AUT: English Chiapas al Dia 161 I

[CIEPAC <ciepac@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

ENGLISH VERSION OF "CHIAPAS AL DIA" BULLETIN No. 161
CIEPAC
CHIAPAS, MEXICO
(July 9, 1999)


THE OTHER CHIAPAS IN FIGURES


The situation in the indigenous communities in Chiapas is not a secret to
anyone today. The state, national and international media, the Internet and
electronic mail from all parts of the world are constantly reporting what
we are describing here.  We have reviewed the Historic Archives of the
former National Intermediation Commission (CONAI), which is made up in very
large part of letters from the different communities, who were always
asking that body to use their good offices to act as an intermediary with
the government for the withdrawal of the police forces from their
communities.  The analysis here is based on those letters, copies of which
were usually forwarded to the corresponding government departments.  It is
therefore, not a secret to anyone.  We are simple taking up the task here
of ordering, writing about and interpreting the situation, according to the
voices of those without voice.

We know that, as civil society, we have the right and the freedom to know
and to write about what affects all of us, independent of whom it is about.
That is why we are taking it upon ourselves to talk about the occupation of
the chiapaneco land by institutions and police bodies foreign to the
indigenous communities and their impact on them.

This is how we discovered that there are 257 military and police
checkpoints in Chiapas, distributed in 63 municipalities, or, in 55.85% of
all the municipalities in the state.  They are distributed in the following
manner:

MEXICAN ARMY:  They are established in 161 locations in Chiapas,
representing 62.64% in relation to the municipalities and places where
other bodies are established in the state.  It is very difficult to speak
of an exact number of soldiers, since there are continuous troop replacements.

PUBLIC SECURITY POLICE:  This force is set up in 57 locations in chiapaneco
communities, representing 22.17% of the control points counted here.

NATIONAL IMMIGRATION INSTITUTE:   This institution increased its level of
activities following the Intergalactic Encuentros convoked by the
zapatistas in August 1996.  After April 11, 1998, however, they set
themselves up at strategic points, as a result of the dismantling of the
"Ricardo Flores Magon" Autonomous Municipality, in the constitutional
municipality of Ocosingo.  Twelve Spanish and US foreigners were expelled
from there.  Today, this body is located in 24 places, representing 9.33%,
in relation to the total of the police and military forces present in
Chiapas.  It would appear that it has carried out the role assigned to it.
According to the US organization Global Exchange, in its "Foreigners of
Conscience" report:  in 1998, 70 foreigners had been expelled from the
country prior to the issuing of the report. 144 had been given official
departure letters, that is, the official argument being that they had been
invited to leave the country, which is nothing more than disguised
expulsion.  However, those expelled in 1994 should also be remembered,
beginning with Frederico (without his last names being remembered today), a
Belgian, who was in Chiapas in solidarity, helping the Guatemalan refugee
camps.  Among others to be noted would be those from 1995-1997 and thus far
in 1999.  There have been more than 200.   The argument that has been used
is that they were involved in the country's domestic policies, and Article
133 of the Constitution and the General Residence Law were applied.

PGR and PJE:  These forces are present in 13 locations, strategically
placed, representing 5.05% of the total.  We will not deal here with their
establishment in urban areas.

SPECIAL FORCES:   Regarding these types of forces, we are referring to
Force and Reaction, a dependency of the state Attorney General's Office.
They are - according to what we have seen and to reports in the state press
- located at the entrance to the Venustiano Carranza municipality and also
at the Chivero in the San Cristobal municipality.  That is, in two places
and representing 0.77% of the total.  It should be noted that the
information regarding this force is from 1996 and was reported in the state
press.

The total number of forces accounted for here is 257.  It is possible that
there are more forces in place, but this is what has been reported by the
communities and reviewed today from the Historical Archive of the former
National Intermediation Commission (CONAI).

According to descriptions from the communities - in their letters where
they ask for the withdrawal of the army and of other police forces - there
are 26 permanent checkpoints in the municipalities of Ocosingo, Las
Margaritas, Chenalho, Larrainzar, El Bosque, Palenque and Frontera
Comalapa.  The other locations are barracks, camps or places from which
flights, patrols, military supervision, etcetera, are controlled.

Public Security forces are established in sites throughout the area of
zapatista support bases, that is, outside those municipalities taken by the
EZLN on January 1, 1994, such as Chenalho in Los Altos, the municipalities
of the Northern zone, and others in the Central.  Meanwhile, in February
1995, the army took possession of the land that the EZLN had under its
control, primarily in the Selva and Los Altos.

Some police and military forces are established in the Coastal and Isthmus
zones, as part of the cordon set up to reinforce the containment wall for
the undocumented in that zone, whose final destination is the United
States.  According to reports from the National Immigration Institute,
there have been around 28,000 undocumented persons detained and deported to
their countries of origin during the first six months of 1999, most of them
Central and South Americans.

Some of the Central Valleys do not have as much police and military
presence, but they do not need to be controlled politically, since they are
already controlled through the Campesino Teachers Solidarity Organization
(SOCAMA), that is tied to the PRI

(In order to better visualize what we are describing in this part, we
suggest you look at the militarization map on our web page:
www.ciepac.org.  The green dots correspond to army positions in 1994,  the
red dots from February 1995 to the present;  blue is the Public Security
police and yellow the NII).

In June of 1999, a new strategy was begun regarding the conflict in
Chiapas:  the attempt has been made to destroy the EZLN as the interlocutor
for national transformations, and reduce it to a state force, so that their
demands would be dealt with locally.  This is why the Public Security
Police went into action in Las Canadas of the Selva, so that the army would
not be so visible.  The army has not withdrawn, it has rather formed a
containment wall for the State Police.  And thus the statement by Governor
Roberto Albores, saying to Subcomandante Marcos that it is now "the time to
negotiate."  In addition to this there has been the federal government
policy of promoting reforms in indigenous matters in all the states, in
order to invalidate the San Andres Accords and to take away from the
Federal Congress the Constitutional reforms regarding the accords signed
between the EZLN and the government, in matters of Indigenous Rights and
Culture.

OCCURRENCES FROM YEAR TO YEAR

>From the time of the armed uprising in January of 1994, through February
1995, the communities reported 74 control points and locations where the
army was established, especially around the area controlled by the EZLN.
>From February 1995 through December 1996, as a product of the military
offensive, the army set up in 94 places, primarily in territory the EZLN
had under its control in the Selva Lacandona.  There had been an increase
of 127.02% since 1994.  From January 1997 through June 1998, the army set
up in 45 places, primarily in the months of January, February and March
[1998], in the Chenalho area, following the Acteal massacre.  This
represented an increase of 40.69% in militarization and the establishment
of police forces compared to the previously noted period.  Thus far in
1999, the army and different police forces, public security police and the
National Immigration Institute have established themselves in 20 more
locations, primarily in the Selva Lacandona, the Northern zone and Los
Altos of Chiapas, representing a 10% increase in relation to the previous
period noted here.

It is true that the EZLN declared war on the Mexican army on January 1,
1994, and the government has justified the excessive militarization because
of that.  As long as the EZLN does not withdraw, the army will not be
leaving the communities.  The number of military personnel is excessive,
and their actions are not helping find a solution to the armed conflict.
The problem is that the government is not paying any attention to the
demands that gave rise to the armed conflict:  land, health, education,
work, independence, democracy, justice, liberty, housing, food, autonomy,
etcetera.  The investments - of which there is so much talk - have more to
do with counterinsurgency, political favoritism in the run-up to the next
election and the feigning of the self disarmament by EZLN members.  La
Jornada recently revealed, on June 29, 1999, that the Alternative
Consultancy A.C. (a purported NGO directed by the sister of Adolfo Orive,
the former coordinator of advisors for the Department of Government, and
now member of Francisco Labastida Ochoa's campaign team) will be investing
108,860,564 pesos for the Selva Lacandona ( loans from the World Bank to
Mexico).  This is nothing more than counterinsurgency taxes that hope to
rebuild the PRI prior to the elections.  It is also an attempt to take
support away from the EZLN and to rebuild the Rural Association of
Collective Interests (ARIC) Official.  The latter have been the shock
troops against the zapatistas, the ARIC Independent and Democratic and the
Union of Unions, among others, who make up the Coalition of Autonomous
Organizations of Ocosingo (COAO) and the CIOAC in the region of Las
Margaritas.

THE MUNICIPALITIES WITH THE GREATEST PRESENCE

The municipalities with the greatest police and military presence are
Ocosingo, with 37;  Chenalho, 27;  Las Margaritas, 20;  Tila, 20;
Venustiano Carranza, 10;  San Cristobal de Las Casas, 9;  Palenque, 8;
Angel Albino Corzo, 7;  Motozintla, 6;  Altamirano, 5;  Cintalapa, 5;
Tapachula, 5;  San Andres Larrainzar, 4 and Sabanilla, 4.

THE IMPACT OF A RECKLESS STRATEGY

In the Economic Arena:
	Destruction of maize, beans, coffee harvests, and others.  Creation of an
artificial market for street vendors and for those women who wash clothes
for the police forces;  at the checkpoints, the continuous searches of
basic needs items that the indigenous buy in the municipal seats;  control
of the sale of basic needs products in rural CONASUPO shops, that is, the
store manager asks for identification and sells without any problems to
those with PRI credentials;  excessive felling of trees for the
construction of military barracks and camps;  invasion of communal lands
without the indigenous having the opportunity to reclaim them;  delivery of
aid to communities who are identified with, or who are members of, the PRI;
 delivery of sweets and money to minors, in order for them to inform on
those who belong to the EZLN or to independent organizations;  transfer of
the communities' coffee harvests to the municipal seats for their
marketing, among other things;  and the establishment of a police military
encirclement of growing lands.

In the Political Arena:
	Harassment and repression of communities who do not belong to the PRI;
control of strategic roads and highways through permanent and intermittent
checkpoints;  location of leaders of opposition campesino organizations;
intimidation of the communities' catechists and religious authorities;
constant overflights and patrols;  support for Public Security Police and
PRI groups in the dismantling of Autonomous Municipalities, among other
things.

In the Social Arena:
	Introduction of alcoholism, drug addiction and prostitution into the
communities;  with the consequent resulting venereal and infectious
diseases;  the depositing of garbage and condoms in the streams;  delivery
of economic aid, food, haircuts, the painting of schools, medical services,
etcetera, especially to PRI members;  the inducement of girls and women in
the rural communities into prostitution;  accompanying PRI members and
Public Security Police when they have taken over and destroyed Catholic
Churches belonging to the Diocese of San Cristobal;  there are various
places where they are installed in schools, occupying a space where the
classrooms should be being used by children, among other things.  It is
sufficient to mention the example of the Health Center in the municipal
seat of Sabanilla, that is converted, today, into a Public Security Police
detachment.

The consequences for the communities have been:  the breaking of the
community social fabric;  the breaking of the unity of social organizations
and worsening of internal conflicts;  the creation of a military siege and
a siege of hunger, that seeks to weaken the resistance of the indigenous
peoples and communities;  an attempt to control traditional and religious
authorities, for the purpose of wresting strength and authority from the
Diocese of San Cristobal;  creating fear and terror among the people, for
the purpose of undermining moral resistance;  at the same time, destroying
the values that give unity and strength to the communities;  increase in
human rights violations;  increase in illiteracy;  increase in crime rates
and social backwardness in the communities, among many other things.

GENERAL COMMENTS

The problem of militarization has structural causes, that is, as the
Mexican government and the PRI have been losing consensus within the
population, there are more obstacles in place for implementation and
operation of the neoliberal program.  One of those obstacles is the
struggle and resistance of the indigenous peoples in opposition to the Free
Trade Treaty [NAFTA], signed between the United States, Canada and Mexico.
Militarization is not just a problem in Chiapas.  It exists all over the
country, especially in the states of Oaxaca, Guerrero, Puebla, Hidalgo,
Veracruz, San Luis Potosi, Monterrey, and others.  Whether or not insurgent
movements exist, social discontent is increasing in the country, with the
official response being the occupation of indigenous and non-indigenous
lands.  The military is increasingly occupying spaces in institutions
responsible for public security.  The clearest example of this is that of
the 5000 soldiers recently transferred to the preventive police (Excelsior,
7/9/99).

Responding to the demands of social organizations and of various sectors of
society with militarization is not the solution.  On the contrary, it leads
to polarization in society, the creation of vacuums that are filled
primarily by criminals and organized crime.  It is enough to mention the
recent "assault" on the Presidential General Staff and a Public Security
barracks.  Militarization and the creation of more police forces will not
do away with this problem.  The culture of corruption must be eradicated,
the repression, the deception and the lie, in all spheres and at all levels
of government in the country.  The measures taken up to now have been
ineffective.  On the contrary, they have caused a greater deterioration,
not just in social relations, but also in the government police forces,
such as the SEDESOL and the NII in the Selva.  These groups are nothing
more than white elephants, without credibility or trust, because they have
only served to strengthen the PRI.  One of the most serious threats is the
underlying threat of a war of greater magnitude and its social
consequences.  Acting out of a thirst for revenge, or treating
organizations and communities as enemies, is not the solution either.  They
are Mexican citizens, after all, who do not agree with the way of life they
have.  They want to change, and the solution to their problems should be
effected without political cronyism.  They should be treated as human
beings, in all aspects.  The disarmament show and the announcement of great
investment programs are only cosmetics for the government's image, not
solutions to the ancestral causes which have given rise to a series of
conflicts.


Onesimo Hidalgo

Center   of   Economic   and    Political    Investigations   of  Community
 Action,   A.C.
CIEPAC
CIEPAC, member of the "Convergence of Civil Organizations for Democracy"
National Network (CONVERGENCIA)

 ******************************************
Translated by irlandesa for CIEPAC, A.C.
******************************************

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