AUT: English Chiapas al Dia 164 I

[CIEPAC <ciepac@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

ENGLISH VERSION OF "CHIAPAS AL DIA" BULLETIN No. 164
CIEPAC
CHIAPAS, MEXICO
(July 31, 1999)

WHILE THE OLD TOPPLES,
SOMETHING NEW IS TAKING SHAPE

The year 2000 is drawing near, and, with it, the elections for the
President of the Republic and for the Governor of Chiapas, as well as the
hope for something different, since the hypothesis we are now operating on
is that the official party, the PRI, and the interim Governor, Roberto
Albores Guillen - whose interim government is illegal in itself - are
governing only with the support of 12.61% of the chiapaneco population, in
real terms.  In addition, under the cover of the "State of Law," while
responding to the demands of the chiapaneco people, while exercising the
"rule of law," while stating that the majority of chiapanecos support them
- at the same time, and in contradiction to the previous, they are
increasing the repressive machinery, both in numbers and budget.  They are
also reinforcing its presence in all the municipalities in the state and
granting more power to the police forces.

This is what we shall demonstrate here.  To this end, we will analyze the
political preferences of the chiapanecos from several points of view.  We
will use two parameters:  the results of the October 1998 elections of the
municipal presidencies (hereafter "elections"), and the Consultation for
the Recognition of the Rights of the Indian Peoples and for an End to the
War of Extermination, convoked by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation
(EZLN) in March of this year (hereafter, 'Consulta").

1).  The comparative advantages of the PRI in the elections are already
well known:  an electoral system controlled by state party interests,
poorly located polling places that prevented many chiapanecos from voting;
intimidation, the buying and coercion of votes, proven innumerable times by
the political parties themselves, by Civic Alliance and social
organizations, and by all of us who have experienced these fraudulent
mechanisms:  ballot box stuffing, media (television, radio and press) at
the service of official propaganda, public funds used for PRI political
campaigns, and many, many other anomalies and illegal acts. Despite all of
this, the official party did not get the votes they expected, yielding
scanty results edging towards downfall.

We would especially like to emphasize a hypothesis that is elemental to our
analysis:  In the vote counting, the official party would tend to
invalidate those votes that were not in their favor.  We say the official
party, because opposition parties have not had the resources to have
representatives at the majority of the polling places on election day.  The
polling places are, therefore, under the control of the PRI.

2).  The zapatista Consulta has, for its part, the advantage of the breadth
of its voters' universe, since it allowed those over the age of 12 to
participate, whereas the constitutional elections set the age at 18.  Its
disadvantage was that it did not have the official resources, and there was
a very strong campaign, both in the media, and in actions, against this
initiative.  Its success was due to the resources of organized civil
society.  Its results, although not often noted, have had a social and
political impact of such magnitude that they will strongly affect the
political life of the country, and of Chiapas, in the mid term.

We also want to put special emphasis on our hypothesis here:  almost
everyone who participated in the Consulta in Chiapas is opposed to the
official party.  This is supported by the fact of the extreme political
polarization:  anyone who participated in the actions convened by the EZLN
would be against the Roberto Albores government, and vice versa.

We are making these statements because the analysis of the participation of
the chiapaneco people will concern both democratic exercises in terms of
numbers, then in real terms.  This will be our criteria for measuring the
credibility of the official party.  Through this indicator, we will be able
to interpret the government's actions from now until the upcoming elections
in the summer of the year 2000.  These elections will be the focus of the
analysis of political events during these months.

The PRI obtained votes in all the municipalities.  The PRD failed to gain
any votes in 6 municipalities (5.40% of the 111 municipalities), and the
PAN failed in 40 of them (36.03%).  The PT was not far behind, not managing
to win any votes in 58 (53.25%), the PDCh in 72 (64.86%), the PFC in 79
(71.17%) and the PVEM in 88 (79.27%).  This percentage would be even worse
for the minority parties if we were to take into account the fact that they
did not receive more than 10 votes in many municipalities.  From this
perspective, one could state that there are only two significant
political-electoral forces in Chiapas: the PRI and the PRD.

>From a  different perspective, however, it would appear that the PAN is the
favorite, since it once again won the state capital, Tuxtla Gutierrez.  The
votes in the capital, however, represented 37.86% of all the votes they
received in Chiapas.  They do not have a significant presence in poor,
indigenous regions, or even in the other important cities.

According to official data, the results were in this order:  the PRI "won"
86 municipalities (77.47% of the total), with 415,747 votes (44.38% of
those voting);  the PRD won 18 municipalities (16.21%), with 246,294 votes
(26.33%), and PAN obtained 7 municipalities (6.30%), with 123,807 votes
(13.20%).  From this perspective, it would appear that there is only one
political-electoral force in Chiapas:  the PRI.

Taking into account only the number of municipalities that were supposedly
won, the impression is given that the PRI has not been discredited in the
eyes of the chiapaneco public:  that it represents the majority, who
support the actions of the interim governor.  We should not forget,
however, that they do not have an absolute majority, but rather 44.38%.
This amount will be drastically reduced in real terms further ahead.  We
shall analyze it scrupulously.

4.5% of the votes were declared void.  That would appear to be a small
number, but it translates into 42,925 persons having their votes thrown
out.  This is a higher figure than the populations of 91 of the
municipalities in the state (81.98%), who have fewer than that number of
residents.

Now let us look at the participation in the Consulta.  People in at least
38 "constitutional municipalities" (34.23% of the total) participated, with
a total of 461,179 votes.  This is more than the votes obtained by the PRI
in all the municipalities in the state in the last election.

Of the 86 municipalities "won" by the PRI, there were only a few in which
they won by a majority of the votes.  In 22 of them, there was a 10%
difference in votes, in comparison with their closest competitor (the PRD
in the majority of the cases, the PAN in the minority).  If we take into
account the great mechanisms of electoral fraud (and, in many cases, the
voided votes were enough to make the difference in the PRI win), the
official party would not, hypothetically, be governing these 22
municipalities, in real terms:  Altamirano (with a PRI margin of 8.8%, in
addition to 480 voided votes);  Amatenango del Valle (7.3%, with 122
voided);  Bejucal de Ocampo (3.5%, with 91 voided);  Cacahoatan (3.6% and
459 voided);  Coapilla (8.4% and 64 voided);  Chicomuselo (4.8% and 296
voided); Chilon (10.5% and 910 voided); La Grandeza (8.5% and 40 voided);
Huehuetan (4.2% and 310 voided), Huitiupan (7.1% and 397 voided);
Ixtacomitan (5.4% and 88 voided), Jiquipilas (1.9% and 411 voided); Las
Margaritas (13% with 946 voided); Mazatan (3.5% and 177 voided); Osumacinta
(0.8% and 28 voided); Cancuc (0.1% and 406 voided); Simojovel (1.6% and 641
voided); Sitala (4.9% and 88 voided); Tapachula (8.1% and 1931 voided);
Venustiano Carranza (8.7% and 710 voided); Acacoyagua (2.8% and 158 voided)
and Pijijiapan (9% and 450 voided).

And so the PRI would be hypothetically governing in 64 municipalities
(57.6% of the total), and not in 86 (77.47%).  And there is more:  this
hypothesis would change if we were to take into account another criteria or
factor:  the Consulta.

In at least 37 of the 86 PRI municipalities, the EZLN convened more people
for their Consulta than who had cast votes for the official party in the
election.  These are: Altamirano, Amatan, Amatenango del Valle, Arriaga,
Bochil, El Bosque, Chalchihuitan, Chanal, Chenalho, Chicomuselo, Chilon,
Frontera Comalapa, Huitiupan, Huixtan, La Independencia, Ixhuatan, Ixtapa,
Larrainzar, Las Margaritas, Nicolas Ruiz, Ocosingo, Ocotepec, Oxchuc,
Palenque, Pantelho, Pueblo Nuevo, Las Rosas, Salto de Agua, San Cristobal,
Cancuc, Sitala, Socoltenango, Soyalo, Tenejapa, La Trinitaria, Yajalon y
Escuintla.

>From this perspective, the PRI would only have relatively greater support
in 49 municipalities (44.14%).  In some municipalities, there was a
difference of from between 2 votes more for the Consulta than for the PRI -
as in Chanal - to 12,143 votes more, as in El Bosque, 21,399 more in
Tenejapa and 7250 in Ocosingo, to give just a few examples, and just the
votes in the civilian population, not counting zapatistas.  This is because
they reported on the vote total in all the Autonomous Municipalities, which
reached 158, 518, a figure that exceeded the total of all the votes
obtained by the small parties, and which would be very close to the total -
if we add the total votes gained by the PAN, PT, PDCh, PVEM and PFC - of
180,614.

Summing up, then, if we take the 86 municipalities supposedly "won" by the
PRI, and subtract those where they received less than 10% more than their
primary opponent - as well as those where the EZLN elicited more votes for
their Consulta than the total votes cast for the official party - there
would, hypothetically, then, be only 40 municipalities (36% of the total)
left in which they would be governing.  Of these, there are only 14
municipalities in which they won more than 50% of the votes:  Comitan, La
Concordia, Copainala, Ixtapangajoya, Juarez, San Fernando, San Lucas,
Solosuchiapa, Sunuapa, Tecpatan, Tzimol, Chamula, Tumbala and Sabanilla.
The majority of these are small municipalities.  Only one is significant
(Comitan), and in two of them the paramilitary group Peace and Justice
dominates (Sabanilla and Tumbala), as well as Chamula, which is
traditionally controlled by the PRI.

Of the 40 municipalities previously mentioned, the 26 where the PRI governs
with a small percentage and a very weak vote count are: : Acapetahua,
Amatenango de la Frontera, Angel Albino Corzo, Bella Vista, Catazaja,
Cintalapa, Chiapas de Corzo, Chiapilla, Frontera Hidalgo, Mazapa, Mitontic,
Pantepec, Pichucalco, El Porvenir, Reforma, Suchiate, Teopisca, Tila,
Tonala, Tuxtla Chico, Tuzantan, Venustiano Carranza, Villa Corzo,
Zinacantan, Motozintla y Siltepec.

Thus the official party's strength, in real terms, is:  14 municipalities
(12.61% of the total) in which they had more than 50% of the votes,
totaling 52,421 sympathizers (5.85% of all the votes cast in the state).

It is significant that the number of persons in Chiapas who participated in
the Consulta convened by the EZLN represents 51.53% of the total votes cast
in the last constitutional elections.  They were both democratic exercises,
the one controlled by the powers, and with hefty economic resources, and
the other organized by civil society, with a great capacity for mobilization.

This gradual decline in support for the PRI caused the government to walk a
tightrope in order to reinforce their legislative strategy that would give
legal justification to the subsequent period of violence and repression.
How would they recover the 16 councils being governed  by the PRD in the
Selva, Northern and Los Altos regions, key for strengthening the proposals?
 We shall not repeat the actions the interim governor carried out from
January to October 1998.  The only thing we wish to emphasize is that - in
contradiction to what we have expressed here concerning the Consulta - the
PRI recovered all these municipal presidencies, in an attempt to gain total
control.

As happened last year, audits are now being announced of municipalities
suspected of corruption, while other PRI municipal presidents are being
dismissed for extensive fraud.  The anti-constitutional, illegal and
anti-democratic manipulations of the town councils and other municipal
bodies is already well known.  It has been through alleged consultations
with these town councils, however, and through endorsements by the
municipal presidents, that the following have been approved:

1).  The Redistricting Law, officially creating, in a few days, seven new
municipalities, including Chenalho, Ocosingo, Angel Albino Corzo, Simojovel
and Larrainzar, with protest from opposition parties, who accuse the
interim governor of imposing unilateral measures and of violating the San
Andres Accords.  Residents of the community of Guaquitepec, Chilon, are now
refusing to accept their redistricting, in the face of government pressure.
 This speeding up of the creation of new municipalities will bring greater
poverty, through the lowering of existing municipalities' budgets, in order
for the new ones to create their infrastructures.  It will also lead to
more military and police camps in their municipal seats, following the
imposition of public security agreements.

These new, small municipalities - far from eradicating fincas - will create
new fincas of power and new "legal" strongholds for PRI, police and
military forces.  There will soon be more municipalities (but not more
people) being "governed" by the PRI And, following them will come the
justification to crush those Autonomous Municipalities who refuse to
incorporate themselves into the imposed legal structures.

2).  State Indigenous Rights and Culture Law, approved last week, again by
the PRI majority, and with the opposition parties against the measure.  And
so, all those proposals or actions in matters relating to this, will be
illegal and likely to be sorted out through violence by way of the "state
of law."

3).  Law for the Disarmament of Civilian Groups in Chiapas.  Already
approved by the State Congress.  It will offer impunity to paramilitary
groups.

In the context of this law, mention should be made of the internal
divisions within the Peace and Justice group over the last few days.  Their
leadership has been accused of the corrupt use of government funds and,
once again, of the collusion of another State PRI Deputy, Raymundo
Hernandez Trujillo, who is now being accused by members of the paramilitary
group itself.  They are also demanding the dismissal of their leader, and
they are threatening the PRI with not participating in the party's internal
elections, if their demands are not met.  They have been joined by members
of this group from Tila, Tumbala, Sabanilla and Salto de Agua, which, as we
have seen, are important political strongholds of the official party.

Another stronghold, however, is also in the balance:  Chamula.  This
municipality has been a PRI bastion, and it awarded the official party 8893
votes after interrupting the elections with impunity last year and managing
to void the count in their district.  It is now being assaulted by police
forces seeking to disarm the population, since tensions between traditional
Catholics and Evangelicals have reached such a point that the government
fears another incident such as Acteal.  It would be very difficult, again,
for the government to distance themselves from the PRI's, from the
administrative anomalies and from other illegalities that could come to
public light and which they have allowed.

The electoral trends are taking shape.  Gilberto de Los Santos - the
brother of Miguel de Los Santos, the defense attorney for the Cerro Hueco
political prisoners and former municipal president of the municipality of
Pijijiapan - is now the new leader of the State PRD.  Meanwhile, opposition
parties were able to agree for the need for an alliance in order to topple
the state party in 2000.  In Chiapas, the former PRI Senator and member of
Cocopa, Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia, who could emerge as the unity candidate,
is attracting support in many sectors.

In response to the above-mentioned trends, the legislative proposals point
towards a consolidation of the "legality" of repression, which should be
enjoyed by the state alone - in order to prevent the changes in electoral
reforms which opposition parties have been demanding in order to secure
more just and equitable elections.  Something new is emerging in society.
The end of the state apparatus is inevitably approaching. Hopefully this
process will not be at the cost of more blood.

All the same, the political parties do not legislate, they do not have the
credibility of the people and abstention is resounding.  The governor was
not popularly elected; he does not have the support of the majority of
chiapanecos; he is interim - and, in the eyes of other analysts, even
illegal.  According to the "Political Constitution of the Free and
Sovereign State of Chiapas," in order to be governor, one must "Have no
job, position or commission from the Federation or from the State, and, if
so, must resign and be separated from them for at least ninety days prior
to the election (Article 35, IV)."  Roberto Albores resigned from the
Cocopa and from his seat in Congress a few days prior to his appointment.
Nor does society  have the strength yet for any party in power to "govern
obeying," or to enforce the fulfillment of the zapatista Consulta and the
demands of the people to stop the war, hunger, misery and injustice.  Who
is governing in Chiapas?  It remains to us to analyze the Army.  That will
be the another issue.

Roberto Albores' government has launched a fierce and costly campaign in
the media, and now also on Televisa Azteca, which is trying to create an
illusion of political consensus for the PRI and for the actions of its
government.  This campaign includes the "shows" that are produced of
"thousands" of zapatistas joining official ranks, the agreements and the
phantom consultas, among other actions.  Let this analysis serve as an
attempt to destroy this illusion.

Abbreviations:
PAN (National Action Party)
PRI (Revolutionary Institutional Party)
PRD (Revolutionary Democratic Party)
PT (Labor Party)
PVEM (Ecology Green Party of Mexico)
PDCh (Democratic Chiapaneco Party)
PFC (Cardenista Front Party)

Gustavo Castro Soto

Center   of   Economic   and    Political    Investigations   of  Community
 Action,   A.C.
CIEPAC
CIEPAC, member of the "Convergence of Civil Organizations for Democracy"
National Network (CONVERGENCIA)

 ******************************************
Translated by irlandesa for CIEPAC, A.C.
******************************************

Note:  If you use this information, cite the source and our email address.
We are grateful to the persons and institutions who have given us their
comments on these Bulletins.  CIEPAC, A.C. is a non-government and
non-profit organization, and your support is necessary for us to be able to
continue offering you this news and analysis service.  If you would like to
contribute, in any amount, we would infinitely appreciate your sending to
the bank account in the name of:

CIEPAC, A.C.
Bank:  BANCOMER
Bank Account Number:  1003458-8
Branch:  437
San Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas, Mexico.
Thanks!

Note:  If you wish to be placed on a list to receive this English version
of the Bulletin, or the Spanish, or both, please direct a request to the
e-mail address shown below.  Indicate whether you wish to receive the email
or the "attached file" (Word 7 for Windows 95) version.

Email:
ciepac@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

VISIT OUR NEW WEB SITE:
http://www.ciepac.org   (Visit us:  We have new maps on the situation in
Chiapas)



_________________________________________________________________________

CIEPAC, A.C.
Center for Economic and Political Investigations of Political Action
Eje Vial Uno Numero 11
Col. Jardines de Vista Hermosa
29297 San Cristobal, Chiapas, MEXICO

Telephone/Fax:	In Mexico:	01 967 85832
Outside Mexico:      +52 967 85832

_____________________________________________________________________
CIEPAC, A.C.
Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Políticas de Acción Comunitaria
Eje Vial Uno Número 11
Col. Jardines de Vista Hermosa
29297 San Cristóbal, Chiapas, MEXICO

Tel/Fax:	en México	01 967 85832
		fuera de México	+52 967 85832
Página Web:	www.ciepac.org
________________________________________________________________________


     --- from list aut-op-sy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---