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Fwd: AUT: East Timor



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From: "John Roosa" <jproosa@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: <Montyneill@xxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: AUT: East Timor
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 1999 13:01:37 +0700
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Monty, Please post to the list. John
*******************
I have to admit that I've found the discussion on this list a bit
ridiculous. I don't think that is just because I happen to be in the middle
of the emergency here. Even if I was not living under the current pressures,
I think I'd think the same thing. Contributors have not bothered to learn
the basic aspects of the East Timorese situation and have busied themselves
with fitting it into some paradigm they know (or think they know).

It is, for instance, ridiculous to debate whether or not the UN or some
international force should or should not intervene. Under the May 5
agreement between Indonesia, Portugal and the UN, it was stipulated that
Indonesia would turn East Timor over to the UN if the majority of the East
Timorese rejected the offer of greater autonomy within Indonesia. It was
known since May that international troops would enter if the East Timorese
opted for independence. A transitional government would be set up and the
foreign troops phased out as a new governmental structure was established.
The only question since September 4, when Indonesia began its scorched earth
policy, has been how quickly the international force should arrive.
Indonesia insisted on holding East Timor until November. Thankfully, the UN,
the US, and Australia did not listen to this list and forced Indonesia to
accept foreign troops immediately.

It is also ridiculous to argue that the CNRT leadership "organized a
situation in which they expected their success to be implemented either
through the accession to the vote [?] of the Indonesian military state or
from the actions of the UN or other outside forces ... they organized a
defeat." The fact is that they did not organize anything. The May 5
agreement was between Portugal, Indonesia, and the United Nations. The CNRT
was not a party to it. Under international law, East Timor has remained
under the authority of Portugal. It has been a non-self governing territory
that has not yet had an act of self-determination. The May 5 agreement
arranged that act of self-determination. The CNRT did agree to cooperate
with the process but objected to Portugal and the UN's willingness to
entrust "security"to the Indonesian police (in effect, the military). The
CNRT was not in control of the process. If it was, the Indonesian military
would have had to withdraw its troops prior to the ballot. If it was, the
referendum would not have been held in such a rush. (Prior to the May 5
agreement, the CNRT had a plan of its own for a 5 year transitional period
leading to the holding of an act of self-determination.)

It is also ridiculous to talk about helping the refugees as the sole
activity for solidarity activists. (By the way, exactly what are people of
this list doing to help the refugees? Or is this just some theoretical
position that sounds nice?) The refugee camps in West Timor are under the
control of the Indonesian military. The military is blocking aid, murdering
suspected pro-independence people, and sending in the militias to terrorize
the captives. A lot of these "refugees" are not refugees at all; they were
forcibly loaded into trucks and brought into West Timor. You are not going
to be able to help the refugees without ending the power of Indonesian
military over the East Timorese.

I think it is clear enough that the US and Australia knew about the
Indonesian military's post-ballot plans beforehand. US intelligence monitors
Indonesian military communications from Australia. And yes, it is clear that
both governments supported Indonesia's terror in East Timor for 24 years.
But whatever dirty tricks the US and Australia is up to, at this point there
is no other method to get Indonesian troops out but to get Australian troops
(among others) into East Timor -- and I think it should be clear that
getting the Indonesian troops out is the most important matter.

In case that isn't clear, let me backtrack a bit. The best way to think of
East Timor under Indonesia was as a large concentration camp, and I don't
mean in just a loose metaphorical sense. Since the collapse of the military
resistance by about 1980, the East Timorese lived like captives of war.
Soldiers were ubiquitous -- a platoon of 15 soldiers was stationed in each
village (and that wasn't even the half of the story) -- and lawless; they
raped any woman they wished. I do not think there was any place in the world
to compare to the severity, the intensity of the military occupation in East
Timor. The guerrillas fought some serious battles but they were not in any
position to protect the people from the military's power much less drive the
military out of the country. It was the people who protected the guerrillas
as proof that had not fully submitted. Everyone had to compromise with the
Indonesian government in order to survive. Even former guerrillas commanders
became civil servants and took on the appearance of being loyal subjects.
The East Timorese became experts at both feigning support for Indonesia and
building a clandestine network.

Once Indonesian troops are out, all other problems are relatively minor.
Yes, there will be a struggle with Australia over the oil. Fine. The East
Timorese can deal with that. Don't imagine that Horta or the UDT folks
somehow represent all of CNRT thinking or the thinking the resistance as a
whole. The East Timorese resistance remains committed to many of the old
Fretilin ideals and will not be content with imperialist dictates over the
economy. Anyway, there really isn't much of any importance to foreign
capital besides the oil -- those coffee fields are not some gold mine that
are going to make a fortune for Australia.

(By the way: maybe I have been out of touch with the latest developments in
Marxist theory but I have no idea what it means to say that "the indonesian
military is the same as indonesian capital," as Angela says. Nor do I
understand how her list of largely NGOs that survive on foreign funding come
to stand for the "working class." Most are not even working class
organizations. And the one clearly left organization, the PRD, has called
for the introduction of international troops. All I said before was that the
Indonesian working class was not going to stop the military's genocide. That
is true. I could have said, though, no force in Indonesia is going to be
able to stop the military from carrying out the genocide.)

Ho Chi Minh made an agreement with France in 1946 to have French troops
re-enter the Tonkin delta. That was how he got rid of the Chinese troops who
had entered, with Allied approval, to take the surrender of the Japanese. To
his detractors, Ho said (to the effect): "The last time the Chinese came
they stayed for 1,000 years. I would much rather eat French shit for five
years than Chinese shit for another 1,000."

John



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