AUT: English Chiapas al Dia 166 I

[CIEPAC <ciepac@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Note:  The book, "The Displaced of Chiapas," by authors Gustavo Castro an=
d
Onesimo Hidalgo, will be presented in Mexico City on August 18 in the Cas=
a
del Poeta, in Alvaro Obregon Street, at 7:70 PM.  It will be presented in
Chiapas in San Cristobal de Las Casas, in the Museum Cafe, on Saturday,
August 21, at 7 PM.  For more information, see web page <www.ciepac.org>

ENGLISH VERSION OF "CHIAPAS AL DIA" BULLETIN No. 166
CIEPAC
CHIAPAS, MEXICO
(Saturday, August 14, 1999)


THE TEMPTATION OF THE MILITARY SOLUTION


THE ECONOMIC ARENA

As we have said previously, the elections for the Presidency of the
Republic and for Governor of Chiapas, in August of 2000, is the lens
through which we will watch events unfold.  It is not just the possible
defeat of the PRI for the presidency and for the governor of Chiapas that
will be at stake in 2000, but also the political program of the
globalization of neoliberalism.

Tension and fear over a change in the country's economic direction,
structural readjustment and privatization process are all causing fear at
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Business
Organization (OMC) and the Organization for Cooperation and Economic
Development (OCDE).  In the midst of this, preparations for a military
solution in Chiapas could be speeded up, in order to prevent change or to
spread fear of something different.

James McCabe, the President of the American Chamber of Commerce, stated, =
on
August 5, that Mexico requires three conditions in order to assure fixed
capital:  1)  effectively fight insecurity (which translates into investo=
r
insecurity and into more resources to police forces and/or the Army);  2)
fiscal reforms that give incentives to investment (which translates into
greater guarantees for investors);  3)  completion of deregulatory progra=
ms
(which translates into greater mobility for investment).  The OCDE stated
that the continuity of the economic program is imperative during the next
presidential term, and he noted that Mexico has carried out the greatest
amount of privatization in the developed world.  Indeed, since, of the 11=
15
government businesses in 1982, only 218 remain, of which, 48 are already =
up
for sale.

President Zedillo is insisting that the Congress speed up privatization o=
f
the electrical energy sector, while, at the same time, the President of
Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, is announcing the privatization of the electrical
arena for the end of the year.

In the midst of the economic crisis, the federal government contracted th=
e
services of the transnational firms Eastern British Power International, =
of
Great Britain, and Union FENOSA, of Spain, charged with the restructuring
of the electricity sector and of the future privatization of the para-sta=
te
business.  The salaries that the Mexican government pays the Spanish firm=
's
personnel vary from $910 to $1638 per day.  And so, the Mexican people ar=
e
paying not only for the rescue of the bankers, for the budgetary shortfal=
ls
due to the sale of para-state enterprises and through higher taxes and th=
e
increase in the cost of public services, but they are also paying the
incredible salaries for those who are going to modernize what they will b=
e
purchasing tomorrow.  For 1999, the agreement goes up to 13 million
dollars, and this technical advisement has cost $20 million over the last
three years, money which has not been spent on fighting poverty.

The sugar sector, made up of 60 privatized refineries in the country (for
which the De la Madrid and Salinas de Gortari governments obtained $200
million), including Chiapas, announced the possible bankruptcy of at leas=
t
22 of them owing to accounts imbalances that have increased at least
24-fold.  In addition, the importing of 20 million tons of fructose is
speeding up the failures in this sector.  This could be a strategy by the
large companies to acquire these refineries, since 90 million bottles of
soft drink are consumed in Mexico every day.

For one thing, the 60 refineries, who represent 0.5% of the Gross Nationa=
l
Product, are threatening the 280,000 rural workers who live in this secto=
r.
 In addition, some 350 million dollars of public funds have been invested
in order to prevent their failure, and around 18 billion pesos of their
debt could pass to public debt.  Curiously, some sugar industries were, o=
r
are, bank shareholders, and, as such, could be involved in the politics o=
f
a financial rescue.  For example, PROAZUCAR, of Eduardo de la Vega, forme=
r
Banoro shareholder, is the owner of refineries in the states of Veracruz,
Jalisco, Sinaloa and Chiapas.

The program to privatize historic monuments has raised another sector
opposed to such a measure.  We recall that, in November 1997, the Mexican
government presented more than 30 observations to the "Project for an
American Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples" of the
Organization of American States (OAS), among them, on the issue which
concerns us, the OAS proposes:

	"The indigenous peoples have the right to restitution regarding the
comprehensive ownership of said heritage from which they were dispossesse=
d,
or (=85) to indemnification no less favorable than the standard of
international law."

	The Mexican government proposed the elimination of this paragraph, and t=
he
addition of:

	"The indigenous peoples will be able to participate in the administratio=
n
and care of those monuments, archeological and ceremonial sites, property
of the state, that are located on their lands (=85) In cases of
indemnification, this should be addressed by domestic law."

	Further along, the OAS proposes:

	"When sacred tombs and relics have been appropriated by state
institutions, they should be returned."

	And the Mexican government proposes adding:

	"When (=85) they are property of the State, the indigenous peoples shall=
 be
able to participate in the administration and care of same."

	In summary, carrying out the San Andres Accords also implies setting up
obstacles for investors, for NAFTA and for the globalizing and neoliberal
program:  the right to education holds the government responsible for
carrying out its obligation to provide funds for education.  The neoliber=
al
program would free the state from that responsibility and put it in the
arena of the investors:  "If you want an education, you pay for it."  The
OAS proposes:

	"The indigenous peoples shall have the right to:  a) define and apply
their own educational programs, institutions and facilities;  b)  prepare
and apply their own plans, programs , curricula and teaching materials, a=
nd
c)  teach, train and accredit their own teachers and administrators (=85)=
,"
to which the Mexican government proposes adding:  "The states will
guarantee the indigenous peoples the right to participate (=85)"

By accepting the right to "the use and enjoyment of natural resources" at=
 a
constitutional level, not only would a million indigenous in Chiapas
benefit, but so would the more than 10 million indigenous in the country.
It would also set a precedent for indigenous and campesino struggles in
Latin America.  If the San Andres Accords were incorporated into the
Political Constitution, the following areas would be affected in terms of
investment:  oil, current and future investments in hydroelectric energy,
the interference of investment in biodiversity, the dividends generated b=
y
tourism in the "ruins," the Mayan temples in Mesoamerica, and so on. =20

In addition, since 1997, Mexico has been paying more and more for the
leasing of geostationary space in the satellites that have been sold by t=
he
government (La Jornada, August 7).  Because of all of this, it is,
therefore, not surprising that Mexico has the second highest foreign debt
in Latin America, following Brazil, with 161 billion, 316 million dollars.
It holds the fourth highest debt with the International Monetary Fund, wi=
th
6 billion, 549 million dollars, after Russia, Indonesia and Brazil.  At t=
he
end of 1998, Mexico's foreign debt equaled 39% of the Gross National
Product (GNP), and, between 1995 and 1998, interest payments reached 45
billion, 649 million dollars.

THE POLITICAL ARENA


It is essential for both sides to carry the war to their own terrain.
President Ernesto Zedillo, through the Army, has been cornering the EZLN
even more over the last few weeks, and is heading towards military
confrontation and provocation.  The government is stronger than the EZLN
militarily, but weaker politically, and, therefore, the cries for democra=
cy
terrify them.  Democracy within their party, outside it, in society, in t=
he
international community, in the armed forces.  The demand is broad, and t=
he
new parties that are being established do not fail to include the officia=
l
party's epitaph.

The EZLN, although we could surmise the same in the military arena, has
been strengthening its political and social alliances this year.  Followi=
ng
the National Consultation in March with civil society, it has extended
important bridges with at least five sectors:  NGOs, teachers, students,
electrical workers and the movement against the privatization of historic
monuments.  1) With the NGOs and Human Rights bodies by granting them a
high level of credibility prior to the visit by the UN Special Relator fo=
r
Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions'  2)  With the Democratic
Teachers at a meeting in La Realidad in August;  3)  Another, the "Nation=
al
Encuentro in Defense of the Cultural Heritage, with hundreds of persons,
and those from the National Institute of Anthropology and History (INAH),
which is currently being held in the same community in the Selva;  4)  Wi=
th
the students of the National Autonomous University of Mexico, also in the
same community;  5)  With the support demonstrated for the movement again=
st
the privatization of the country's electric energy sector;  6)  and with
students from the National Pedagogical University and teachers from the
Rural Teachers Training Colleges on August 9.

Through these actions, the EZLN is focusing on, and promoting, the social
reaction in at least four of the government's most important programs:  t=
he
privatization of education and the UNAM strike, the privatization of
historic monuments, the privatization of electric energy and human rights
in Mexico.

While the National Encuentro in Defense of the Cultural Heritage (against
the privatization of historic monuments) was being held in La Realidad, a
short time ago, Subcomandante Marcos reported that between 400 and 500
heavily armed Mexican Army soldiers - 300 of whom landed by parachute and
others in 14 helicopters from the San Quintin and Ibarra barracks - took
over the community of Amador Hernandez.  They set up barbed wire around
their position, at the entrance to the Montes Azules biosphere reserve.  =
At
the same time, there was an increase in military overflights, checkpoints
and patrols between Guadalupe Tepeyac and San Quintin, the stretch of roa=
d
which includes La Realidad.  Marcos stated that "the largest oil reserve =
in
the world" is in the Amador Hernandez Valley, which also takes in the
Corralchen sierra, in the Montes Azules reserve and in the Santa Cruz
sierra.  Military checkpoints were similarly reinforced between Las
Margaritas and La Realidad.

The Commander of the 39th Military Region, General Fermin Rivas Garcia,
confirmed that some 400 soldiers went to the community of Amador Hernande=
z,
"in order to protect" the company that was building the (militarily
strategic) 19-kilometer road between that community and San Quintin, wher=
e
one of the most important military facilities in Ocosingo is located.

Coincidentally, on July 23 the Federal Prosecutor for Environmental
Protection reported that 700 families (3500 persons from 6 towns) had bee=
n
relocated in the Montes Azules reserve, arguing that the forest reserve i=
n
the Selva Lacandona had been reduced by 40% over the last 14 years.  This
area has the richest ecosystem in the country (more than half the bird
species, 37.1% of the mammals, 40% of the butterflies, etc.).  This regio=
n
has many zapatista families, and it would appear that the Army is prepari=
ng
a military assault.

Journalist Juan Balboa, from La Jornada, reported that the military
encirclement had been stepped up with an addition of approximately 10,000
more soldiers, fifty camps and absolute control of the roads, with 15
checkpoints in the valleys and the Canadas of the northeastern Selva
Lacandona.  They have also penetrated - for the first time since the
zapatistas' appearance - into the communities of the Montes Azules
biosphere reserve.  This is considered to be the second massive
mobilization of troops in this region since 1995, when 5000 soldiers
arrived, and another 5000 in July for a purported reforestation program.

The Army is keeping some 30 indigenous communities in the Taniperla canad=
a
and within the reserve under siege.  Meanwhile, along the Palenque -
Marques de Comillas highway, on a stretch approximately 200 kilometers
long, 20 military camps and 8 checkpoints have been installed.  The comma=
nd
posts for these new settlements are located in Cintalapa, Palestina and
Taniperla.  Among the camps that have been reinforced are those that have
been established in Crucero Corozal, Boca Lacantun, Crucero Real, Monte
Libano, Ocotalito, Taniperla, Crucero Palestina, San Quintin, Chancala,
Pico de Oro and San Jeronimo Tulija, among others.  Among those new camps
and installations - which are being called Montes Azules Reforestation
Camps - are:  Frontera Corozal, Bonampak crossroads, La Arena, Laguna
Suspiro and the mountains close to La Culebra and Santa Rita.  In their
passage through the valleys and Canadas of the Selva Lacandona, they have
set up checkpoints, the majority of them intermittent, in indigenous
communities such as El Limonar, Cintalapa, La Culebra, Arroyo Granizo, El
Paraiso, Crucero Palestina, Ocotalito, La Arena, Calvario, San Jose,
Patihuitz, Lindavista, Jardin, Laguna Ocotal, San Geronimo Tulija, Monte
Libano and Taniperla.  All of these communities are being patrolled day a=
nd
night.

Meanwhile, the state government is also attempting to strengthen its
position.  In addition to the seven already established, on August 20 the=
y
are hoping to create seven more municipalities:  one in La Independencia,
one in Pueblo Nuevo, three in Ocosingo, another in Sabanilla and one in L=
as
Margaritas, in the community of El Eden, where the Army has recently
installed a new military camp.  In addition, they also hope to form anoth=
er
eight municipalities by the end of the year:  Senobio Aguilar, Amparo
Aguatinta, Taniperla, San Quintin, El Limar, Patihuitz and San Jeronimo
Tulija, from the municipalities of Las Margaritas, Ocosingo, Tila and
Chilon.  All of these are located within areas that are strongholds of th=
e
Army, of alleged paramilitary groups, of police forces or of PRI communit=
ies.

Prior to the end of the year, the government hopes to establish 22 new PR=
I
municipalities with their own municipal authorities, budgets, and militar=
y
and police camps.  There are some municipalities that are so small and
absurd that they would appear to be more "military municipalities" or
"police municipalities."  In this manner it will be easier for the
paramilitary groups to coexist or to be incorporated into the rural polic=
e,
or to serve as the headquarters for the carrying out of "legal" actions o=
f
repression against the zapatista Autonomous Municipalities, or against
anyone who is opposed to the program of the state.

The Attorney General of the State, Eduardo Montoya Lievano, named a forme=
r
soldier (when they are named by the law, they are "former," such as at
Acteal), as the alleged assassin of Jose Hidalgo Perez, who disappeared o=
n
June 10 in the city of San Cristobal de Las Casas.  The capture of the
alleged culprit would have appeared to be impossible, not just because of
his alleged military connections, but also because the Attorney General
himself has admitted that there is a backlog of 37,000 open investigation=
s
in Chiapas, and only 6% of the year's arrest warrants have been executed.
With this, the fifth Attorney General to serve during this 6-year term
begun by Eduardo Robledo Rincon, confirms that 94% of all criminals are
walking the streets in the state with total impunity.=20

The Episcopal Commission for Peace and Reconciliation in Chiapas (made up
of eight bishops:  Raul Vera Lopez and Samuel Ruiz Garcia of San Cristoba=
l,
Felipe Aguirre of Tuxtla and Felipe Arizmendi of Tapachula, Chiapas;  Jua=
n
Guillermo Lopez of Cuauhtemoc Madera;  Carlos Talavera of Coatzacoalcos;
Jacinto Guerrero of Tlaxcala;  Luis Morales of San Luis Potosi) came to t=
he
state for the eighth time, following a years' absence.  They visited the
interim governor, the Cerro Hueco prisoners and Bachajon.  Among other
things, they stated that they had not come to replace anyone, but rather
with a coadvisory program.  They also said that it is necessary for
dialogue to be renewed and that the peace process not be damaged by the
year 2000 election campaign.  Nothing could be further from reality.

For better or for worse, the call for dialogue could strengthen the
government's strategy, through insisting on that line at the same time as
the government and the Army, through their actions, demonstrate their lac=
k
of willingness for dialogue.  This would serve to back the EZLN into a
corner, facilitating public opinion turning against the intransigents.  T=
he
truth is, under the present conditions and during the elections, it would
seem impossible for a process of dialogue and peace to be initiated, at a
moment when all the politicians are trying to defeat the PRI in the next
electoral contest.

The Chiapas conflict is now on the presidential candidates' platforms.  T=
wo
candidates stand out among the four candidates from the official party -
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI): the former Secretary of
Government, Francisco Labastida Ochoa, as the official candidate, and
Roberto Madrazo Pintado, the former governor of Tabasco.

Labastida Ochoa, who is loyal to President Ernesto Zedillo's economic
policies, during his not very outstanding visit to Chiapas, stated that:
"Only if Chiapas develops, can Mexico develop."  And, despite the support
of the interim governor and the state apparatus, who are carrying out the
most aggressive policies against Chiapas, it is "suffering" from the
poverty in which millions of indigenous and campesinos are existing.  He
has offered, if he wins the presidency, to not persecute the EZLN, to
appoint a negotiator of stature and to personally participate at the end =
of
the peace process in a "comprehensive solution," to respect indigenous
rights, to incorporate the rebels into security forces once peace is
signed, and to stamp out the impositions from the center in the definitio=
n
of the Chiapas government.  The "key" point for Labastida Ochoa is the
concept of communal exploitation of the land.  Certainly what is being
contemplated now is exploitation by the international community of the
land, of natural resources, biostrategies, and even the Mayan ruins.

The other, Madrazo Pintado, who has ties to former President Carlos Salin=
as
de Gortari - and who has been associated by the public and by opposition
parties with corruption, ties to drug trafficking and as having benefited
from economic policies - is now criticizing the neoliberal economic
policies promoted by the President.

There are two other candidates, less dangerous for their political rivals=
,
but more dangerous for the statements they made on July 14, when the Army
began to penetrate the Montes Azules.  Manuel Bartlett Diaz, the hard-lin=
e
former governor of the state of Puebla, said the Chiapas conflict should =
be
resolved immediately, although he said it should not be done through arms=
,
but rather through dialogue.  The fourth candidate, however, Humberto Roq=
ue
Villanueva, stated that Mexico's governability in the future "will have t=
o
depend on the armed forces, because, after Chiapas, no one will be equal =
in
this country."

And so, one of the fiercest political battles is being waged within the
official party, prior to the selection of their single presidential
candidate, who will be chosen on November 7.  After the candidate is
selected and internal wounds healed with difficulty - which will have
negative consequences for the PRI - the official party and the government
apparatus will focus its energy against the opposition and their possible
alliance, in order to avoid being thrown out of power.

The National Action Party's (PAN) candidate, Vicente Fox, in addition to
promoting the sale of Mexican Petroleum (PEMEX) and the electrical
industry, says, if he were to become president, he would make peace with
Subcomandante Marcos within 15 minutes. It would appear, nonetheless, tha=
t
it might take a bit longer to smoke the peace pipe, given what the press
has been reporting over the last few days concerning the presence of
guerrilla groups in the country:

Armed Revolutionary Commando of the South (Guerrero), Clandestine
Indigenous Command of National Liberation (Oaxaca), Genaro Vazquez
Execution Army (Guerrero), Clandestine Indigenous Army of National
Liberation (Chihuahua), Insurgent Army of Chilpancingo (Guerrero),
Liberation Army of the South (Guerrero), Liberation Army of the Southern
Sierra (Guerrero), Jose Maria Morelos Popular Liberation Army (Guerrero),
Clandestine Armed Forces of National Liberation (Guerrero),  Magonista
Popular Army (Guerrero), Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Chiapas,
D.F., Veracruz y Puebla), Popular Revolutionary Army (Oaxaca, Estado de
Mexico, D.F., Chiapas, Guerrero y Puebla), Revolutionary Army of the
Insurgent Peoples (ERPI), Popular Revolutionary Movement (Guerrero), 28th
of July Clandestine Justice Command, Popular Revolutionary Movement
(Guerrero), Armed Forces of Liberation of the Marginalized Peoples of
Guerrero (Guerrero), Insurgent Revolutionary Popular Army (Baja Californi=
a,
Sonora, Coahuila, Chihuahua y Durango) and the Veracruz Liberation Army
(Veracruz) (Cuarto Poder, July 24 and 27, 1999).

For Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, the Chief of Government of Mexico City and the
Democratic Revolutionary Party's (PRD) favorite candidate, the opposition
alliance stands above his own candidacy.  However, the internal divisions
in his own party - and the bad image they have been given by the UNAM
strikers through the use of police force during the strike - could wrest
thousands of traditional sympathizers from the student movement away from
him.  In any regard, his popularity could pick up once social demands are
kept in the forefront, such as opposition to the privatization of PEMEX a=
nd
electrical energy, the renegotiation of the Free Trade Treaty, the carryi=
ng
out of the San Andres Accords, the demilitarization of Chiapas, Guerrero
and Oaxaca, the renegotiation of the debt, and others.  Because of these
factors, this candidate would be the most uncomfortable for the interests
of the International Monetary Fund, unless an opposition alliance were to
force the PAN and the PRD to field a candidate who would balance the
interests of both sides and not radicalize positions.

In Chiapas, there is another uncomfortable political actor.  Independent
Senator Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia, former PRI, former member of the COCOP=
A,
architect of - and possible candidate for - the opposition alliance in
Chiapas, is now the target of a new government attack.  The newly revived
problem that has existed for years around the 40,000 hectares of Los
Chimalapas, an area of land between Chiapas and Oaxaca, has provided a
launching pad for a new attack against the Senator.  He is being accused =
of
having ceded the territory to the state of Oaxaca during his term as
Secretary of Government in Chiapas, in 1994.  This land of alleged
trafficking in wood, of economic interests and of arms trafficking, has
aggravated the tensions between both state governments, and caused the Ar=
my
to carry out more patrols in the region and to set up more checkpoints.

Gustavo Castro Soto

Center   of   Economic   and    Political    Investigations   of  Communi=
ty
 Action,   A.C.
CIEPAC
CIEPAC, member of the "Convergence of Civil Organizations for Democracy"
National Network (CONVERGENCIA), and member of RMALC (Mexico Action Netwo=
rk
on Free Trade)

 ******************************************
Translated by irlandesa for CIEPAC, A.C.
******************************************

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Eje Vial Uno Numero 11
Col. Jardines de Vista Hermosa
29297 San Cristobal, Chiapas, MEXICO

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CIEPAC, A.C.
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