again to get the EZLN to sit down at the
negotiating table in the midst of the following:  even days after the Fifth
Presidential State of the Union - where important issues on the national
agenda were omitted during President Zedillo's speech, such as Chiapas;
several weeks since the violence in the Northern region, provoked by the
divisions within the heart of the Peace and Justice group, which could
erupt in violent incidents;  24 hours from when an official campesino
organization created violence in the municipal seat of Palenque, leaving
injuries and one death, with accusations of bad management of public funds
by the PRI municipal president;  a few weeks since the start of one of the
Army's largest military incursions in Ocosingo and Altamirano;  a few days
from the breaking once again of the cease-fire by the federal Army, which
resulted in wounded in the community of San Jose La Esperanza;  a few weeks
from when the tension had begun in Amador Hernandez, etcetera.

It is difficult to believe in the government's willingness to dialogue and
to carry out its word.  How is it possible to expect a response from the
EZLN when it is having to evade the federal Army, which is pursuing them
throughout the entire Selva Lacandona - in order to avoid the spilling of
blood?  And we might ask ourselves:  Why is the government making this
proposal now?  They have always held that the EZLN refuses to accept the
calls to dialogue because it wants to influence state and federal elections
in the year 2000 in a way that would impact negatively on the interests of
the government and the official party.  From this, we could formulate a
hypothesis:  if the government were not anticipating a defeat, rather than
a strengthening in the elections, they would be able to equally continue
with their policies of wearing down, without attempting to reach dialogue.
But the opposite makes us think that the purpose of this proposal could be
to keep the Chiapas conflict from being one of the most important stumbling
blocks affecting the year 2000 elections.

In summary, among the 10 conditions that the CONAI and the COCOPA presented
in January of 1998 in order to disentangle the suspension of the dialogue,
and the EZLN's five conditions, the government should now carry out the
following agenda, that has been demanded for many years now:

1)  Release the zapatista indigenous prisoners.

2)  Withdraw the forward military positions that the military forces made
after the Law for Dialogue and Negotiation (see Second Part).

3)  Eliminate interim governor Roberto Albores' unilateral actions:  the
state indigenous rights and culture law, redistricting and the amnesty law
for paramilitary groups.

4)  Enforce justice in the Acteal massacre and indemnify the material losses.

5)  Carry out the San Andres Accords, changing the Political Constitution
of the Republic of Mexico in accordance with the proposal made by the PRI,
PAN, PRD and PT legislators who made up the COCOPA.

6)  Name a new coordinator for dialogue with the capacity for negotiation
and decision-making.

7)  Enforce the law against paramilitary groups and those who support them.

8)  Make a serious proposal in order to continue with Table 2, Democracy
and Justice, a process that was cut short one step before definitive
accords were formulated.

Once these commitments are carried out, one will be able to speak of
political will, and then the following steps would be possible:  a meeting
between the federal Government and the EZLN in order to define the
immediate agenda and to make up a new Mediation.

On the other hand, this government proposal tells us that the strategy
being implemented by interim governor Roberto Albores Guillen is not
working:  to try to reduce the conflict to Chiapas, to be the person who is
the interlocutor with the EZLN, to establish a state coadvisory and
mediation, among others.  Left to his own, the situation in Chiapas reached
such an extreme that the Chiapas conflict once more returned to the
national agenda and as a priority.

Losing historic memory could be very costly for the peace process.  When
the government launched the February 1995 offensive, the federal Army went
in and achieved more military positions in indigenous areas.  Once the
objective of military advancement had been met, it was "willing" to
negotiate the rules of dialogue from its new position, not without many
difficulties and violence.  During the Table 1 and Table 2 negotiations,
the violence and provocations by the government and the federal Army
achieved their mission:  the suspension of negotiations.  The peace process
has, thus, had at least two characteristics:  1) a parallel increase in
violence, in provocation and in the crisis of social indices (greater
division, more displacements, more prisoners, more paramilitaries, more
soldiers, etc.);  and, 2) the failure to carry out what was agreed.
Something similar is happening now.  The legal and military strategy
against the EZLN and society is being reinforced, and the counterpart is
asked for a new dialogue.

Next week, during September 15, 16 and 17, campesino and indigenous
organizations are calling on society for a march from the municipal seat of
Ocosingo to the community of Amador Hernandez in the same municipality, in
order to demand the withdrawal of the federal Army, the resignation of
Albores and a jointly agreed upon transition government.  Among the
organizations are:  the Coalition of Autonomous Organizations of Ocosingo
(COAO), the Front of Political Parties of Ocosingo (FREPPO), the
Independent Central of Agricultural Workers and Campesinos (CIOAC), the
Emiliano Zapata Campesino Organization of Ocosingo (OCEZ), the Multi-Ethnic
Autonomous Regions of Chiapas (RAP-ANIPA), the Association of Debtors to
Credit Institutions of Cintalapa (ADICCIN), the Emiliano Zapata Proletariat
Organization (OPEZ-BFP), the Association of Debtors of Credit Institutions
of Chiapas (ADITOCH), the Student Movement of Revolutionary
Internationalists (MERI), the Union of Independent Coffee Growers (UPIC),
the Coordinator of Coffee Growers of Soconusco (CCS) and the UNORCA of
Chiapas.

Soon , at the national level, and with the participation of Chiapas, civil
society will, in an organized manner, and with dozens of civil
organizations (NGOs), campesino, indigenous organizations, etc., will draw
up and discuss the civil agenda aimed at building a national program.  It
would appear the organizations are once again finding sources in order to
channel the same demands and to strengthen their social power.

The paper war is now going to intensify, that of the struggle for the
credibility of the evaluations concerning the country, of the truth and the
lie in the public arena of the media, in order to create consensus.  We
will speak of these on another occasion.  Nonetheless, on September 8, in
an event unprecedented in the history of the country, the four aspirants
from the official party for the presidency of the Republic, participated in
a televised public debate, where they accused each other, were at least
able to reach a consensus that could be a response to the Fifth
Presidential State of the Union:  what has happened up to this point is the
creation of more poverty, marginalization and injustice in the country.

Gustavo Castro

Center   of   Economic   and    Political    Investigations   of  Community
 Action,   A.C.
CIEPAC
CIEPAC, member of the "Convergence of Civil Organizations for Democracy"
National Network (CONVERGENCIA), and member of RMALC (Mexico Action Network
on Free Trade)

 ******************************************
Translated by irlandesa for CIEPAC, A.C.
******************************************

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