AUT: English Chiapas al Dia 172 I

[CIEPAC <ciepac@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

ENGLISH VERSION OF "CHIAPAS AL DIA" BULLETIN No. 172
CIEPAC
CHIAPAS, MEXICO
(Saturday, September 4, 1999)

S.O.S. FOR MEXICO


The war in Chiapas is taking on more and more critical dimensions today,
and it has been growing especially worse in the Selva Lacandona over the
last three months (see Bulletins 168 to 171)

Our central hypothesis posits that what is fundamentally at stake is the
implementation of the globalization of neoliberalism and its continuation
after 2000.  The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World
Bank of Commerce (OMC), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OCDE) and the European Union, are all hoping that President
Zedillo does not alter the course of Mexico's structural readjustment:
elimination of subsidies, privatizations, commercial openings, payment of
external debt, strengthening of bilateral free trade agreements with Latin
America, optimal conditions in political, social and investment security
terms.  These and other elements factor into the impetus for a favorable
solution to the Chiapas conflict.  In a parallel fashion, however, the
conflict reflects internally another fundamental political element:  the
hegemony of the official party, which has controlled the state apparatus
for decades.  The political class refuses to give up power.  This - power
for the sake of power - exists aside from the multinational interests of
the great powers.

The international agenda is progressing:  in 1994 we entered into the Free
Trade Agreement with North America (TLC or NAFTA), and Mexico entered the
exclusive club of the OCDE.  In 1995, Mexico participated in the Democracy
Commission through Rights and in the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development;  in 1996, in the work of the ad hoc Group on Corruption.  In
1998, Mexico participated as an observer in the Committees of Legal
Advisors in International Public Rights, Superior Education, Research and
Culture.  In March 1999, it joined the Group of Experts on Problems of
Crime.  It is now about to enter as an observer in the European Council,
along with the EEUU, Canada and Japan, whose interest in Mexico is that of
consolidating its commitment to democratic values, human rights and
reinforcing the process of profound reforms that it has been promoting over
the last few years in order to consolidate the rule of law, as the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Rosario Green, stated.  We must add, to all
of these, Mexico's commercial accords with the rest of Latin America.

Putting the two trends together, (concern over the diversion of the
country's economic program, and the PRI losing political power), the
escalation of violence becomes clear.  And Chiapas has its own special
characteristics that allow us to interpret the latest occurrences and
government strategy from this perspective.

For some analysts, the economic program - as the fundamental problem - is
not only not at stake, but not even in danger.  Nor do they believe that
the PRI has lost its hegemony, even less that it could lose either the
presidency of the Republic, or the governorship in Chiapas in the year
2000.  According to this analysis, the attitude being taken by the interim
governor of Chiapas and by the federation is simple a warlike position, and
a desire to crush the indigenous.  This, coupled with stubbornness, and
without any other economic or political reasons.  They would utilize this
context to explain their actions, independently of what is going on in the
world.  We, however, believe that the problem is more profound and complex,
and that we cannot analyze events without taking into account the current
world situation and the political circumstances that are sharpening the
contradictions.

The trends seem clear.  Among them:

1)  The official party (PRI) has been losing support and sympathy among the
people of Chiapas, and, in general, at the national level over the last few
years.  The opposition has been gaining ground.  However, the official
party's new publicity campaigns - which are being talked about all over the
country - could turn around over a few months time what the opposition has
been struggling for for years.

2)  The PRI continues in collapse and breakdown that owes little to its
so-called openings to internal democracy.  We cannot discount the
possibility of more political assassinations.

3)  Privatizations continue at an accelerated rate, as the growth of
poverty is hastened. As does the elimination of all subsidies and resources
for programs to fight poverty.  If they do increase, it is, according to
official figures, more and more due to outside loans which, paradoxically,
tend to impoverish a county forced to pay its external debt.

4)  Buying power continues to decline, as does employment.

5)  The countryside is moving towards a devastating crisis in agriculture
and for the country's millions of campesinos and indigenous.
Self-sufficiency in food production continues to decline, and there is a
greater dependency in this arena on the US.

6)  The external debt continues to eat away at the heart of the Mexican
economy.  At the same time, the banking system has been swamped with frauds
that are placing a weak financial system on the weakest shoulders of the
increasingly more millions of poor who must bail out the bank.

7)  The increased militarization is being extended across the country, and
this explains the increased number of military troops, out of their
barracks with better positions, the larger public budget and their presence
in the state structure and apparatus, as well as their interference in the
three levels of government.  It no longer applies just to Chiapas, but also
to Guerrero and Oaxaca, as well as states in the center and north of Mexico.

8)  Violence continues to increase, as do human rights violations.

Meanwhile, as the loss of national sovereignty continues to mount, Mexico's
dependency on the outside is serious:  military dependence on the United
States;  dependency for food products on the neighbor to the north;
dependency for fighting poverty, for the budget and for social policies on
World Bank loans:  economic dependency for a purported development which
could not occur without direct foreign investment.

According to our hypothesis, the federal government - through the interim
governor and the Army - has the following objectives:

1)  Win the elections for governor of the state of Chiapas in 2000 and give
the majority of votes to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) for
the presidency of the Republic.  In order to accomplish this, the
opposition alliance must be prevented, which could defeat the official
party, and which could draw together, not just the political parties, but
social organizations as well.

2)  Prevent the advance of the EZLN, isolating and destroying it
politically, economically and militarily.

3)  Prevent the Diocese of San Cristobal de Las Casas from continuing its
pastoral line.

4)  Reducing the Chiapas problem to the state level, and removing it from
the national dynamic.

5)  Set the conditions and bases for facilitating direct foreign investment
in the fields of hydroelectricity, oil, agro-export, and so on.

6)  Divert attention from the nation's fundamental problems, such as:
privatization of electric energy, of railroads (a process completed on
August 31), The Bank Fund for Savings Protection (FOBAPROA) fraud, in
addition to others.

Among the mechanisms that are being used by interim governor Roberto
Albores and the Army to implement the above, we can mention:

1)  The launching of a lynching campaign against independent Senator,
former member of the Commission of Concordance and Peace (CCOPA), former
PRI, and now possible candidate for the opposition alliance in Chiapas for
the next elections [Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia].  In order to accomplish
this, they revived the problem of Los Chimalapas, an area bordering the
neighboring state of Oaxaca.  They also took out newspaper ads and
manipulated information in order to create a negative impact on his
election campaign.  The campaign failed.

2)  See that Bishop Raul Vera does not become the Bishop of San Cristobal
de Las Casas.

3)  Extremely costly publicity campaigns for the state on television, radio
and in the press, in order to create a positive image for the interim
governor and his social works.

4)  Campaigns aimed at tying the movement by the "ultra" striking students
at the Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) to the EZLN, and to provoke a
political and social lynching, in Mexico City as well as in Chiapas, of
both actors who are checkmating the government.  Similarly, it is trying to
hinder the EZLN's relationship with other national movements against the
neoliberal program and privatizations.

5)  Xenophobic campaigns against, not only foreigners, but also
non-chiapaneco Mexicans, leading to the municipal president of San
Cristobal de Las Casas - and the self-named "authentic coletos" of this
city - as well as PRIs from the communities. Thus encouraged, they reacted
by creating an atmosphere of violence, division and hostility with absolute
impunity.  Meanwhile, immigration officials are increasing their
persecution of foreigners in the city of San Cristobal de Las Casas.

6)  Provoke confrontations between zapatistas and PRIs by way of Albores'
counterinsurgent municipalities.  The interim governor hopes to have
established more of the 20 new municipalities before the end of the year.
He is giving priority not only to those planned in his original proposal,
but also to those PRI communities who want to be included in the
redistricting and those which would offer a good arena for counteracting
the strength of the zapatista Autonomous Municipalities.  Police and
military camps are now being installed in these new municipalities,
offering a legal haven from which to operate.  The interim governor is now
promoting the Social Foundation for Chiapas, made up of businesspersons who
have joined the counterinsurgency efforts.  One of their first tasks will
be the collecting of 20 million pesos for the seven new municipalities,
which are getting under way with illegally imposed officials, and without
funds or facilities from which to serve.

7)  The interim governor is giving signs of distancing himself from the
federation and of assuming responsibilities on his own, in order to
function as a direct interlocutor with the EZLN, not with President Ernesto
Zedillo.  At the same time, he is asking for direct dialogue with the EZLN
and is proposing a state COCOPA.

8)  Promoting and supporting the campaigns of the official PRI aspirant for
the presidency of the Republic, Francisco Labastida Ochoa, the former
Secretary of Government.  Labastida had been responsible for implementing
policies in Chiapas and against the EZLN and the indigenous communities
since January 1998.

9)  The Mexican Army, creating a necessary counterinsurgency
infrastructure.  It has completed roads and highways in Ocosingo around the
conflict zone, as it has also done in the Northern and Los Altos regions.
The problem in Amador Hernandez was an explosion as a consequence of this
process.  Meanwhile, the interim governor is trying to make it appear that
he commands the federal Army, and that he is independent of the President
of the Republic, forcing a militarized "development."  The Army, meanwhile,
which has, on other occasions, carried out the construction of these
highways, put forward a civil construction company in order to thus justify
the need for the workers' security.  On other occasions, the
paramilitaries, PRIs or police were up front.  Nor should it be forgotten
that the community of Amador Hernandez forms part of a zapatista Autonomous
Municipality, and it is also where the interim governor is proposing a
counterinsurgent redistricting.  Once more, a dispute over the political
and military control of strategic regions.

10)  The Mexican Army achieved new military positions, camps, checkpoints
and barracks, from which they will not back off, and which has been in
process since the February 1995 offensive.  They are now dug in in San
Cayetano, municipality of El Bosque, in San Jeronimo Tulija, and others,
despite massive mobilization by indigenous and civil society against it.  A
war exists in Chiapas, but the provocation to open fire is latent, and the
incidents at San Jose La Esperanza demonstrate that.  The cease-fire has
already been broken by the federal Army on at least two occasions:  a) the
massacre at El Bosque in June 1998, and b) San Jose La Esperanza in August
of this year, which was also part of the interim government's
counterinsurgency strategy.  The Army and the Federal Government, however,
deny not only responsibility for the incidents, but also the very existence
of the deaths and injuries.

11)  The Mexican Army achieving strategic positions in political, economic
and military terms, also using the excuse of reforesting the thousands of
hectares burned in 1998, and who - as pointed out by many indigenous
organizations and communities - were one of the primary agents of the
forest fires, for counterinsurgency purposes.  They are posted in Albores'
counterinsurgency municipalities, at dams, oil wells and places of
investment, and for the purpose of increasing the possibility of rapidly
eliminating the EZLN, if it becomes necessary.  And, in order to achieve
the isolation of the EZLN, PRIs are also posted in the communities, with
their checkpoints, with the police and immigration officials playing a
fundamental role.

Chiapas is now characterized by a lack of legality and "rule of law:"

1)  the installation of the state Congress at the end of 1998, following
the state elections, was illegal, since seats were assigned without
elections having been held in three districts.  Opposition parties
denounced this to no avail.

2)  The actions of the Mexican Army are illegal:  requests for passports
and documentation, searches without warrants, takeovers of predios and
ejidal lands, registrations of vehicles and documentation of non-residents,
detention of indigenous on the roads, etcetera.  Their actions go beyond
the purported enforcement of the Federal Firearms and Explosives Law.  The
advances of positions they have made violate the Law for Dialogue for Peace
and Reconciliation in Chiapas, the San Andres Accords, Convention 169 of
the ILO on Indigenous and Tribal Rights, the Second Protocol of the Geneva
Convention (not signed by the Mexican government), the Mexican Political
Constitution, and so on.

3)  The redistricting is unilateral, and its procedures illegal, in
addition to violating the San Andres Accords.

4)  The recent appointment of officials for the seven municipal councils is
illegal, since there is no constitutional provision for their creation.

5)  The lack of freedom of movement, and the harassment in order to impede
it, in the Selva, Los Altos and Northern regions, violates the Political
Constitution.

6)  The creation and proliferation of armed groups and paramilitaries are
illegal, as well as the direct or indirect participation by police and
military forces, as confirmed by the communities, witnesses and "former
military" and "former police officers" themselves.

7)  The disarmament law for paramilitary groups is impugn and unilateral.

8)  The State Law for Indigenous Rights and Culture is unilateral and
violates the San Andres Accords.

9)  The proposal for a state Commission of Concordance and Peace (COCOPA)
is unilateral and violates the San Andres Accords and the law for dialogue
and peace in Chiapas.

10)  The interim governor is illegal, since his election was not in keeping
with the Political Constitution of Chiapas, which, in its Article 35,
Section IV, states that, in order to be governor, one must:  "Have no
employment, position or commission with the federation or the state, and,
if so, must resign and be separated from them at least 90 days prior to the
election."  Roberto Albores resigned just a few days before.

11)  The expulsions of foreigners are illegal.

12)  The economic contributions from public funds to the political
campaigns of PRI candidates in the 1998 state elections, by Governor
Roberto Albores Guillen, were illegal according to denunciations made by
the National Action Party (PAN).  The support for the official aspirant,
Francisco Labastida Ochoa, during his visit to Chiapas in August, were also
illegal, a denunciation made by another PRI, Roberto Madrazo.

13)  The detention of, and violence against, the media is illegal, such as
the case of Cuxulja, where the police, in the presence of the military,
attacked journalists, beat them, confiscated their credentials and
threatened them.

14)  As for the displacements of the population created by the Mexican Army
and the paramilitaries, they are illegal because of the impunity, the
deprivation of freedom of movement and of freedom of worship, among others.
 They also violate the human rights to education, health, land and the
"Guiding Principles" of the UN "Guiding Principles for the Internally
Displaced," signed by the Mexican government.

15)  The deprivation of liberty of the dozens of EZLN indigenous support
bases, imprisoned today in the Cerro Hueco Jail and in other prisons in the
state.

16)  The functioning of many PRI councils are illegal, where there is
constant violation of laws, norms and municipal regulations in order to
support the policies of the state government.

17)  The speeches by the interim governor have provoked violence, inviting
an angry reaction against foreigners, against the EZLN, against civil
society that does not share the same opinions, against university students,
and so on.

18)  The charges brought by the interim governor against the students are
illegal and violate fundamental human rights and constitutional guarantees,
as do the demands by the San Cristobal municipal president to expel actress
Ofelia Medina from Chiapas.

19)  The checkpoints manned by the Peace and Justice paramilitary group are
illegal, as well as those manned by PRIs in the communities of Ocosingo.
These actions were rejected by the interim governor in his 1998 State
Accord for Peace and Reconciliation in Chiapas, where he promised to
enforce the law against instances of deprivation of freedom of movement.

20)  The expulsion of thousands of Chamulas - without the government's
doing anything about it - are illegal and impugn.

21)  The police checkpoints, which the police set up in order to block the
access of university students to the state of Chiapas, are illegal, as was
the harassment at other highway checkpoints located in other states on the
way to the Federal District.

Within this framework, and with the above actions implemented, we should
not forget:

1)  The Peace and Justice paramilitary group, in the Northern region, has,
for the last few weeks, been experiencing breakdown, division and internal
confrontations.  They themselves are accusing their state PRI deputies and
other leaders of mismanaging public funds.  This could break out in armed
confrontations at any moment.

2)  The PRI aspirant for the presidency of the Republic, Roberto Madrazo,
has, for his part, demanded justice from his party due to the
misappropriation of public funds by the interim governor, which he used for
the other PRI candidate, Francisco Labastida Ochoa.

3)  The increase in paramilitary groups in the state.

4)  The overflights are continuing, as are the patrols, checkpoints and
harassment in more communities in the state.

5)  Regarding the disappearance, presumed torture and decapitation of Jose
Hidalgo Perez, in San Cristobal de Las Casas, the authorities have pointed
out a former soldier as the alleged culprit.  This could be the beginning
once again of an escalation of violence against members of urban civil
society.  It should be noted that the appearance of the city of San
Cristobal de Las Casas has been changing.  It has become more common over
the last few months to see dozens of police officers stationed on the
corners, with new black uniforms similar to the judicial police and
military ones.  At the same time, housing and accommodations for the
judicial police and military have been proliferating.

6)  A very serious political confrontation is going on inside the PRI
between the candidates, which is sharpening and polarizing positions within
the official party, where it would appear that President Zedillo's
candidate, Francisco Labastida, is not the front runner, despite the
incorporation of top former officials in his campaign team.

Campesino organizations (OCEZ-CNPA, OPEZ-BFP, ARIC-Independent, CIOAC,
AEDEPCH, etcetera), dozens of civil organizations, political parties, the
Diocese of San Cristobal, unions, teachers, and many other actors at the
state and national levels, have all, over the last few weeks, demanded the
demilitarization of Chiapas.  This has always happened, and the government
has refused.  The indigenous resistance has its limits, and that is what
they are trying to break.  We should all stop this war.  What more do we
need?  But the demands go further, and they are repeated again:  political
judgment against interim governor Roberto Albores Guillen, the carrying out
of the San Andres Accords, the reinitiation of the peace dialogues and new
mediation in the conflict.

These demands were raised forcefully after the Acteal massacre, in December
of 1997.  If the demands for a political judgment against the then interim
governor, Julio Cesar Ruiz Ferro, did indeed lead to his resignation and
his being rewarded with a public position abroad, the imposition of the new
interim governor, Roberto Albores Guillen, brought with it a federal and
state response to the demands in terms of more military camps,
police-military operations against the Autonomous Municipalities, more
prisoners, more displaced, more deaths, higher budgets for the police and
more officers, more harassment of the CONAI - until it disappeared - and of
the opposition political parties, more arrest warrants for leaders of
social organizations, and so on.

What will the response be now?  The interim governor warned that he would
not resign.  The political lynching has been turned on him, and the
response could be more dangerous for society.  The apparent contradictions
between the federation and the state of Chiapas, between Zedillo and
Albores;  a "coordinator for dialogue" overcome by the current situation,
without credibility and without the capacity to create consensus in order
to defuse the critical situation in Chiapas;  the federal Army that has to
face public opinion, denying the breaking of the cease-fire:  all of these,
and other indicators, give the impression of ungovernability, of a vacuum
of power and the lack of political management.  It becomes more and more
clear that it is the federal Army that governs in Chiapas, and they are
willing to pay any political cost in order to assure military positions
designed for counterinsurgency.  This places the civil government in the
position of having to justify these actions through "development."
Similarly, not one finger is lifted in the municipalities and in the new
Albores municipalities without the federal Army's arrival.

Governor Albores has committed many mistakes for the federation:  he put
the Chiapas issue on the national agenda again, he did not fulfill the
expectations of him for supporting Francisco Labastida's campaign, his
campaign against Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia did not work.  He has turned
intellectuals and artists against him for wanting to expel actress Ofelia
Medina, as well as union members, university students, political parties,
social organizations, the COCOPA.  He has had to be refuted by federal
officials for many of his words, and it would appear that he is standing
alone.  The desired investments have not appeared, the campaign of
zapatista deserters did not work for him, to mention but a few.

The S.O.S. call is for Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Mexico in general.
The globalization process brings with it an acceleration of poverty, the
danger of political instability, the loss of national cohesion and the
erosion of the fabric of social organizations.  The head of the campaign
effort of PRI aspirant Esteban Moctezuma - who was head of the Department
of Social Development (Sedesol) - said it himself.  Despite the fact that
the Department stated, on August 30, that the 413.963 billion pesos in
spending for 1999 was the largest in history, at the same time the Social
Development Committee of the Chamber of Deputies said that the total was
8.9% of the GNP, while, in 1994, it was 9.1%.

Gustavo Castro Soto

Center   of   Economic   and    Political    Investigations   of  Community
 Action,   A.C.
CIEPAC
CIEPAC, member of the "Convergence of Civil Organizations for Democracy"
National Network (CONVERGENCIA), and member of RMALC (Mexico Action Network
on Free Trade)

 ******************************************
Translated by irlandesa for CIEPAC, A.C.
******************************************

Note:  If you use this information, cite the source and our email address.
We are grateful to the persons and institutions who have given us their
comments on these Bulletins.  CIEPAC, A.C. is a non-government and
non-profit organization, and your support is necessary for us to be able to
continue offering you this news and analysis service.  If you would like to
contribute, in any amount, we would infinitely appreciate your sending to
the bank account in the name of:

CIEPAC, A.C.
Bank:  BANCOMER
Bank Account Number:  1003458-8
Branch:  437
San Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas, Mexico.
Thanks!

Note:  If you wish to be placed on a list to receive this English version
of the Bulletin, or the Spanish, or both, please direct a request to the
e-mail address shown below.  Indicate whether you wish to receive the email
or the "attached file" (Word 7 for Windows 95) version.

Email:                               ciepac@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

VISIT OUR NEW WEB SITE:  http://www.ciepac.org/ (Visit us:  We have new
maps on the situation in Chiapas)



_________________________________________________________________________

CIEPAC, A.C.
Center for Economic and Political Investigations of Community Action
Eje Vial Uno Numero 11
Col. Jardines de Vista Hermosa
29297 San Cristobal, Chiapas, MEXICO
Telephone/Fax:	In Mexico:	01 967 85832
Outside Mexico:      +52 967 85832

_____________________________________________________________________
CIEPAC, A.C.
Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Políticas de Acción Comunitaria
Eje Vial Uno Número 11
Col. Jardines de Vista Hermosa
29297 San Cristóbal, Chiapas, MEXICO

Tel/Fax:	en México	01 967 85832
		fuera de México	+52 967 85832
Página Web:	www.ciepac.org
________________________________________________________________________


     --- from list aut-op-sy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---